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Abstract
The first chapter presents a model in which a principal requires an agent to work on multiple
tasks, which require varying levels of effort. Initially the appropriate actions are unknown to
the principal and so he cannot monitor the agent's effort; however he may succeed in learning
the game over time. I provide conditions that ensure full learning and cooperation on all
tasks. If these conditions are not met, then the performance of the relationship may depend
critically on the order in which tasks are first required and on whether early attempts are
successful. We may therefore see variation in long-run performance amongst partnerships
facing an identical environment.
The second chapter considers the role that mission statements made by firms may play
in influencing workers' expectations, and whether these mission statements may thereby
constitute informative cheap-talk. I consider a setting in which firms send costless mission
statements at the start of the game, then with positive probability have an opportunity to
send a costly signal of their type at a later stage. I show that this can generate informative
cheap-talk in environments in which, absent the prospect of a costly signal, cheap-talk
messages would otherwise be uninformative. However firms will face a welfare trade-off
between informative communication and costly signaling, and moreover may be constrained
in their ability to adapt to changing circumstances.
In the third chapter I present a model of relational contracting in which the principal's
type determines the probability that effort generates high output, and where this type is
private information. In this setting the bonus payments will be driven by the agent's beliefs,
and by the principal's desire to signal her type. I show that we will expect to see higher bonus
payments following a run of poor output, given the need to restore the agent's confidence.
I then consider an extension in which the agent receives a signal about the performance of
the principal's competitors, and so the principal will be under more pressure to "match the
market". I argue that this model may explain the dynamics of bonus payments following
recessions.
Thesis Supervisor: Robert Gibbons
Title: Professor
Thesis Supervisor: Glenn Ellison
Title: Professor
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Chapter 1
Learning to Cooperate: Building
Relational Contracts in Environments
with Imperfect Monitoring
1.1 Introduction
There is an extensive literature in economics showing that even in the absence of formal
contracting and incentives it may be possible for parties to sustain a cooperative outcome in
an infinitely repeated game through a relational contract. However this implicitly assumes
that it is clear to both parties what constitutes cooperation. Often, however, cooperative
behaviour may be hard to define. This may be because workers are unfamiliar with a partic-
ular environment or task, and need time to experiment before they can provide consummate
effort, or because workers are unwilling to invest costly effort in a project until they are
sure that it is necessary and worthwhile. In both these cases we may imagine that actions
could be misinterpreted, potentially leading to the breakdown of a relationship. However
if a partnership has survived these initial hurdles then as time goes on and those involved
have a better understanding of the others' behaviour it should become easier to maintain a
cooperative relationship.
In this paper I propose a model of relational contracting in an infinitely repeated game
in which a risk-neutral principal and agent must collaborate on a finite number of tasks, one
of which will be required in each period. These tasks will differ in the level of effort that
they require from the agent: some tasks require only a minimal level of effort, which I will
assume is costless, others require the agent to take a more costly action. If the agent takes
the appropriate action, then the task will be completed successfully with positive probability;
if she takes the incorrect action then there is no chance of success. The cost of effort and
the probability of success are such that it is optimal for the agent to supply effort on all
tasks. I will assume that the principal can observe the agent's actions, and whether or not
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the task is a success, but does not know the mapping from tasks to correct actions. This,
combined with the fact that taking the correct action cannot guarantee a success, means
that the principal cannot perfectly monitor the agent's behaviour. The paper proposes an
environment without formal contracting and with limited liability on the part of the agent,
and so the means through which the principal can provide the correct incentives to the agent
are limited to the promise of non-negative monetary transfers and the threat of terminating
the relationship.
As an example of a setting in which we may expect there to be asymmetric information
regarding what constitutes the appropriate level of effort we could consider the R&D process.
Different stages of a project may require different levels of effort and whilst at times the
agent would be expected to be very busy, at other times she may be waiting for results
and thus appear to be supplying less effort. If the principal is unfamiliar with the particular
research process then he may be unable to tell whether the agent is behaving correctly, given
what the project requires, or whether she is shirking. Moreover, the inherent uncertainty
involved in R& D projects means that the principal cannot necessarily attribute the failure
of a project to the agent's actions. However as the principal gains in experience and has
observed the outcomes of earlier projects, he is able to monitor the agent's behaviour more
closely. We could also think about modelling a more basic manufacturing procedure, such
as a production line, in this manner. Whilst quotidian tasks may require little input from
the agent, at times she may be required to put in extra effort in order to resolve a problem
or increase the efficiency of the process. Although the principal can observe when this extra
effort is supplied, if he cannot identify the situations in which the agent should be supplying
a higher level of effort then he cannot identify whether failures are due to the agent shirking,
or to chance. Once again, as the principal observes more of the agent's behaviour in different
situations, and the outcomes of her actions, he is better able to monitor her effort in the
future.
To analyse this model, I will begin by considering the full-information benchmark in
which the actions required on each task are common knowledge, and show that in this
setting cooperation on all tasks can be sustained if the discount factor is sufficiently high.
Failing this, it may be possible to achieve cooperation on only the costless tasks; it will never
be optimal to work only on a subset of the costly tasks. I then turn to the case with imperfect
monitoring and I show that in this setting there will be values of the discount factor a for
which full cooperation on all tasks is possible in the game with full information, but cannot
be achieved in the game with private information. In particular, I show that there are three
potential causes of inefficiency or relationship breakdown: (i) following certain histories the
parties' beliefs about the future surplus of the relationship may drop to a level at which
they no longer wish to continue the game, even if there is in fact sufficient surplus to sustain
cooperation; (ii) the agent may attempt to deceive the principal about the true value of the
relationship in order to extract more surplus, making the principal skeptical of her behaviour
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even if she is behaving truthfully; and (iii) the principal may be unable to elicit effort on
a particular task without using the threat of termination. Any one of these factors could
generate an outcome in which the principal and the agent either terminate the relationship
entirely, or work only on a subset of tasks. Moreover, I show that the eventual outcome is
highly dependent not only on the realised costs of tasks, but on the order in which they
are required and whether early attempts are successful. I go on to show that relaxing the
restrictions on the equilibrium to allow for a "probationary period" during which the agent
is not expected to provide costly effort will alleviate some of these problems and reduce the
discount factor necessary to induce cooperation, however it will not return the relationship
to the full-information level of efficiency.
Given that eventual outcomes are highly dependent on initial draws in this setting,
this model may provide a possible explanation for the differences we see in performance
amongst firms that operate in the same industries. These large differences in performance
have been shown to exist even in narrowly defined industries and amongst firms producing
homogeneous goods (Foster et al. 2008, Syverson 2004). Moreover, these differences have
been shown to be highly persistent over time (Melitz 2003, Baily et al., 1992, Foster et al.,
2006). This paper suggests that these differences may arise if some firms draw costly tasks
at the start of the game, before they are sufficiently confident of the value of the relationship.
These differences in eventual outcomes could also occur if some firms are unsuccessful on
early tasks, whereas others are successful. These gaps in performance may occur even if the
set of tasks (and the costs of those tasks) is identical across firms. The paper goes on to
ask whether the gaps in performance can be closed if firms can observe something about the
performance of other firms in the industry. That is, is it easier to sustain cooperation in this
game if the parties involved can infer something about the total value of the relationship
from the behaviour of others?
The paper proceeds as follows. The next section sets out the related literature. In section
3 I describe the model, and analyse two benchmark cases against which I evaluate the the
performance of the partnership. Section 4 provides the main results of the paper, which
are then illustrated through two examples in section 5. Section 6 returns to the question of
persistent performance differences and considers whether allowing firms to observe a coarse
indicator of other, more successful, firms' behaviour can enable them to close the gap in
performance. Section 7 concludes.
1.2 Related Literature
This paper builds on the literature on relational contracts in its analysis of the provision
of incentives in a repeated game in which output is not contractible. In the later stages of
the game, once the mapping from actions to output on each task is common knowledge, the
problem for the firm is one of incentive provision, similar to that in Levin (2003). The earlier
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stages of the game, however, share more characteristics with the work on imperfect public
monitoring (Fudenberg-Levine-Maskin 1994, Green and Porter 1984) in which players only
observe an imperfect signal of others' actions and use this imperfect signal to infer deviations,
meaning that with positive probability punishments may occur on the equilibrium path. In
this setting the principal observes actions perfectly, but does not initially know the mapping
from actions to output; imperfect monitoring comes from the fact that the principal cannot
distinguish whether a failure was due to the agent shirking or to chance.
This paper can also be related to the literature on establishing collusion across multiple
markets, as in Bernheim and Whinston (1990). As in that paper, in this setting slackness in
incentive constraints in certain markets, or on certain tasks, can be used to enforce collusive
behaviour in other markets or tasks. This may make it possible to sustain cooperative
behaviour for values of the discount factor for which it would not be possible to do so were
markets treated independently. This paper adds the problem of imperfect monitoring, and
shows that the need to provide incentives on other tasks may in fact hamper the principal's
ability to enforce cooperation on a new task.
Another paper that deals with the problem of establishing a cooperative relationship in
a setting in which there is asymmetric information about what such cooperation entails is
Chassang (2010). That paper also has the result that inefficient termination may occur on
the equilibrium path, and that different partnerships may end up facing different outcomes
as a result of the early history of the game. This paper differs from Chassang's in that it
allows for the principal to promise variable transfers based on output. Moreover this paper
also incorporates a priori uncertainty about the expected surplus from the relationship, and
so the asymmetry of information between the principal and the agent extends to the total
value of the relationship, as well as the actions required in any particular period.
Other papers have also explored cooperation games in settings in which there is uncer-
tainty amongst agents regarding the appropriate actions required to generate a success. For
example Crawford and Haller (1990) consider an environment in which players know the
mapping from actions to payoffs but lack any means of communicating their strategy to
the other players, meaning that experimentation is required at the start of the game, but
cooperation becomes easier as the game proceeds and parties can communicate by referring
to the history of the game. Blume and Franco (2007) analyse a somewhat similar game in
which the mapping from actions to payoffs is initially completely unknown, and in addition
players lack the means to describe their actions or strategies to other players; optimal exper-
imentation in this context requires that each player switches actions with some probability
in each period. More closely related to this paper, Blume, Franco and Heidhues (2012) ex-
tend the previous model to allow each player to have some private signal about the correct
action to be taken, the optimal strategy must now incorporate this information. In this
paper the interests of the players are fully aligned, but they are unable to commicate their
informative. This paper differs from these mentioned since it adds an incentive problem:
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whilst one player has (initially incomplete) information about the mapping from actions to
payoffs, this player may have an incentive to conceal that information. Later sections of
this paper consider whether more formal rules concerning experimentation can alleviate the
incentive problem.
1.3 Model
A principal (he) and an agent (she) are required to work together on a series of tasks.
Let the set of tasks be denoted by 7 = {1, ..., n}. In each period one task is drawn at
random. The probability that task i is drawn in any period is aj, where E> ai = 1. These
probabilities are independent and identical over time. Each task requires that the agent
take an appropriate action. Assume for simplicity that the agent has two available actions:
a E & = {ao, ac}, where ao denotes the costless or default action, and ac denotes the
costly action, with c(ac) = c. If the agent takes the correct action, then the task will be
successful with probability q < 1; otherwise the task will fail. Let the probability that the
task requires the costly action be p. If the task is successful then value 1 accrues to the
principal. Assume that q > c, and so total expected surplus is maximised by having the
agent take the correct action on all tasks. Let C E W = {0, c} denote a particular cost
profile, that is, C = (ai, ... , a,,) indicates the appropriate action on each task. Further, let y
represent the total fraction of tasks which are costly, y = Ei ail{ai = ac}.
The information and contracting environment is as follows: in each period t both the
principal and the agent observe the task drawn, the action taken by the agent at, and
output yt E {0, 1}. However neither the action nor output are contractible. Assume that
when task i is first drawn, the agent learns the appropriate action for that task aj, but that
this is not observed by the principal. If a success is observed on task i, then, knowing the
action taken by the agent, the principal learns aj; however if a task is unsuccessful then
the principal cannot distinguish between the agent having taken the incorrect action, and
the agent taking the correct action but being unsuccessful. There is no formal contract
available to the principal, but he may promise a bonus payment ri to the agent if the task
is successful. I will assume that the agent has a limited liability constraint and so transfers
must be non-negative.
The relationship thus faces two potential issues. Firstly, the principal and the agent are
unable to contract on actions or output, therefore any bonus payments can only be sustained
through the threat of termination of the relationship. This bounds the amount that it is
credible for the principal to pay. Secondly, the principal cannot fully monitor the agent's
actions, since he does not initially know which actions are appropriate.
The relationship is modelled as an infinitely repeated game. In each period, the following
stage game occurs:
1. The principal offers the agent a relational contract, which the agent may accept or
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reject. If the agent rejects, both players receive their outside option.
2. A task i is drawn, and observed by both the principal and the agent.
3. If the task i has not previously been encountered, the agent learns the appropriate
action a(i) E {ao, ac}.
4. The agent chooses an action a E {ao, ac} at a cost c(a). This action is observed by
both the principal and the agent.
5. Output y E {0, 1} is realised, and observed by both parties.
6. The principal may make a transfer r to the agent.
7. Payoffs are received.
Both the principal and the agent are assumed to be risk neutral. The agent's expected
utility in each period is therefore her expected transfer, net of any costs of effort. The
principal's profit is his expected surplus net of transfers paid to the agent. Assume that the
principal and the agent share a common discount factor 6. Let the agent's outside option
have a net present value of U0, and the principal's outside option have a net present value
of 11o; assume that -c + 77 2 (1 - 6)(IHo + Uo) and therefore it is efficient for the principal
and the agent to work together even if all tasks are costly.
1.3.1 Benchmark Cases
Before proceeding to analyse the full model with private information and no formal contracts,
it is worth relaxing these assumptions in order to create a benchmark against which to
evaluate the efficiency of the equilibrium in the game with private information. I will consider
both the benchmark in which output is perfectly contractible, and then the case in which
output is non-contractible, but the correct action on each task is common knowledge.
The first benchmark case is that in which output is fully contractible. Since both are
risk-neutral, the principal can use an optimal incentive contract to induce the agent to take
the correct actions, even though the principal cannot contract directly on the action. For
example, the first-best can be achieved by having the principal pay a transfer TFB following
any success, where r > max{c/q, (,yc + (1 - J)Uo)/q}. Setting TFB ? c/ ensures that the
agent will take the costly action when appropriate, whilst TPB (yc + (1 - 6)Uo)/7 ensures
that the agent is willing to remain in the relationship.
The other benchmark that may be considered is the game with full information, that is,
the game in which the principal knows C and so can fully monitor the agent's actions. Al-
though the principal and the agent cannot formally contract in this setting, for a sufficiently
high discount value 6 they may be able to ensure cooperation through a relational contract.
In this case, following Levin (2004), a stationary relational contract can do as well as any
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other contract. Let the contract take the following form: the agent will take the appropriate
action in every period, and the principal will pay a bonus Ti if the task is a success. In this
setting with perfect monitoring there need not be any punishment on the equilibrium path,
and therefore the optimal relational contract can maximise punishments for deviation by
having the relationship be terminated whenever either the agent takes the incorrect action,
or the principal fails to pay the appropriate transfer.
The following conditions are necessary to sustain the correct actions: the agent must be
willing to take the costly action whenever appropriate, and the principal must be willing to
pay the specified transfer. The former condition requires that:
-ci + ?ri + JEU > SUo, (1.1)
and the latter that:
-Ti + SE > Pi0, (1.2)
for all i.
Proposition 1. The maximal payoff that can be generated by a relational contract can be
achieved by a contract that sets Ti = T for all i, j.
Proof. Combining the two constraints (1.1) and (1.2) above, we know that the relationship
can be sustained on a given task i only if
-(EU - Uo)+ (EU - Ho)
Since y < 1, it is therefore optimal to shift surplus from the principal to the agent, subject to
the constraint that - maxi{T} +6EH> 61 o. This can be achieved by having the principal's
constraint bind for all i, implying that ri = r, for all i, j.
The intuition for this result is that if the principal's payment constraint doesn't bind for
all ri, that is, if there is slack in this constraint for certain -ri, then this should be transferred
to the agent in order to increase her continuation value. Although doing so will reduce the
principal's future surplus, and hence the maximum transfer that he is willing to pay, for
7 < 1 this reduction in a particular transfer is less than the gain to the agent through future
surplus, and this will increase the set of values of 6 for which the agent can be induced to
supply costly effort.
Therefore the optimal relational contract under full information has the principal pay
a transfer T to the agent following any success, even on a costless tasks. Letting y denote
the fraction of tasks that require the agent to take the costly action, the constraints above
become:
-c-+ 17T+(± g)26o
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-7-+ 6 T(1 - T) 2 611o.
-T+
The relationship can therefore be sustained under full information whenever there exists T
such that
c(1 - J + J-7) + Uo6(1 - J) < og< 7 - Hoo6(1 - 6)(13
< -< -8 . (1.3)
Therefore, for a given fraction of costly tasks y, the relationship can be sustained under
full information for all 6 > , where '*, is found by having the two constraints above hold
with equality. These cutoffs are increasing in y: a higher fraction of costly tasks decreases
the total surplus from the relationship, making it more difficult to elicit effort on these tasks.
For ' < '* cooperation on all tasks will not be possible. In this case the principal and
the agent may be able to achieve a partial level of success by agreeing to work only on the
costless tasks. However they cannot do better by only working on a subset of the costly
tasks: given that q > c, all tasks generate positive surplus in expectation, so eliminating
certain costly tasks only reduces total surplus, it does not make it easier to provide the
correct incentives on the remaining costly tasks.
The agent can be persuaded to remain in the relationship and work on the costless tasks
if the expected surplus from doing so exceeds her outside option:
7)r ± 1-(1 - y)?)r 'Uo,
1 - - q 
U
where the promised transfers must be incentive compatible for the principal:
(1-7)7(1 - T) 6Ho.
1-8
Combining these constraints, cooperation can be sustained if there is some T that satisfies:
Uo < r < (1.4)
1-7 - - I - + 6(1 - Y)77
which yields a series of cutoffs {60}, where ' < * for all y, for which cooperation can be
sustained only on the fraction 1 - -y of costless tasks.
1.4 Equilibrium in the game with private information
I now turn to the game with private information, and show that for sufficiently high ' it
is possible to obtain the same level of performance as in the game with full information.
I then consider lower values of the discount factor, and show that there exist parameter
values for which optimal performance is possible in the game with full information, but the
relationship may be terminated inefficiently or operate at a lower level of output when the
correct actions are not common knowledge.
In the game with private information the principal does not initially know C, but may
16
learn it over time, after which cooperation can be sustained as in the full information case
above. In the interim, the principal cannot perfectly monitor the agent's behaviour but
can use transfers and the threat of termination to induce the agent to cooperate. Since the
principal cannot distinguish between the agent correctly taking the costless action but being
unsuccessful, and the agent shirking, she may need to punish the agent whenever he takes
the costless action without success. The principal can either punish the agent by reducing
expected surplus through the reduction of transfers on other tasks in the futures, or through
the threat of terminating the relationship altogether.
I look for a Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium of this game, and will first consider an equilib-
rium which is also subject to the following conditions: (i) the agent always takes the correct
action a(i) = C(i); (ii) if a success is realised on task i, the principal pays a transfer Ti(ht);
(iii) if at any time s task i is drawn and the agent took action a8 (i), then if at any time
t > s task i is drawn and the agent takes an action at(i) : a,(i) then the relationship is
terminated; and (iv) if the principal fails to pay the specified transfer following a success
then the relationship is terminated. That is, I will first look for an equilibrium in which the
agent takes the correct actions from the start of the game, and the relationship is terminated
if she ever changes her action on a particular task. I later relax this assumption to consider
an equilibrium in which the agent is allowed to shirk on costly tasks at the start of the game
while she obtains information about C.
1.4.1 First-Best
For sufficiently high 6, the principal and the agent may be able to sustain correct behaviour
on all tasks without any risk of the relationship breaking down on the equilibrium path.
Since neither the principal nor the agent know how many tasks will require the costly action
there is initial uncertainty about the value of the relationship, and so for any 6 < 6o there
is a positive probability that C will be such that full cooperation cannot be sustained even
under full information. It is only for 6 ;> 6 that the principal and the agent can be sure that
the relationship will succeed under full information, for any draw of tasks. In this case there
is sufficient surplus to ensure cooperation on all tasks in the game with private information,
and there will be no risk of the relationship breaking down.
Proposition 2. For 6 > 6 there exists {ri}iE. such that agent supplies the correct level of
effort at(i) = ai on all tasks i.
Proof. This result can be shown by constructing an equilibrium which satisfies the following
properties: (i) the agent always takes the correct action; (ii) the principal pays a transfer
Tc = c+Uo(1-3) if the agent takes a costly action and is successful, and a transfer ro = WU
if the agent takes a costless action and is successful; and (iii) the agent quits if the principal
fails to pay the transfer when appropriate.
In order to ensure that the agent takes the correct action a' on task i, then we require,
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for any prior history ht, that
-c(af)+ Tc+ E[U(ht , at(i))Iat(i) = ai] max{O+6E[U(ht , at(i))|at(i) $ ai], 6Uo}, (1.5)
where E[U(ht, at(i))Iat(i) = ai] is the agent's expected continuation value from taking ac-
tion at on task i, conditional on the correct action being ai. Since -c c 2TC > 0 the expected
payoff from correctly taking the costly action on task i in the current period exceeds the
payoff from deviating. Moreover, the principal can ensure that E[U(ht, at(i)), at(i) = ai] >
E[U(ht, at(i))|at(i) = ai] by making the agent's expected payoffs on all tasks j # i inde-
pendent of the outcome of task i. Therefore this transfer -c is sufficient to induce the agent
to take the costly action when appropriate. If we turn to the tasks for which the costless
action is appropriate, we need to ensure that the agent does not quit the relationship:
7ro + SE[U(ht , at(i))Iat(i) = ai] 2 SUo.
For the specified transfers, it must be the case that E[U(ht, at(i))Iat(i) = a2 ] > 0, and there-
fore the transfer To = 6 is sufficient to ensure that the agent remains in the relationship.
It remains to check that the principal is willing to pay these transfers whenever appro-
priate. This requires that
- max{-rc, ro} + 6EH(ht) > 61io.
We know that Tc > ro, and therefore that EH <;~ 6(1 - Tc). A sufficient condition for the
principal to be willing to pay these transfers is therefore that:
6
T± 1 - 6 ?lT) lI
where Tc - c+Uo6(1-6). But from the full information case, we know that R* is the discount
'7
factor for which this expression will hold with equality, and therefore full cooperation can
be assured on any draw of tasks for any 6 > J. E
The intuition for this result is that if the discount factor is sufficiently high that the
principal can commit to a transfer that will induce effort if all tasks are costly, then that
same transfer can be used on a task-by-task basis to induce the agent to take the correct
action. There is therefore no need to use the surplus generated on the costless tasks to cross-
subsidise the agent on the costly tasks. Whilst the agent still faces a temptation to shirk
since the principal cannot identify this as incorrect behaviour, shirking will never generate
a success whereas the expected transfer from taking the (correct) costly action exceeds the
immediate cost.
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1.4.2 Second-Best
In this section I consider values of 6 for which it is not possible to sustain the relationship if
all tasks are costly, and so there is uncertainty about whether the relationship will survive.
Moreover, it may be necessary to cross-subsidize tasks: that is, to use the surplus generated
on costless tasks to provide the incentives necessary to induce effort on costly tasks. I
will begin by considering the subgame in which only one task remains unknown to the
principal, and show that it may not be possible to provide the necessary incentives on this
task without using the threat of inefficient termination. I then extend this argument to the
general case, and show that the uncertainty about the surplus generated will add another
source of inefficiency
It is worth noting that for any 6 < 6* there will always be some risk of efficient termi-
nation on the equilibrium path. That is, if C is such that cooperation cannot be sustained
under full information, then the relationship must also break down in the game with private
information. However there is also a positive probability of inefficient termination on the
equilibrium path. There are three possible sources of this inefficiency. The first source of
inefficiency somes from the uncertainty about C, and hence about the true value of the
relationship. Even if C is such that cooperation could be maintained under full information,
following certain histories the parties' beliefs about the future surplus may drop to the point
at which further cooperation on costly tasks is not possible. This in turn affects the trans-
fers that the principal can commit to pay, since the risk of breakdown reduces the expected
surplus from the relationship, making it harder to elicit cooperation from the agent.
Secondly, in addition to this symmetric ex ante uncertainty, there may also be asymmet-
ric uncertainty about future surplus. On drawing a task for the first time the agent learns
the action required to complete the task and updates her beliefs about the value of the
relationship. If an equilibrium exists in which the agent always takes the correct action (or
quits), then at the end of each period the principal also updates his belief about the value
of the relationship. However following certain histories the agent may have an additional
incentive to deviate in order to conceal information about the value of the relationship, and
thereby extract further surplus from the principal. Whilst this deception cannot persist in
the long term, it may be profitable for the agent to attempt to deceive the principal in this
way in the short-run (if, for example, the relationship would be terminated as soon as the
principal learned the true value). Moreover, even if the agent is not deceiving the principal,
if her actions are unsuccessful then the principal may still be skeptical about the true value
of the relationship: this will in turn reduce the transfers to which he can commit, making
cooperation more difficult.
The third issue is that of incentive provision. Given that the principal does not know
the appropriate action for each task and so cannot perfectly monitor effort, the threat of
termination may be required to induce the agent to cooperate. Since r; < 1 and so the agent
may in equilibrium take the correct (costless) action and fail to achieve a success, this will
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lead to inefficient termination on the equilibrium path with positive probability.
These three sources of inefficiency mean that the first-best will often be unattainable,
in the sense that for any draw C of costs across tasks, such that a fraction -y require a
costly action, there will exist values of 6 for which cooperation on all tasks is possible in
the game with full information, but there will be a positive probability of termination in
the game with private information. Whether or not this deterioration in the relationship
occurs may depend critically on the order in which tasks are drawn. In particular, if costly
tasks are required at the start of the game then this reduces the expected surplus from the
relationship, and the ability of the principal to commit to the transfers necessary to support
full cooperation.
Game in which only one task remains unknown.
To state these results more formally, I will first focus on the case in which there is just
one task i, occuring with probability ai, for which the correct action remains unknown.
Assume that at period t, following history ht, all tasks except task i have been attempted
successfully and so the correct actions on these tasks are common knowledge. Assume that
a fraction y-i of these tasks are known to require the costly action. Therefore if ai = ac, the
total share of tasks that require the costly action is y-i(l - ci) + ci; otherwise, if ai = ao
a fraction _i(1 - ai) of tasks require the costly action. We can then define the values of
6 for which full cooperation would be possible in the game without private information, in
either scenario: if the last task is costly, then we require 6 > * if costless, then
we need 3 > 5* where 6* > 6* .
- i ((1-i )I+-Y ly.(-k
There are two cases to consider: firstly, the case in which the tasks already drawn are
such that there is sufficient surplus to sustain cooperation on either a costly or a costless task;
and secondly, the case in which the known surplus from the relationship is near the cutoff
such that task i being costless would allow the principal and the agent to reach cooperation
on all tasks, but a costly task will make cooperation on any costly task impossible. In the
former case, where & > 6*i-ai)+ai, it is common knowledge that there is sufficient surplus
to maintain the relationship, but nonetheless the principal wishes to ensure that the agent
takes the costly action if required. In the latter case, if 6 E [6*_ _ 6* ) there
is no way of inducing the agent to take the costly task, but the agent may have an incentive
to misrepresent the value of the relationship to the principal in order to obtain some surplus
in the short term. In either case we may see the relationship be terminated with positive
probability on the equilibrium path if the agent takes the costless action without success.
Proposition 3. There exist values of ai, y-i such that for S E [6* 4 _ )
there will be inefficiently low performance in equilibrium even though it is common knowledge
that there is sufficient surplus to sustain the relationship at the optimal level.
This result states that there exist values of 6 > 6*(n + for which it is either
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impossible to induce the agent to take a costly action when appropriate, or doing so requires
the threat of inefficient termination on the equilibrium path. This occurs for values of 3 for
which it is common knowledge that there is sufficient surplus to induce the agent to take
a costly action on task i. Therefore the problem is not that the principal cannot commit
to the necessary transfer once he knows that task i requires the costly action, but that he
doesn't know whether it requires this action.
A full proof is in the appendix, but the intuition is that the principal's ability to provide
incentives through the promise of future surplus is limited by the fact that some of this
surplus has already been pledged to the agent in order to provide incentives on earlier tasks.
In order for the agent to be induced to undertake the costly action, it must be the case that:
-c + 7Ti(h t , ac) + 6E[U(ht, ac)Iai = ac] 6 max{E[U(ht , ao)Iai = ac], Uo; } (1.6)
where E[U(ht, a)jai = ac] is the agent's expected continuation surplus having taken the
action a, given that task i requires the action ai = ac. The bonus payments promised by
the principal must also be credible, so
-T(h', ac) + 3EH[h', ac lai = ac] H0 . (1.7)
In the game with full information, these constraints hold with equality at 6 = 6*
when the continuation value is Uo. That implies costly effort can only be obtained in the
game with private information if E[U(ht, ao)|ai = ac] < Uo. However in the game with
private information the principal's ability to set E[U(ht, ao)|ai = ac] is limited. This is
because the principal cannot distinguish between a deviation and the agent correctly (but
unsuccessfully) taking the costless action; moreover the principal must still provide incentives
on the remaining fraction i (1 - ai) of costly tasks. If he cannot commit to a transfer
T > c/77, then in order to provide these incentives the principal will need to set the agent's
continuation value when task i is in fact costless to be greater than her outside option:
E[U(ht, ao)|ai = ao] > Uo. We must have E[U(ht, ao)|ai = ao] > E[U(ht, ao) jai = ac], since
by deviating to the costless action the agent forgoes any transfers on this task following a
success. However for a small these transfers contribute little to the agent's future surplus,
and so it will not be possible to set E[U(ht , ao)|ai = ac] Uo without reneging on the
surplus already promised to the agent on other tasks.
This problem can be ameliorated by using the threat of termination. Assume that if
the agent takes a costless action and is unsuccessful, then the principal can commit to
terminating the relationship with probability ((ht). In this case cooperation requires that:
-c + 7r i(ht, ac)+6E[U(ht, ac)|jai = ac] >
(1 - ((ht))6 max{E[U(ht, ao)|ai = ac], Uo} + (ht)Uo. (1.8)
21
Clearly, by setting (ht ) = 1 this incentive constraint reduces to that in the game with
full information, ensuring that the agent will take the costly action if appropriate. The
trade-off here is that since 7 < 1 there is a positive probability that the relationship will be
terminated inefficiently on the equilibrium path; moreover this possibility reduces expected
surplus earlier in the game, increasing the probability of termination. The resolution of this
trade-off will depend on p and 77: for 7 high, the expected loss of surplus due to inefficient
termination is small; meanwhile for p large, the possibility of being unable to obtain effort
on a costly task carries more weight that the risk of inefficient termination on a costless
task.
The above result focused on the case in which it is common knowledge that there is
sufficient surplus to sustain cooperation on another costly action on the final tasks, but
nonetheless it might not be possible to provide the correct incentives for the agent to un-
dertake this action. We will obtain a similar result, although for different reasons, for 6
close to P*( . In this case both parties know that there is insufficient surplus to sustain
cooperation on all tasks if the final task requires the costly action. However if the final
task is costless then there is sufficient surplus to maintain the relationship with the agent
working on all tasks, and receiving a transfer following a success on any of them. Given that
the agent obtains a surplus on costless tasks in this case, she will have an incentive to try
and deceive the principal as to the true value of the relationship by deviating to the costless
action. This implies that if the agent takes the costless action and is unsuccessful then
the principal cannot be certain of the surplus from the relationship. At 6 = 6* the
expected surplus is such that all incentive constraints bind in the game with full informa-
tion: introducing any uncertainty will reduce the principal's expected surplus, and hence the
bonus that he can commit to pay. This could lead to the breakdown of the relationship even
if task i was in fact costless. For larger values of 6, slack in the incentive constraints allows
the principal to increase the transfer paid on costly tasks whilst reducing that on costless
tasks, removing the incentive for the agent to misrepresent total surplus and hence removing
the need for the principal to punish the agent if the costless action is taken unsuccessfully.
General case in which the value of the relationship is uncertain.
The previous subsection analysed the problem of providing incentives on a single task as-
suming that the correct actions on other tasks were known. I now turn to a general case
in which there may be multiple tasks that remain unverified. In addition to the problems
of incentive provision shown above, there is now uncertainty on both sides about the future
value of the relationship. This uncertainty may make it impossible to provide appropriate
incentives, even if C is in fact such that full cooperation could be achieved.
To illustrate this, consider the example above, and assume that at some period t' the
penultimate task j is drawn, and requires a costly action. As above we can look at different
scenarios based on the history of the game and the principal's belief about y. If the tasks
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already learned include a sufficiently high fraction of costless tasks, then the surplus of the
relationship will not be an issue, although the principal must still provide the necessary
incentives, as above. Alternatively learning that task j is costly may reduce the expected
surplus to a level at which full cooperation cannot be achieved regardless of the cost of the
final task, and so the agent can never be induced to take the costly action. The final case is
the one in which 6 is such that the relationship can be sustained under full information if
one of the remaining tasks is costly, but not both. In this case if the probability that task
i requires the costly action is sufficiently high, it will not be possible to induce cooperation
on task j.
In order to ensure that the agent is willing to supply costly effort on task j we require
that:
c + 7Tj(ac, ht) + E[U(ht, ac)|aj = ac] > max{6Uo, 0 + E[U(ht, ao)|aj = ac]}
and moreover that the principal must be willing to pay the transfer, if appropriate
-T (ac, ht) + E[II(ht, ac)Iaj = ac] > 0.
Combining these expressions, given that the agent's continuation value following a deviation
must be bounded below by Uo, we require that
c + Uo < 3[E[U(ht, ac)Iaj = ac] + E[I(ht, ac)ai = ac]] < 6E[TSlaj = ac, ht]
This expected surplus, given that the cost of task i is still unknown, is:
E[TSly i,ai] = (1_-a)(77-_Y__c)+aj(1-p) 77+ (7 - -_( ai)c) +1 ei - a1 1 -6 1
ceip (1 - quit) F - c + ( - (qy.i(1 - ai) + ai)c) + IquitoUo
1 - agoi61 1 - 1 5
If task i is costless, then if the relationship has survived until this point then it will not be
terminated now. If not, the relationship may survive with cooperation on the costly task,
or it may be terminated. If 6 and -yi are such that the relationship will survive then this
expression simplifies to
1
E[TSlh t] = [1 - (-y-i(1 - ac) + paj)c)1-6
This is exactly the expected surplus that would be generated in the game with full informa-
tion if a fraction yi(1 - a) + pai of tasks were known to be costly. However if 6 is such that
the relationship cannot be sustained if both tasks i and j are costly, then the relationship
will terminate if the agent learns that the last task is costly. This implies that the expected
surplus in the game with private information is strictly less than that in the game with full
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information, for any p > 0:
1
E[TSy-i, ai) < E[TSfull infolY-i, ai] < [r/ - ('ya( - ai) + pai)c].
In particular, this means that it will be impossible to induce the agent to supply effort for
= *1 if there is any chance that the last task i will also be costly. It follows that
there are cases in which this task is in fact costless, and so cooperation could have been
supported under full information, but in the game with private information the relationship
will be terminated. Moreover, in such a case, had task i been required before task j, this
would have ensured enough surplus to maintain the relationship. Thus the order in which
tasks are required will be critical to the long-run performance of the partnership.
We can apply this same argument for each successive task as it is first drawn. This yields
the following proposition.
Proposition 4. In the game with full information, let 6* be the discount factor required to
sustain full cooperation when a fraction p of tasks require the costly action. In the game with
private information in which the independent probability that any particular task is costly
is p, a discount factor (p) > * for all p > 0 is required for cooperation if a costly task is
drawn at the start of the game.
This result states that there exist values of J for which it is possible to achieve full
cooperation in the game with full information when a fraction p of tasks are known to be
costly, but it may not be possible to achieve this in the game with private information
when in expectation a fraction p will be costly. This implies that for some realisations of C
such that cooperation is possible in the game with full information, cooperation will only
be possible in the game with private information if the tasks are encountered in a specific
order.
The proof is in the appendix, but this result can be shown by inductively constructing
an upper bound for the expected surplus in the game with private information, following
any history. This upper bound coincides with the expected surplus in the game with full
information. It can then be shown that for any 6 < 6o and any p > 0 there will exist
histories such that the expected surplus given this history is strictly less than this upper
bound, implying that cooperation will be possible for a smaller set of parameter values than
in the game with full information.
As a corollary to this result, we can see that for any p > 0 the relationship runs the risk
of inefficient termination on the equilibrium path. Moreover, for p close to one it will not be
possible to achieve any cooperation on costly tasks, or to get the agent to participate in the
relationship, even for 6 arbitrarily close to 6*. We can see this by noting that at p = 1, the
agent cannot be induced to take the costly action for any 6 < 6*, and moreover she prefers
not to enter the relationship at all, rather than entering for one period arid postponing her
outside option. Since the expression for surplus is continuous in p, this implies that there
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exist values of p < 1 such that the agent will never enter the relationship, even if 6 is very
close to the level that would support cooperation even if all tasks are costly.
1.4.3 Equilibria with "probation"
Thus far in the paper, we have focused on equilibria with the following characteristic: the
principal will terminate the relationship if the agent takes an action a(i, s) # a(i, t) at any
time s > t. That is, the agent cannot switch from one action to another on a given task
without the principal terminating the relationship. In this section of the paper I relax the
assumption that the agent is expected to provide appropriate effort on all tasks from the
outset. I show that in this case, since the agent is no longer required to take costly actions
until she can acquire more information, the set of discount factors for which cooperation can
be achieved is increased.
We could think of such an equilibrium as allowing for a probationary period. The
principal would permit the agent to take only costless actions while she ascertains the true
value of the relationship, after which, if there is enough surplus, the agent can start to work
on costly tasks. Whilst the agent may still be promised a bonus if she takes a costly action
at the start of the game, she will not be punished if she takes the costless action on this
task initially and later switches to the costly action. In order for such a policy to succeed in
inducing cooperation on all tasks (wherever possible in the game with full information), two
conditions must be met. Firstly, the expected surplus during the probationary period must
be sufficient to ensure both parties are willing to participate and forgo their outside options.
Secondly, the agent must be induced to take the costly action, when appropriate, after the
probationary period is over. I show that the set of discount factors for which the agent will
remain in the relationship will increase, reducing the probability of inefficient termination
due to uncertainty about the surplus. However an equilibrium of this type cannot resolve
the incentive issues shown in Proposition 3, and the agent may still quit the relationship
inefficiently after certain histories.
Proposition 5. For any p > 0, assume that 6 is such that the agent can be induced to take a
costly action in the equilibrium described in section 4.2. Then cooperation can also be ensured
in the equilibrium with probation. Moreover the set of values of 6 for which cooperation can
be achieved on a costly action at the start of the game will strictly increase.
Proof. Since the equilibrium with probation does not rule out a case in which the principal
promises the same transfers as in the baseline equilibrium, and the agent immediately takes
the costly action whenever these transfers elicit effort in that equilibrium, it is clear that the
equilibrium with probation can replicate any payoffs achievable in the equilibrium without
probation. I now show that there will exist histories following which the equilibrium with
probation does strictly better. Given that these histories will occur with positive probability,
allowing a probationary period must increase the expected surplus at the start of the game,
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thereby increasing the set of values of 6 for which the agent can be induced to take a costly
action at the start of the game.
As shown above, in the equilibrium in which the agent is expected to fully cooperate
from the start of the game, she will only take the costly action on a given task if
-c + 7ri(ac, ht) + 6E[U(ht, ac)|ai = ac] > Uo.
If we relax this constraint on the agent's behaviour, we require that the agent is willing to
either take the costly action, or to take the costless action, and remain in the relationship
until she has acquired more information. The relevant constraint becomes:
max{ -c + viri(ac, ht) + 6E[U(ac, ht)|ai = ac], 0 + SE[U(ao, h')|ai = ac]} > Uo.
Given that the agent always has the option of playing as if in the baseline equilibrium in all
subsequent periods and receiving the concomitant payoffs, we must have E[U(ao)|ht , ai =
ac] ;> E[U(ac)Iht , ai = ac]. Given that a transfer r = c/v is sufficient to achieve cooperation
on any task, without requiring the principal to commit future surplus, the principal will never
promise a transfer r > cv. Moreover following certain histories we must have T < c/7. This
follows from the fact that the discount factor required to sustain cooperation is minimised
by cross-subsidizing tasks, which must mean that r < c/77 for any 6 < 6o. Given that C
is initially unknown, for any J there is a positive probability of reaching a history in which
cooperation can only be achieved by setting T < c/. This implies that we must have
0 + 6E[U(ao)Iht], ai = ac] > -c + v7ri(ht, ac)
following certain histories, and therefore that the set of values of 6 for which the agent can
be induced to remain in the relationship strictly increases. By reducing the probability that
the relationship is terminated abruptly when there is in fact sufficient surplus to continue the
relationship, the expected surplus of the relationship increases, making it easier to achieve
cooperation at the start of the game.
Therefore relaxing the restriction that the agent cannot switch actions on a given task
can increase the set of values of (6, p) for which the agent can eventually be induced to take
the costly action. However this will not necessarily be sufficient to replicate the payoffs in
the game with full-information for any Uo. This is partly because this equilibrium cannot
resolve the problem of providing correct incentives since the extent to which the principal
can manipulate the continuation surplus remains constrained. However as long as the agent
has a positive outside option, then for sufficiently large p there will still be histories after
which the agent quits rather than remaining in the relationship to acquire more information.
To see this, consider a case in which cooperation can be ensured on all tasks if a fraction
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1 - y are costless, that is 6 > 5*. In the game with private information, if the agent has
observed that a fraction 1 - -y of tasks are costless, then she will be willing to take the costly
action on other tasks, as required, since there will be no risk that the surplus from the
relationship drops below the level necessary to ensure cooperation in the future. However,
until a fraction 1 - y of tasks are known to be costless, the agent will not take the costly
action, but must accept a payoff of zero on those tasks until she obtains further information.
We therefore require that there is sufficient surplus to ensure that the agent stays in the
game until more information is acquired.
Consider the following potential history. Whilst a fraction 1 - - of tasks are in fact
costless, the agent encounters the fraction -y of costly tasks before encountering any costless
tasks. In this case the likelihood that the relationship will terminate increases, and the
expected continuation surplus from the game decreases. Moreover, since the agent cannot
be induced to take the costly action (which does generate an expected surplus) until she
has more information, the potential gains from the relationship are deferred and the agent
receives 0 < Uo on the costly tasks in the interim. In this case the expected surplus.from
remaining in the probationary stage until she receives more information will drop below Uo
for sufficiently high p, and therefore the agent will terminate the relationship.
Given that the history described above will occur on the equilibrium path with positive
probability for certain (6, p), in the game with private information the relationship may
break down on the equilibrium path for values of 3 for which cooperation would be possible
in the game with full information. Relaxing the restrictions on the principal's equilibrium
strategy therefore cannot generate the first-best for any Uo > 0.
1.5 Example
In this section I provide some illustration of the results of the previous section, in particular
those relating to the dispersion in firm performance and the dependence of long-run payoffs
on early draws. For purposes of exposition, I will do this through two distinct examples. The
first example involves just two tasks, which occur with equal probability. In this example
the only source of relationship breakdown is the ex ante uncertainty about whether the tasks
will be costly, and hence about the future value of the relationship. Following proposition 4,
I show that this uncertainty may make full cooperation impossible in cases where it could
be achieved under full information. I then consider the equilibrium with probation, and use
this setting to explicitly show the extent to which allowing probation improves the expected
long-run value of the relationship, as discussed in section 4.3. This example also illustrates
that long-run performance may depend critically on the order in which tasks are drawn:
if one task is costless and the other costly, there are values of J, p for which drawing the
costless task first guarantees success, but drawing the costly task first (given that neither
party knows the cost of the other task) will lead to the breakdown of the relationship.
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The second example has three tasks, which occur with asymmetric probabilities. In this
case, in addition to the uncertainty about the surplus generated, there will also be problems
of incentive provision following certain histories. Following Proposition 3, I show that there
are regions of the parameter space in which, even if both parties know that there is sufficient
surplus to achieve full cooperation, the principal cannot provide the appropriate incentives
without using the threat of (inefficient) termination. Moreover, this example shows that it
will be more difficult to provide incentives on tasks that occur infrequently. The intuition
for this is that the upfront cost c faced by the agent on such tasks is the same, but the future
value of effort, and hence the surplus foregone by deviating, is smaller for tasks that are
rarely required. As in the two-task example, the long-run payoffs will depend not only on
the realised value of C but also on the order in which tasks are first encountered. I conclude
this section with an illustration of the heterogeneity in outcomes for firms facing identical
draws of costs across tasks, but encountering the tasks in a different sequence, and with
differening success.
1.5.1 Example with two tasks
This example focuses on the results in propositions 4 and 5. That is, I show that full
cooperation may not be possible in cases in which it is possible in the game with full
information. I go on to consider the equilibrium with probation or cooperation on only a
subset of tasks, to illustrate the extent to which this can improve the expected long-run
performance of the partnership. We can see this by comparing the areas of the parameter
space (6, p) for which full cooperation is possible in each equilibrium, which will be shown
in figures 1 and 2. In both cases the long-run outcome can depend on the order in which
tasks are required. The details of this example'are in the appendix.
Assume that the principal and the agent are required to work on two tasks, which occur
with equal probability. Let the principal's outside option HO = 0, and let the agent's outside
option be Uo. From the full-information case, we may obtain the set of critical values of 6,
{ 6i}i=0,1/2,1 for which full cooperation is possible, and the cutoff 60 at which the agent
can be persuaded to remain in the relationship, working only on a single, costless, task.
Note that 6 < 6/2 < 1/2 < 6
Cooperation from the start of the game
I first consider the baseline equilibrium in which the agent is expected to cooperate, and
take costly actions if necessary, from the start of the game. If the first task to be drawn
requires the costless action, then there is no difficulty in providing incentives. The principal
must only ensure that the agent is willing to remain in the relationship, and if the expected
surplus was sufficient to induce the agent to participate at the start of the game, it must
be sufficient to induce the agent to remain in the game given that the expected value of the
relationship has increased.
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Moreover if the first task is costless then the principal can obtain costly effort on the
second task, if necessary, whenever he would be able to do so in the case with full information.
The details are in the appendix, but the argument is that the principal can hold the agent
to her outside option if both tasks are in fact costless, meaning that if she deviates to the
costless task she must receive less than her outside option, since she will never receive any
transfers. The principal can then offer the same transfers as in the full information case if
she takes the costly action: we know that these transfers are incentive compatible for the
principal, and are preferred by the agent to her outside option. Therefore cooperation is
assured.
It is worth noting that for 6 close to o*/2 the transfer paid on the costless task will increase
after the costly task has been confirmed: the principal wants to minimise the surplus given
to the agent if both tasks are costless in order to use the promise of greater surplus to provide
incentives should the second task be costly. He can do this be paying larger transfers to the
agent on both tasks once the costly action has been verified on the second task.
If the first task required is costly, however, then maintaining the relationship becomes
more difficult. If 6 < 6*/2 the agent can never be persuaded to take a costly action. Oth-
erwise, whether or not it will be possible to persuade the agent to cooperate and take this
action will depend on the probability that the second task will also be costly. Assume that
6 c [6*/2, 6), then, as shown in Proposition 4, it will no longer be possible to induce the
agent to take the costly action at 6 = 6*/2 for any p > 0. Moreover, as p increases it will
reach a point at which cooperation cannot be achieved even if 6 is arbitrarily close to 6o.
The range of parameter values for which cooperation can be achieved is shown in figure (2).
Given the difficulty of inducing the agent to cooperate on a costly task at the start of
the game, we can see that the eventual surplus generated by the relationship may depend
crucially on the order in which tasks are first required. In particular, at 6 = 6* the
principal cannot induce the agent to take the costly action at the start of the game for
any p > 0, however if the costless action is required first then we are assured of obtaining
full cooperation. In this case, the breakdown in the relationship arises entirely from the
uncertainty about the total value of the relationship. Moreover, this breakdown is due to
the fact that the principal is trying to induce the agent to take a costly action before this
uncertainty is resolved. In light of this, it would seem sensible for both parties to agree that
the agent should not have to undertake any costly tasks until she knows more about the
value of the relationship. I now consider the extent to which equilibria with probation and
equilibria which allow for partial cooperation on only one (costless) task can do better.
Equilibrium with probation.
In order to illustrate the extent to which allowing probation can improve the likelihood
that the relationship survives, I relax the assumption that the agent must take the costly
action, if required, from the beginning of the game. Instead assume that the agent may
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be permitted to take the costless action on any task until she has established that there is
sufficient surplus to support the transfers necessary to induce cooperation on a costly task,
or, failing that, she may continue to work only on costless tasks throughout. I show that for
some parameter values allowing probation can ensure that the relationship reaches the full-
information level of output, when the agent would otherwise have quit. In this case we may
see substantial short-run heterogeneity in firm output, as the duration of the probationary
period varies. Moreover there will still be regions of the parameter space in which the draw
of the first task is critical for the survival of the partnership.
There are two issues we must consider when evaluating the feasibility of the equilibrium
with probation: can the agent be persuaded to remain in the relationship, forgoing her
outside option, while she collects information, and can the agent be induced to take the
correct actions once she is in possession of this information. In the two-task case the second
consideration will not prove a problem: if only one task requires the costly action then the
agent can be induced to take this action for any 6 > 6*/2. This can be achieved with the
same transfers as in the baseline equilibrium.
We now need to ascertain whether the agent will be willing to remain in the relationship
to acquire information. Specifically, if the first task required is costly, then even though the
agent is not required to take the costly action her belief about the value of the relationship
may nonetheless drop to a level at which she prefers to quit. We can consider different cases,
for different values of 6. If 6 E [6*, A/2) then the agent will only remain in the relationship
if both tasks are costless, and therefore will quit as soon as a costly task is drawn; moreover
for higher values of p she will not be willing to enter the partnership at all. For 6 > 6*
then we know that there is sufficient surplus to support cooperation on any combination of
tasks, from the outset, and so there is no need for probation. We can now consider the two
intermediate cases.
For 6 E [60/2 61/2) the agent cannot be persuaded to work on a costly task, but there
is sufficient surplus to support the agent working on a single costless task. Therefore if the
costless task is drawn first the agent will remain in the relationship, regardless of the cost
of the second task. If, however, the costly task is drawn first her expected surplus from the
relationship will fall. In a result similar to that of proposition 3, we find that at 6 = 61/2
the agent will not be willing to stay in the relationship, for any p > 0. The intuition is that
for this value of 6 the agent is indifferent between staying in the relationship and taking
her outside option in the full information case, given the largest transfer the principal can
credibly pay. Any uncertainty about future surplus means that the agent will prefer to quit.
Nonetheless, compared to the equilibrium without probation, in which for 6 < 6o/2 the agent
would immediately quit after drawing a costly task, the set of values of 6, p for which the
relationship may continue strictly increases.
The other intermediate case to consider is 6 E [6*/2, R*), in which it is possible to support
full cooperation if just one task is costly. If the costless task is drawn first then, as before,
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the relationship is secure; otherwise, the agent will only remain in the relationship if her
expected payoff, conditional on first drawing a costly task, is sufficiently high. The expected
surplus from remaining in the relationship is the same as in the example without probation:
once the agent learns the second task, she will either quit if it is costly, or work on both
tasks if it is costless. The difference comes from the fact that in the interim the agent is not
expected to provide costly effort, and so the agent is only concerned with the opportunity
cost of forgoing her outside option. Therefore this strictly increases the set of parameter
values for which the agent is willing to remain in the relationship after drawing a costly task
at the start of the game.
Parameter values for which cooperation can be achieved.
We can put these results together to compare the parameter values for which it is possible
to induce the agent to cooperate, depending on whether or not the first task drawn is costly
or costless.
Co:opersion possible on all tasks, for anY histotN
8-Y history
BOth, only if
A eni will work on both ask ifat most oe is costly Both , 
tless t k
--------- 11------------- .... -------------- -------------------
I P 0
Figure 1-1: First task is costless Figure 1-2: First task is costly
Figure (1) shows the outcomes of the game, as a function of 6, if the first task to be
drawn is costless. As shown above, in this two-task example providing incentives for the
agent on the second task will not be a problem if the first task is costless. Therefore the
principal will be able to obtain the correct action from the agent whenever it would be
possible to do so in the game with full information.
Turning to figure (2), we see that if the first task to be drawn is costly then obtaining
cooperation becomes more difficult. In particular, if the principal insists that the agent
cooperate from the outset, the relationship will be maintained only for small values of p,
and cannot survive at 6 = o for any p > 0. Relaxing the requirements on the equilibrium
to allow the agent avoid supplying costly effort until she has acquired more information
increases the set of parameter values for which full cooperation is possible, but nonetheless
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there will still be regions of the parameter space in which full cooperation can be achieved
if and only if the costless task is drawn first.
From this simple example we can already see that there will be heterogeneity in firm
performance, even conditioning on the realised draws of tasks. This will occur both in the
short-run, as the time it takes for firms to move from probation to full cooperation varies,
and in the long-run, if some partnerships terminate altogether.
1.5.2 Example with three tasks
In the example with just two tasks the breakdown in the relationship is due entirely to
the uncertainty about the long-run value of the relationship: once the agent knows that
there is sufficient surplus to sustain cooperation the principal can provide the incentives
necessary to achieve this. In this example I focus on the problem of providing the necessary
incentives, as per Proposition 3. The critical difference from the two-task example is that
once more tasks are introduced we may see a situation in which the principal wishes to
ensure cooperation on a particular task, having already learned that a prior task is costly.
Inducing the agent to take the costly action on an earlier task requires guaranteeing the
agent a certain share of future surplus, reducing the principal's ability to use this surplus to
induce cooperation on other tasks. This will generate an additional source of heterogeneity
in long-run performance: in the two-task case, the parties would either achieve the optimal
full-information level of performance, or terminate the relationship; in this case we may also
see firms achieving an intermediate level of output by working on a subset of tasks. This
example also demonstrates how the difficulty in obtaining effort will vary with the frequency
with which tasks occur.
Assume now that the principal and the agent work on three tasks, {A, B, C}, in which
tasks are required with differing frequency. Let the weights on each task be {o}i=ABC 
{0.45, 0.45, 0.1}. Given the possible draw of costs, we will obtain thresholds {6.1, 60.45 , 60.55,
0.9, 6}. I will begin by considering the continuation game after two tasks have been verified,
and show that it may not be possible to provide the incentives necessary to elicit costly effort.
I then turn to cooperation in earlier stages of the game, and show that uncertainty about the
true value of the relationship may prevent the principal from offering adequate incentives
for effort, analogously to the two-task example. As in that case, allowing for a probationary
period ameliorates the effects of uncertainty, but does not resolve the issue of incentive
provision. The last part of this section shows that the performance of the partnership may
vary substantially even for a fixed draw of C, due to the order in which tasks are required.
Cooperation on the third task
Assume that the actions required on two of the three tasks have already been verified.
If either both actions are costly, or both costless, then we can be assured that cooperation
will be possible on the third task whenever it is possible in the game with full information.
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This situation is analogous to that in the two-task example, but with asymmetric weighting
on the tasks. However we may see a different outcome if one of the verified tasks is costly,
and the other costless. In this case the fact that some surplus must be guaranteed to the
agent in order to ensure cooperation on the prior costly task limits the principal's ability to
use the promise of surplus to induce effort on other tasks.
We can consider two cases here: that in which the third task carries weight 0.1, and
that in which it carries weight 0.45. Assume in both cases that Task B, which occurs in any
period with probability 0.45, is costless. Let J = 6055, and so it is common knowledge that
there is sufficient surplus to sustain cooperation in the game with full information. Assume
that the second task required, either Task A or Task C, is known to be costly. The principal
needs to provide incentives that will induce the agent to take the costly action on the third
task, if necessary. Following the argument of Proposition 3, the principal can induce the
agent to supply costly effort on the third task if the agent's continuation value following a
deviation can be set less than or equal to her outside option. However the principal cannot
distinguish between a deviation on the third task, and the agent correctly taking the costless
action but without success. In the latter case, the principal wants to ensure that the agent
will continue to work on the other costly task. The need to provide incentives on previously
attempted tasks and the inability to distinguish whether the agent has deviated therefore
constrain the principal's ability to manipulate the agent's continuation value.
This problem of incentive provision will not occur on tasks that are required frequently,
in this case, on Task A, where oA = 0.45. Intuitively, this is because the principal can set
transfers such that the difference between correctly taking the costless action on Task A
(but without success), and deviating to the costless action is large. Given that the principal
cannot distinguish between these two cases, the difference in the continuation values to the
agent comes from foregone transfers: the agent knows that if she deviates she will not receive
any transfers on Task A in the future. Given that Task A occurs frequently, this represents
a substantial drop in the agent's continuation surplus. This means that the continuation
value following a deviation can be set to be less than the outside option, whilst still ensuring
the agent has enough surplus to cooperate if the third task is in fact costly.
If the third task occurs less frequently this will not be possible. Assume that Task A is
already verified as costly, but the principal must provide incentives on Task C. Since Task C
occurs infrequently, transfers paid on this task contribute little to the agent's total surplus.
Therefore any attempt to set the continuation value following a deviation to be less than
the agent's outside option must also greatly reduce the agent's continuation value when she
correctly takes the costless action but is unsuccessful. Moreover, since Task A is costly and
occurs frequently, more surplus is required to ensure cooperation on this task in the future.
In this case the principal must either accept that the agent will not be willing to provide
costly effort on Task C, or he can use the threat of termination following a failure on this
task to provide incentives. For rl large, the probability of the agent correctly taking this
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action but being unsuccessful is small, and so this may be optimal.
Cooperation on earlier tasks
We can now turn to cooperation in earlier stages of the game, taking into account the
fact that after certain histories it may not be possible to obtain costly effort on later tasks,
even if the discount factor is sufficiently high to ensure full cooperation in the game with
full information. The results here are similar to those in the example with two tasks (for
more detail, see the appendix), but it is worth noting how the weight attached to different
tasks affects the likelihood that the relationship breaks down.
If we consider the subgame after one task has been verified, then we can find a lower
bound for the discount factor required to sustain cooperation on a specific costly task. In
this case it will also depend on the task already verified and on the weight attached to the
new task. For example, assuming that Task B is verified as costless, we could compare the
set of discount factors for which it is possible to persuade the agent to take a costly action
on Task A and Task C respectively. Given that Task A is required more often than Task C,
learning that Task A is costly leads to a larger drop in the agent's expected surplus, making
it more difficult to induce the agent to supply costly effort. However these tasks differ not
only in the probability they are required, but in the outcomes of the continuation games:
even if the agent can be persuaded to supply costly effort on Task A, we know that it might
not be possible to induce her to cooperate on Task C. If Task C is verified as costly then we
know that cooperation can later be sustained on Task A whenever it is possible to do so in
the game with full information.
The same argument can be made with regard to cooperation on the first task drawn:
in the early stages of the game it is easier to induce the agent to supply effort on tasks
that carry little weight. This is due partly to the direct effect that learning such a task is
costly has a smaller impact on expected surplus. There is also an indirect effect due to the
fact that in the later stages of the game it is harder to induce costly actions on tasks that
occur infrequently; encountering these tasks early on rules out the possibility of this type of
inefficiency arising later. We can also see that if the principal and the agent could choose
the order in which tasks were attempted (before learning their costs), they would face a
trade-off: learning that a frequently occuring task is costless early on may ensure that there
is enough surplus to sustain the relationship, but this is risky if the task turns out to be
costly. Attempting infrequent tasks early on reduces the risk of the relationship ending if
the task is costly, but learning that the task is costless may not have much impact on the
continuance of the relationship.
As in the two-task example, allowing probation will increase the set of parameter values
for which it is possible to eventually reach full cooperation, however it does not eliminate
the possibility that the relationship will break down following certain histories. Moreover,
in this case, it cannot solve the problems of incentive provision and therefore we would still
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expect to see inefficiently low performance after certain histories.
1.5.3 Path Dependence
Following the analysis above we can consider the variety of outcomes which may occur on
the equilibrium path for different draws of costs C. The figures in this section show the
dispersion in possible outcomes conditional on a fixed draw of C, illustrating that even if
firms face identical tasks and costs there will still be variation in their performance, both
in the long-run and as they learn C. I focus on equilibria that allow a probationary period,
i.e., a period of only partial compliance. The differences in performance become more stark
if we rule out this option. If we consider the baseline equilibrium in which the principal
seeks to enforce full cooperation from the start of the game then it is not possible for the
relationship to recover from a period of partial cooperation: it will either remain at this
level, or the relationship will be terminated.
Tasks ( A, B, Cl, weights {0.45, 0.45, 0.1}, correct actions a, , a,)
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B: 0.45 C: 0. 1q AB: 0.9q-0.45c BC: 0.55-0.Ic C: 0.Iq B,C: 0.55-O.Ie
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Figure 1-3: Path Dependence when two tasks are costly
Figure (3) illustrates the dispersion of outcomes on the equilibrium path when the ac-
tualised costs are {ac, ao, ac}, that is, when a fraction y = 0.55 of tasks require the costly
action. The figure shows the various orders in which the tasks may first be required, and the
action that the agent will take on each task - which may not be the correct action, especially
when the task is first required. The figure also shows the expected payoffs from working on
a limited set of tasks, for example during the probationary period. Note that until all tasks
have been drawn neither the principal nor the agent know C, thus their strategies must take
into account all possible cost combinations, even though only the histories that can follow
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a particular draw are shown here. Assume that 6 = R0.55 + e, and p = 0.5: this implies
that it is possible in the game with full information to achieve cooperation on all tasks. We
can see that the eventual long-run level of performance will depend on the first task drawn.
For example, drawing Task A at the start of the game is damaging to the relationship: not
only is it impossible to obtain costly effort on this task from the agent, but if Task C is then
drawn before the costless Task B the agent will become so skeptical about the value of the
relationship that she will quit altogether.
In contrast, drawing Task C first will ensure that the partnership will eventually be able
to work at the optimal level: for these parameter values, even if Task A is drawn before
Task B, the fact that some surplus can be generated on Task C in the interim will convince
the agent to remain in the partnership. Moreover, drawing Task C at the start of the game
removes the risk of being unable to ensure cooperation on this task later in the game.
We can compare these outcomes with those when the draw of costs is {ac, ao, ao}, i.e.
when only -y = 0.45 of tasks are costly, for the same values of 5 and p. This is shown in figure
(4). For these parameter values the risk of the agent quitting the relationship is removed:
whilst she will not be willing to take the costly action on Task A at the start of the game,
she is willing to remain in the relationship until it is clear that there is sufficient surplus to
proceed. However we may still see suboptimal performance due to the fact that the principal
cannot be sure of the true value of the relationship on observing the agent take a costless
action on Task C without success. This generates uncertainty about the true value of the
relationship, which undermines the credibility of the promised transfers. This may lead to
partial cooperation on only the costless tasks (until a success is achieved on Task C, and
the principal can verify the surplus from the relationship), or to termination if the principal
reneges on a transfer.
Whilst it is for these intermediate values of y that we will see the greatest heterogeneity
in performance, we can also consider the other possible draws of costs here. If all tasks are
costless, then cooperation is assured, and the order in which tasks are required is incon-
sequential. Likewise if only Task C (with weight 0.1) is costly: for the parameter values
considered here it will be possible to induce effort on this task following any history. If all
tasks turn out to be costly, then in the long-run no cooperation is possible; however if Task
C is drawn first then the agent may be persuaded to supply effort on this task for a limited
period before eventually terminating the relationship; if either Task A or Task B is drawn
first the agent will not supply any effort, and the relationship is likely to terminate sooner.
In general, therefore, we can see that not only are there short-run differences in per-
formance as partnerships learn the value of future surplus and the correct actions on each
task, but we may still see long-run differences in performance if it is impossible to provide
appropriate incentives after certain histories. Considering the evolution of this heterogeneity
over time, we will expect the variance in output to decrease, but not disappear, even for
firms facing identical costs C.
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Figure 1-4: Path Dependence when one task is costly
1.6 Persistent Performance Differences
Thus far, this paper has shown that success in maintaining the relationship in this model,
and the level of productivity achieved by the partnership may be highly dependent on the
order in which tasks are first required and on whether early attempts on a particular task are
successful. We may therefore expect to see great variation in outcomes across partnerships,
even if the underlying distribution of costly tasks C is the same. This may explain why
seemingly similar firms have very different levels of productivity, and if we consider each
partnership in isolation then in the absence of any further information these differences will
persist. However. if we consider a larger set of firms, which are known to share the same
set of costs C, then any individual partnership should be able to infer something about
the value of their relationship by observing the performance of other firms. In this case a
partnership that has initially performed poorly may be able to recover if it becomes clear
from others' performance that there is in fact enough surplus to maintain the relationship.
Over time, therefore, these differences in performance might be expected to disappear.
In this section of the paper I ask whether increased knowledge about the total value
of the relationship can alleviate the informational problems that prevent full cooperation
on all tasks. For simplicity. I will focus on a simple case in which there is an "incumbent"
firm which has full information about the cost of each task, and a new firm that has no
information. I will assume that the individuals in each firm share a common discount factor
5, and that C, c and q are known to be equal across firms. There are multiple information
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structures that could be envisaged in this setting: firstly, the new firm may only be able to
observe the fact that the incumbent firm is still in existence, but not their level of output;
secondly, the new firm may be able to observe revenues, but not costs; and lastly, that the
new firm can observe the profits of the incumbent. I will consider each of these settings in
turn.
In the first case, the new firm can observe only that the incumbent is still in production,
but does not know whether the agent is working on all tasks, or only on the costless tasks.
In some cases this may be informative. For example, for any given 6, learning that a firm
remains in the market places an upper bound on the number of costly tasks. Specifically,
the new firm can construct the set {S }-E]r, where F is the possible fraction of tasks that
may be costly, given the number of tasks and their weights.' Knowing that the incumbent
shares the same discount factor, and that the relationship has survived, the new firm can
infer an upper bound for y: y = max{y E rS < 6}. This is turn places a lower bound
on the potential surplus from the relationship, and knowing this, the agent can be induced
to remain in the relationship even if the draws of early tasks are discouraging, at least in
the equilibrium with probation. However knowing this information does not alleviate the
incentive problems, and we may still see cases in which firms remain in the probationary
stage for a long time.
The second case to consider is that in which the new firm can observe the revenues or
the level of output of the incumbent, and can thereby ascertain whether that firm is able
to work on all tasks, or only a subset of costless tasks. I will abstract away from the fact
that learning per-period output over a finite history cannot convey this information with
certainty, given that the correct action only generates a success with probability j. We may
assume that the new principal and agent observe a sufficiently long history and can apply
the law of large numbers.
As discussed before, either the agent should work on all tasks, or only on the costless
tasks; we will not see an equilibrium in which the agent works on a subset of the costly
tasks. In the former case, the new firm will observe mean per-period revenues of 7. Once
again, given that firms share a common discount factor, this allows the firm to infer an
upper bound on the fraction of tasks that require the costly action. Moreover this bound
will be more informative than in the previous case. Since the incumbent is working on all
tasks, we will have y = max{y E IF6* < 5}, where 6* > 60, for all -y E (0, 1). Since this
guarantees that the surplus from the relationship is sufficient to sustain full cooperation,
the agent will be willing to supply costly effort at the start of the game. Nonetheless, the
problems of providing adequate incentives on particular tasks will remain, and so we will
still see inefficiently low performance following certain histories.
In the case in which the incumbent is working only on the costless tasks, the new firm
can observe -y perfectly, since the average per-period surplus will be -77. As in the first case,
1In the three example case above, for instance, I = {0, 0.1, 0.45, 0.55, 0.9, 1}.
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this will ensure that in an equilibrium with partial cooperation the agent does not quit the
relationship if she draws costly tasks at the start of the game. No incentives need to be
provided in this case, since the agent will only take costless effort, but the principal must still
ensure that the agent chooses to participate. Knowing y with certainty allows the principal
to extract all the surplus from the relationship and hold the agent to her outside option. In
the case above, in which there is a positive probability that y < --y, the agent would have
obtained some of this surplus.
Increasing the amount of information available to the new firm further, we can consider
the situation in which the new firm may observe both the revenues and the profits of the
incumbent. In this case, subject to the same assumptions that the new firm is able to
observe sufficient history to make a reliable inference, the new firm can learn the precise
fraction of tasks that will require the costly action, although not the identities of these tasks.
This could potentially help the principal enforce the correct actions since he can terminate
the game if the agent takes the costless action on too many tasks; a situation such as that
described in Proposition 3 can therefore be avoided without the threat of termination on the
equilibrium path. However this alone will not resolve all the difficulties: the agent may still
be tempted to deviate to the costless action in order to increase her surplus in the short run,
even though she knows that this will eventually lead to the termination of the relationship.
To see this, let a fraction a of tasks be commonly known to be costly, and assume
that 6 > 6*. For 6 sufficiently large, it will be possible to ensure cooperation on all tasks
by paying a transfer T > c/7 to the agent only following a success on a costly task.This
effectively means that the agent is rewarded on a task-by-task basis, and so she cannot gain
by deviating to a costless action when this action cannot possibly be successful. For this to
be possible, the promised transfer must be credible, that is, we need:
c S F c'\
-1+ 1a - - +(1 - a) 2 no.
This will hold with equality for some 6 strictly greater than 6*. For intermediate values
of 6 close to 6*, in order to ensure that the agent cooperates on all tasks the principal
must increase her continuation surplus further by paying a transfer following success on the
costless tasks as well. For the agent to be induced to take the costly action on a task i, it
must be that
-c + rTi(ht) + SE[U(ac, ht)Iai = ac] 0 + SE[U(ao, ht)Iai = ac].
At 6 = 6*, for any set of transfer payments that are incentive compatible for the principal
this expression will bind with equality for E[U(ao, ht)|ai = ac] = Uo, i.e., the principal
must be able to set the agent's continuation value following a deviation equal to her outside
option. However if the principal must pay a transfer following a success on a costless task
then the agent is receiving a per-period surplus on these tasks. In contrast, she is making a
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per-period loss when she correctly takes the costly action, and obtains nothing by deviating
to the costless action. This implies that the agent can drive her continuation value above
Uo, at least in the short run, and therefore cannot be persuaded to take the costly action.
This will not be a problem if the costly action is only required on a single task, since the
principal can avoid paying any transfers on the costless tasks until the costly task has been
attempted. However if the costly action is required on more than one task, then for o close to
6* then the fact that the relationship may break down in the furture may make it impossible
to induce the agent to cooperate on a costly task at all.
It is worth noting that for certain values of 6 and p, increasing the amount of information
available (to the agent especially) can make cooperation more difficult to enforce. Let TS(y)
denote the surplus generated when a fraction -y of tasks are costly, and assume that 6 = 6*.
If the parties know only revenues, then they know that the surplus is at least TS(-y), and
so the expected value of the relationship is strictly greater than TS(y), for any p E (0, 1).
In contrast, if the parties observe profits then they know that the value of the relationship
is exactly TS(-y). This uncertainty about the total value of the relationship may increase
the transfers that the principal can credibly promise to the agent at the start of the game,
especially for small p, and will increase the expected value to the agent of the relationship.
Whilst this does not prevent the possibility that the relationship may be terminated on the
equilibrium path following certain histories, for 6 close to 6* it will make it easier to achieve
cooperation at the start of the game.
A further implication of these results is that there may be parameter values for which
an uninformed partnership is able to achieve the optimal level of cooperation, if they are
lucky at the start of the game, but an informed partnership is deterred from attempting to
cooperate at all. To see this, consider a case in which a fraction -y of tasks require the costly
action. Assume that 6 is slightly greater than 6*, and so it is just possible to induce the
agent to supply the costly action when required in the game with full information. In the
game with private information, if the costless tasks are all drawn first, and are successful,
then it will be possible to obtain cooperation on the remaining costly tasks. (Alternatively,
for smaller values of p the relationship requires only that the agent is not required to work
on too many costly tasks before encountering some costless tasks.) Moreover, for p small
the expected surplus of the relationship is such that the principal and the agent are both
optimistic about the value of the relationship, and therefore willing to forego their outside
option at the start of the game in order to attempt to build the relationship. However, if
the realised value of y is -y >> p then this may deter other partnerships from attempting to
establish a relationship at all. We saw above that there is a positive probability of reaching
a history in which the agent prefers to deviate to a costless action, expecting to receive
a short-run surplus on certain tasks before terminating the relationship. The possibility
of reaching such a history may reduce expected surplus from the relationship to a level at
which the principal cannot credibly promise to pay the agent the transfer needed to ensure
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cooperation; knowing this, the parties may never attempt to enter a partnership.
1.7 Conclusion
This paper presents a model of relational contracts in which there is initally asymmetric
information regarding the mapping from actions to output on a series of tasks, and therefore
the principal cannot easily monitor the agent's actions. As the game goes on, the principal
may be able to learn from past successes on each task, and thereby monitor the agent's
actions on that task in the future. However, given these difficulties in monitoring and the
initial uncertainty about the total value of the relationship it may not be possible to achieve
full cooperation. The paper shows that there will exist regions of the parameter space and
discount factors for which cooperation can be achieved in the game with full information,
but cannot be assured in the game with private information. Moreover, whether or riot it
is possible to eventually produce at the maximal level may depend critically on the order
in which tasks are first required, and on whether or not early attempts at each task are
successful.
I go on to consider whether relaxing the assumptions on the equilibrium can increase
the likelihood that the principal and the agent are able to maintain the relationship at
an efficient level. In particular, the paper shows that allowing the agent a probationary
period in which she is not expected to work on all tasks can alleviate some of the problems
associated with uncertainty about the total surplus from the relationship, but cannot resolve
all the difficulties of monitoring.
I argue that these results may partially explain why we see large differences in perfor-
mance amongst firms in similar industries: even firms that share the same set of tasks and
costs may end up performing at very different levels if the order in which they are required
to undertake these tasks varies, and if some firms have more success on early tasks than
others. The paper goes on to ask whether we should expect these differences in performance
to be eliminated over time: if a poorly performing firm can see that an identical enterprise
is functioning at a much higher level, they should be able to infer something about the value
of the relationship, which may in turn make it easier to provide the correct incentives. I find
that even learning the total surplus from the relationship with uncertainty cannot resolve
all the incentive issues, and therefore we may still expect to see inefficient termination on
the equilibrium path, and hence differences in performance, for certain values of 6.
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1.8 Appendix
1.8.1 Proof of Proposition 3
Proposition 3: There exist values of ai, -yi such that for 6 c [6* (1 ,) ' a a)
there will be inefficiently low performance in equilibrium even though it is common knowledge
that there is sufficient surplus to sustain the relationship at the optimal level.
This result states that there exist values of 3 > 6* for which it is either
impossible to induce the agent to take a costly action when appropriate, or doing so requires
the threat of inefficient termination on the equilibrium path. This occurs for values of 6 for
which it is common knowledge that there is sufficient surplus to sustain the relationship.
Proof. In order for the agent to be induced to undertake the costly action, it must be the
case that:
-c +'rjri(ht, ac) + E[U(ht, ac)|ai = ac] 0 + 6 max{E[U(ht , ao)|ai = ac], Uo} (1.9)
The bonus payments promised by the principal must also be credible, so
-,ri(ht, ac) + 6EH[ht, acIai = ac] > IHo
where it is worth noting that the principal is only ever required to pay a bonus once the
task is successful, meaning that the mapping from tasks to actions and the surplus of the
relationship is now common knowledge. T We know that at 6* this constraint holds
with equality when the continuation value following a deviation is UO. Therefore in order to
ensure cooperation in the game with private information we need:
E[U(ht, ao)Iai = ac], Uo < Uo (1.10)
However the principal cannot distinguish between a deviation to the costless action, and the
agent correctly taking the costless action without success. In the latter case, the continuation
surplus E[U(ht, ao) Iai = ao] needs to be sufficient to ensure the agent supplies effort on costly
tasks in the future:
-c +rmin{rjyla = ac} + 3E[U(ht ,ao)ai = ao] Uo (1.11)
Therefore in order to reach the same level of performance as in the game with full infor-
mation, we need equations (1.10) and (1.11) to hold at 6 = *. I will show that
for ai = 0 these equations cannot hold for any y-i > 0, and therefore, through continuity
in a, there exists an open interval [0, &) for which it is not possible to obtain the level of
cooperation possible in the game with full information.
If ai = 0, these equations will hold with equality by setting rila=ac = 6(1-6)Uo+c and
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ijaj=ao = 6(1-6)Uo This is possible as long as these transfer payments are credible for the77
principal. This requires that:
-Tijaj=ac + (7 - 6(1 - 5)Uo - yCiC) > 611o
but this expression will not hold at 6* for any y-i > 0. (This is the same argument
made in Proposition 1: the set of values of 6 under which cooperation is possible is maximised
by paying the same transfer on all tasks.) For a > 0 we must have 6E[U(ht, ao)jai = ao] >
6E[U(ht, ao)|ai = ac] since the agent is losing any bonus payments on task i. Nonetheless
since this difference 6E[U(ht, ao)|ai = ao] - 6E[U(ht, ao)|ai = ac] is continuous in a, the
necessary constraints cannot be met at 6 = 6* _ for a E [0, di).
We can also show that using the threat of termination may increase the set of values of
6 for which it is possible to sustain cooperation. Assume that if the agent takes a costless
action and is unsuccessful, then the principal can commit to terminating the relationship
with probability ((ht). In this case cooperation requires that:
-c + T)rz(ht, ac) + 6E[U(ht, ac)|ai = ac] >
(1 - (ht))6 max{E[U(ht, ao)Iai = ac], Uo} + ((ht) Uo (1.12)
Clearly, by setting ((ht) = 1 this incentive constraint reduces to that in the game with
full information, ensuring that the agent will take the costly action if appropriate. The
trade-off here is that since 77 < 1 there is a positive probability that the relationship will be
terminated inefficiently on the equilibrium path; moreover this possibility reduces expected
surplus earlier in the game, potentially making it more difficult to obtain effort on costly
tasks. The resolution of this trade-off will depend on p and 7: for 77 high, the expected loss
of surplus due to inefficient termination is small; meanwhile for p large, the possibility of
being unable to obtain effort on a costly task carries more weight that the risk of inefficient
termination.
1.8.2 Proof of Proposition 4
Proof. In order to ensure that the agent is willing to cooperate on a costly task i that has
not previously been attempted, given a history ht, we require that:
-c + 77(ac, ht) + 6E[U(ac, ht)|ai = ac] > max{6Uo, 0 + 6E[U(ao, ht)|ai = ac}}
and moreover that the principal must be willing to pay the transfer, if appropriate
-T(ac, ht) + 5E [T I(a, ht)Iai = ac] > 0
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combining these expressions, given that the agent's continuation value following a deviation
must be bounded below by Uo we require that
c + 6Uo 5 6E[U(ac, ht )|ai = ac] + qE[H(ac, ht)ai = a] < 6E[TSlai = ac, ht ]
We now want to place a bound on this expected total surplus, conditional on the history of
the game. I will show that following any history, if at time t a fraction at tasks are already
known, of which a fraction -yt are costly then the expected surplus in the game with private
information is bounded above by the expected surplus in the game with full information in
which a total fraction atyt + (1 - at)p of tasks are costly. That is,
1
E[TSfuI inSo|7ht, at] [7 - (at yt + (1 - at)p)c]
We can do this inductively, starting with the case in which only 1 task remains unknown.
Assume that this final task will occur in any period with probability aj, and that a fraction
jj of the previously attempted tasks are known to be costly. The expected surplus given
that only this task remains unknown is
E[TSl-yi, ai] = [(1 - ai)(77 - y-ic) + ac(1 - p) +1 6 (?7 - Y-i(1 - ai)c) +
aip (1 - Iquit) 7 - c + (7 - (yj(l - aj) + ai)c) + ]Iquit6Uo
1 -ago 1 j
If task i is costless, then if the relationship has survived until this point then it will not be
terminated now. If not, the relationship may survive with cooperation on the costly task,
or it may be terminated. If 6 and yj are such that the relationship will survive then this
expression simplifies to
E[TSlht ] - [ - (>Yi(1 - ai) + pai)c]1-65
This is exactly the expected surplus that would be generated in the game with full infor-
mation if a fraction y-i + pai of tasks were known to be costly. That is if it were common
knowledge that there were no risk of termination (for any reason), then it would be possible
to achieve cooperation in the game with private information for some expected 7 whenever
it is possible to achieve it in the game with full information and known Y. If, however, the
relationship will terminate with positive probability if the task is costly then the expected
surplus will be strictly less than that under full information.
Having established a bound for the expected surplus on the last task, consider some
arbitrary point in the game. Assume that a fraction ak of tasks are known. At time t + 1,
either a new task will be required, increasing the share of known tasks to ak+1, or one of
the tasks already learned will be repeated. If a new task is drawn and it is costly, then the
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fraction of tasks known to be costly will increase to 7k+1(ac)ak+1 = kak + (ak+1 - ak); if
costless, then Yk+1(ao)ak+1 = Ykak. We can therefore write the expected surplus as
1
E[TSIYk, ak] - [ak (77 - Ykc) + (1 - ak)(1 -p) [77 + E[TS|7k+1(ao), ak+1]]) +
1-ako
+ 1 - 6T [(1 - ak)(1 - p) [(1 - Rquit) [r -. c + 6E[TS|7k+1(ac) , a+1]] ± lquit&Uo]]
We know that the continuation surplus from quitting is strictly less than that from remaining
in the relationship. From the inductive assumption, therefore,
E[TSI-Yk,ak] < 1 (1 -ak)P 7 c+ [7 - (kak + ak+1 - ak + (1 ak+1)P)c]
-1 - akOI1 1 -
ak(77--kc)+(1-ak)(1-p) 77± 6 77 - (kak + (1 - ak+1)P)C
1
= 1 _ (7 - (ak-yk + (1 - ak)p)C)
Therefore, following any history,
1
E[TSIyt, at] < 1 -[ (at,t + (1 - at)p)c]
- j-
and so we have an upper bound for the surplus in the game with private information.
However, we also know that for 6 < 6* and p > 0 there is a positive probability placed
on histories for which the expected surplus is strictly less than this. This upper bound
is constructed by taking the continuation value if the agent remains in the relationship
rather than quitting. However for any 6 < J*, if all tasks are revealed to be costly then
the relationship will be terminated. For any p > 0 this occurs with positive probability,
and so the expected surplus in the game with private information cannot attain this upper
bound. E
1.8.3 Details from the examples in section 5
Obtaining costly effort on the second task when the first is costless
For any 6 > 6J*2 it is easy to ensure that the agent is willing to cooperate should it
require the costly action. The agent will take the costly action on task 2, knowing that task
1 requires the costless action, as long as:
-c+77T(ac, ai = ao)+E[U(ac)|ai = ao, a2 = ac] 2 max{O+6E[U(ao)|ai = ao, a2 = ac], UO}
where E[U(a)|al = ao, a2 = ac] denotes the expected continuation surplus for the agent,
conditional on the agent taking the action a, given that the actions required are (ao, ac).
We also require the transfer to be incentive compatible, bearing in mind that in the event
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the principal is required to pay a transfer, it must be that the task has been successful and
therefore the correct actions are common knowledge:
-T(a2 = ac, al = ao) + SE[ljai = ao, a2 = ac] > 0
where E[HTai = ao, a2 = ac] if the principal's expected continuation surplus conditional on
the tasks requiring actions (ao, ac).
As long as SE[U(ao)ja2 = ac, ai = ao] < Uo, these constraints will be satisfied they
are satisfied in game with full information, that is, whenever 6 > o* We need only
check, therefore, that the principal can set 6E[U(ao)|a2 = ac, ai = ao] Uo. In. this
example with two tasks, this will not be a problem: if both tasks were costless, the principal
could ensure that the agent remained in the relationship by setting transfers such that
E[Ulai = a2 = ao] = 0 > Uo. In this case the expected surplus from deviating to the
costless action must be strictly less that U0 , given that there is no chance of success on one
of the tasks.
Obtaining costly effort at the start of the game
The agent will take a costly action on the first task if:
-c + ?r(al = ac) + 6E[U(ac)jai = ac] > 0 + 6E[U(ao)|ai = ac]
and the principal is willing to pay the transfer:
-Tr(ai a,) + SE[flIa. = a,] > 0
We can place bounds on these continuation values: since the agent has the option of severing
the relationship altogether, her continuation value following a deviation cannot be less than
her outside option. The agent's incentive constraint can therefore be rewritten as:
c +U 0  < q-r(ai = ac) + SE{U(ac)jai = ac]
< io6E[r7fai = ac] + SE[U(ao)Iai = ac]
< JE[H+4-U}= o-c+(1-p) 77+ ( 6- -) +p
This expression for total surplus conditional on one costly task being drawn takes into
account the expected time until the agent will draw, and learn, the second task (after which
the relationship will either be terminated, or proceed as in the full information case), and
the expected surplus generated by working on a single task in the interim. We can compare
this expected surplus when, in expectation, 1 tasks are costly to the surplus generated in
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the game with full information in which a fraction !±p of tasks are known to be costly:
E[TSprivate infolac) - E[TSful infolY = (1 +p)/21 (2 - 6)(1 - 6)
This expression is strictly negative for all p > 0, and 6 E (0, 1). For p = 0, there is no
uncertainty about the cost of the remaining task, and so the game with full information
and the game with private information generate the same surplus, and it will be possible
to achieve cooperation on the costly task under the same conditions, that is, whenever
3 > 6* As p increases, the game with private information generates strictly less surplus,
-1/2-
and therefore cooperation will only be possible for higher values of 6, and in particular,
cooperation will no longer be possible at 6 = 2 , for any p > 0. As p approaches 1, it will
not be possible to achieve cooperation on a costly task at the start of the game even for 6
arbitrarily close to 6*.
Equilibria with probation: ensuring the the agent remains in the relationship
If 6 C [60 /2R O/2) then if the agent learns that exactly one task requires the costless
action, then she will be willing to remain in the relationship, working only on that task.
Therefore if the first task to be drawn requires the costless action, the relationship is secure.
Otherwise, if the costly task is drawn then her expected surplus from the relationship will
decrease, and she may quit. To remain in the relationship, we require that her expected
surplus exceed the outside option:
EUpatai(p, 6ala = ac) = 2 - 6p6Uo + (1 -p) [70 + 1-6 2 > U0
This condition cannot be satisfied for p = 1, and at 6 = 6 1 2 , given the maximum transfer
that the principal can commit to paying, this expression holds only if p = 0. Therefore we
can find values of 60 (p) E (0 /2' 1/2) such that the agent will only remain in the relationship
after drawing a costly task if 6 > 60 (p). Given that the agent's expected surplus is decreasing
in p, 60 (p) is increasing in p, with 60(0) = 6 /2, and 6*(p') = for some p' < 1.
The other intermediate case to consider is 6 C [6* /2, *), in which it is possible to support
cooperation on a single costly task. The agent will remain in the relationship if and only if
6 F F 6 ciii
EUf.u(p, 6ai = ac) 6 pUo + (1 - P) 771,c + [roc - > Uo
As above, at p = 1 the outside option strictly exceeds the expected surplus from remaining
in the relationship, and so for sufficiently large p it will not be possible to convince the agent
to remain in the relationship, even for 6 very close to 6*. However at 6 = * the agent
will be willing to remain in the relationship for any p E [0, p"], where p" > p'. We can see
this by comparing the surplus generated at 6 = 6* by working only on the costless task,
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to the surplus generated by working on both tasks. Full cooperation generates a strictly
higher surplus for the agent than partial cooperation, and therefore if EUpartiai(p' 5 /21a1 =
ac) = Uo, EUfulI(p',61/2 Ia1 = ac) > Uo, implying that EUfUIy(p", 6 / 2 |ai = ac) = Uo for
some p" > p'.
Example with three tasks: incentives on the third task
We know that the agent can be induced to take costly effort on a task i if:
E[U(ht , ao)|ai = ac] Uo
and so the continuation value from deviating is less than the outside option. The difference
in the agent's expected utility from deviating to the costless action as opposed to correctly
taking this action comes from the loss of expected transfers on this task in the future:
(1 - 6)E[U(ht, ao)|ai = ac] = (1 - J)E[U(ht, ao)|ai = ao] - air/Ti(ht)
Assume that a task j has been verified to be costly. In order to provide the necessary
incentives on this task, the principal must set the transfers and the continuation surplus
such that:
-c + irT(ht, ac) + SE[U(ht, ao)|ai = ao] 2 SUo (1.13)
For ai large, the fact that deviation to the costless task cannot possibly generate a success
(and so the agent forgoes any transfers) may be enough to reduce the agent's continuation
surplus following a deviation, whilst still generating enough surplus to support cooperation
when the agent correctly takes the costless action. If Task C is encountered last, then
since ac = 0.1, this will not be the case here. However this will be sufficient to provide
the incentives on Task A, where aA = 0.45. Alternatively, as J increases the principal
can provide the necessary incentives on Task A by promising a larger bonus on that task
alone and reducing transfers on other tasks: increasing TA allows the principal to reduce
E[U(ht, ao)|a(C) = ao], and thus to set E[U(ht, aola(C) = ac] 5 Uo. At 6 close to 6.55 this
will not be possible, and so the principal will be unable to obtain costly effort on this task.
Example with three tasks: incentives on earlier tasks
In this section I construct an upper bound for the value of the discount factor required
to support cooperation on an earlier task, when there is still uncertainty about the costs of
the remaining tasks.
Assume that one task j has been verified as costly, and that this task has weight aj.
Now the agent is required to take the costly action on task i, with weight ai. If the agent
is to take the costly action, we require that:
-c + 77ri(ht, ac) + SE[U(ac)Iai = ac, ht] 2 0 + 6E[U(ao)|ai = ac, h']
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and the principal must be willing to pay the transfer:
-Ti(h', ai = ac) + 6E[(ac)Iht , a=ac] 2 0
Bounds can be placed on these continuation values: we must have E[U(ao)|ai = ac, ht] 2 Uo
since the agent can always choose to quit, in which case her continuation payoff becomes
the outside option. We can then rewrite the agent's constraint as
c + OU < 7Ti(ht, ai = ac) + SE[U(ac)Iai = ac, ht]
< q6E[FI(ac)|ht , ai = ac] + 6E[U(ac) ai = ac, h']
< JE[U + HIja = ac, ht]
We can then find an expression for the expected total value of the relationship as a function
of p, given that the relationship will be severed should the 3rd task turn out to be costly.
(5
E[U + Uljht] 1- +[(  aj)(, - c) + (1 - ai - ao)pUo] +1 - + aj)
6 (1 -ai -aj)(1- p) y+ ( a jc
1 - (ai + aj)6 1 6 (i+a~~
Since 6 < 6* we know that there is insufficient surplus to sustain cooperation on all tasks.
The expected fraction of tasks that require the costly action, conditional on two tasks
requiring the costly action is (±i+acj+(1-ai-aj)p). Let * be the discount
factor necessary to sustain cooperation on all tasks in the game with full information, if a
fraction (ci + aj + (1 -ai - ac)p) are known to be costly. I show that in the game with
private information the discount factor 6(ac,p) required to induce cooperation on the second
costly task is strictly greater than 6* ±, for all p E (0, 1].
Cooperation on the second task requires:E[U + Hht] c + Uo In the game with full
information, cooperation on a fraction (ai + aj + (1 - ai - ac)p) of costly tasks will be
possible if
6 - c + (1 - (ai + ay))c] > c + Uo (1.14)
This latter expression will hold with equality for 6 = 6 (*a+aJ+(1-as-ak)p) In order to induce
cooperation in the case with private information at 6 = 6* it must therefore
be the case that the expected surplus in the game with private information is greater than
or equal to expected surplus in the game with full information:
E[U + lht] - [1 - (a + aj + ai - aj)p)c] > 0
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This expression simplifies to
p((1 - 6)Uo - (r - c)) > 0
However by assumption all tasks generate an expected surplus and so 77 - c > Uo.
Therefore expression (1.14) cannot hold for any p c (0, 1]. This implies that for any p >
0, the discount factor required to induce the agent to take a costly action in the game
with incomplete information where the probability of the third task being costly is p is
strictly greater than the discount factor required to induce cooperation in the game with
full information in which a fraction ai + aj + (1 - ai - aj)p of tasks are known to require
the costly action.
As a corollary to this result, we can consider 6 arbitrarily to close 6*. At 6*, the dis-
counted expected surplus from the relationship is such that cooperation can be sustained
even if all tasks are costly, essentially by paying transfers on a task-by-task basis. However
once uncertainty about the total value of the relationship is introduced cooperation will not
be possible even arbitrarily close to 6*, for any p > P c (0, 1). Letting p(6) define the inverse
function 6-1(p), as 6 -* 6*, P(6) -+ $i(6) < 1.
We can also consider what happens as p approaches zero, and so both parties can be
confident that the third task will not also require a costly action. In this case, we will have
6(p) 6*+ as p -+ 0. Proof: we know that 6* 6*4+ as p - 0.
Moreover, for any p E (0,1), we know that 6 (p) > 6( From the continuity
of 6(p) and the fact that 6(0) = 6* +, the result follows.
We could find a similar bound for the case in which the first task verified is costless, and
compare the expected surplus:
E[U + Hlai = a, aj = ac] [? - (a + a + (1 -a aj)p)c]1-6
E[U + Ulai = ac, aj = ao) I [n - ( j + (1 - a - aj)p)c)
1-6
From these two expressions we can see:
1. In either case the surplus is decreasing in aj, the costly task on which cooperation is
required. Therefore in cases in which the total surplus of the game remains uncertain,
it is easier to induce cooperation on costly tasks that carry little weight: this is because
learning such a task is costly has a smaller effect on the expected surplus from the
relationship in the future.
2. If the first task verified is costless, then the expected surplus is increasing in aj; if
costly, then it is decreasing in aj. Attempting an "important" task early on is therefore
more risky in terms of the survival of the relationship.
Now consider cooperation on task j at the start of the game.
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Without solving for the optimal transfers necessary to induce the agent to take the
costly action at the start of the game, we can show this result by placing a lower bound
on the discount factor needed to ensure cooperation. This requires calculating an upper
bound for the expected surplus from the relationship, and comparing this to the value of the
relationship in the game with full information. We will do this by finding an expression for
the expected total surplus assuming that there is no inefficient termination on the equilibrium
path, following an unsuccessful attempt at the costless action. The outcome of the game
will depend on the subsequent tasks drawn and whether (and at what point) the game may
terminate.
Assume that 6 > 6*7, and therefore there is enough surplus to support cooperation on
this task under full information. We can also define *.o where i # j, as the discount
factors required to support cooperation if a second task i is costly. However we know that
the discount factor required to support cooperation on this task if there is uncertainty about
the cost of the third task is strictly greater than this. Therefore define 6(p, aj, aj) as the
discount factor required to sustain cooperation on task i, given that task j has been verified
and the third task remains unknown: for 6 > 6 (p, aj, aj) cooperation can be sustained on a
second costly task i; for 3 < 6(p, aj, aj) the relationship will end if another action is revealed
to be costly before a costless task is found.
There are three cases to be considered: (1) effort can be sustained on a second costly
task i, without having verified that the third task is costless; (2) effort can be sustained on
a second costly task i only if the remaining task has first been verified as costly; and (3) the
agent will not supply effort on a second costly task.
Consider the first case (6 > 6(p, aj, ac)) and the subgame after that task has been
verified. If, after learning that task j is costly, task i is also found to be costly:
1
E[TSIac, ac,6 > 6(p, aj, ao)] 1 - [(ai + aj),q - c + (1 - (ai + av))poUo]
1 - (ai + aj)J
+ (1 - (ai + aj))(1 - p) + (i - (ai + aj)c)
1 - (ai + aj)6 1- 6
Otherwise, if task j is costly but task i costless:
p 'E[TSSac, ao, 6 > 6(p, a%, a)] -c + (7?- (1-- a))
1-
+ (as + aj)?7-ajc +(1 -(a + aj))(1- p) ?7+ (?7- ajc)1 - (a1 + aj)1 
In this case the order in which the tasks are drawn is irrelevant. For 6 > 6(p, aj, a2 ),
cooperation can be achieved if a second costly task is drawn before a costless task has been
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revealed, and so in this case the expected surplus is:
E[TSIac,6 > 6(p)]
1 - [ -c + ai((1 - p)[q + 6E[TSIac, ai = ao]] + p[r - c + 6E[TSIa, ai =a]])|
Consider the second case, for which cooperation on a second costly task i will be possible
only if a costless task is encountered first: 5*j +, > 6 < 6(p, aj, ai). The continuation
surplus after drawing a costly task at the start of the game is:
E[TSIac, 6 > 6* ] 1 [ - c + (1 - aj)(1 - p)[i + 6E[TSIac, ao]] + (1 - aj)poUo]
-1 
- g
In the third case, for smaller values of 6 < 6* the relationship can be sustained
only if neither of the remaining tasks are costly. The continuation surplus having encountered
two of the tasks is therefore bounded by:
E[TSIac, ao, 6 < 6* |+min {ci} =
(ai + aj)q - ajc + (1 - (ai + aj))(1 - P) 7 + (q - "j) + p6Uo1-(ai + aj)J - 6
and the continuation at the start of the game, having drawn a single costly task, is:
E[TSIac, 6 < 6(p, a| 5 1 1 [ - c +( ai [(1 - p)['q+6E[TSac, ao]] + (1 - aj)p6Uo]]
isi
In all three cases, the expected surplus is strictly less than the expected surplus in the
game with full information in which a fraction (a, + (1 - aj)p) of tasks are known to be
costly
6
T Sf~u info = 1-6[7 - (aj + (1 - aj)p)c]
Perhaps the easiest way to see this is by considering p = 0 and p = 1. At p = 0, both
parties know that the remaining tasks are costless and so the surplus in the game with
private information is equal to that in the game with full information. However for p = 1
it is straightforward to confirm that the surplus is strictly higher in the game with full
information. From the fact that TSful info is linear in p, and TSpivate is convex in p, it
follows that TSfyII info - TSprivate > 0 for all p > 0.
Since the expected surplus conditional on drawing a costly task j in the game with
private information is strictly less than that in the game with full information in which a
fraction of tasks aj + (1 - aj)p are known to be costly, this places a bound on the parameter
values for which cooperation is possible. We can see that this surplus is decreasing in a, and
therefore it is more difficult to obtain cooperation on costly tasks which occur frequently,
given that this leads to a greater decrease in the expected surplus of the relationship. These
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expressions are then used to calculate the values of 6 for which it is possible to sustain
cooperation on Tasks A, B and C at the start of the game.
We can also use these expressions to find the parameter values for which the agent can
be persuaded to remain in the game and acquire more information in the equilibrium with
probation. In this case the cost to the agent is the opportunity cost of foregoing her outside
option, so discount factor required decreases. However it will not restore efficiency compared
to the game with full information.
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Chapter 2
Walking The Talk: Mission
Statements as Cheap Talk
2.1 Introduction
Many firms publish mission statements or expressions of firm philosophy, professing ideals
concerning their treatment of employees or their place in the community. These state-
ments can range from banal phrases about fairness, to more specific pledges to avoid layoffs
wherever possible, to offering fraining and career advancement to employees, and so on.
Given that these claims are not legally binding, they may be regarded with skepticism by
employees, in which case they serve little purpose for the firm.
Whilst the sentiments expressed in many mission statements may seem trite, there
nonetheless seems to be a consensus within management that mission statements matter.
Studies have suggested that up to 85% of European and North American firms publish
mission statements (Desmidt and Heene, 2006), and that a majority of managers believe
them to be among the most important management tools (Bain & Co. 2003, Iseri-Say et
al, 2008). Moreover, some research has claimed a link between certain forms of mission
statements and performance: mission statements expressing values or the firm's philosophy
appear to be associated with better performance, an association that doesn't seem to exist
for more specific mission statements detailing the firm's technology or market base (Pearce
II and David 1987, Musek 2008, Dermol 2012). However, it has also been noted that most
mission statements fail the criterion of "reasonable disagreement" and thereby may in fact
say very little (Leuthesser and Kohli, 1997).
Despite this consensus within the management literature that mission statements matter,
there have been few attempts to model how mission statements may affect performance.
Their influence has been attributed to "a heightened sense of purpose" (Pearce II, 1982)
or to the fact that they specify a common organizational goal or code of behaviour (Bart,
Bontis, Taggar, 2001). The literature has also highlighted the potential downsides of mission
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statements: too generic and they may seem platitudinous, too specific and they may make
adaptation more difficult. Moreover mission statements may be open to misinterpretation,
and subsequently risk laying management open to charges of hypocrisy (Edmondson and
Cha, 2006).
This paper asks whether it is possible for an employer to relay credible information
through such messages, and then reap the benefits via increased effort or loyalty to the firm
on the part of employees. I present a model in which mission statements function as a form
of cheap talk from firms to their employees, during a two-period game. I assume that firms
differ in their quality, and can use the mission statement to send a costless message about
their type to an agent at the start of the first period. Based on this message, the agent
chooses the level of effort that he is willing to supply to the firm. I will assume that the
principal's profit function is such that if the game were to terminate here, then the only
cheap-talk equilibrium will be a babbling equilibrium. At the start of the second period of
the game, there will be some probability that the firm will be called upon to follow through
on their mission statement. This will take the form of a signaling game, in which the firm
can destroy surplus in order to convey information about its type to the agent. The agent
then has an opportunity to update his beliefs, before choosing how much effort to supply
to the firm in the second period. I will assume that the agent's choice of effort at this
second stage depends both on his earlier effort, and on his belief about the principal's type.
Therefore, by affecting his earlier choice of action the message sent in the mission statement
can influence both the agent's actions later in the game, and the cost of signaling. This in
turn will influence the initial messages that different types of firm wish to send.
This paper shows that the possibility that the firm may have to act within the constraints
of the mission statement, or face the ramifications of being regarded as hypocritical, may
allow an informative cheap-talk equilibrium to exist in a setting in which cheap-talk would
otherwise be uninformative. If we interpret mission statements in this way, then stronger
statements of values or stronger commitments to employees represent messages correspond-
ing to better types, and may be successful in eliciting higher effort. This provides a possible
explanation for the widespread use of mission statements, and the model also predicts that
broader statements of values may indeed have a greater impact than mission statements
pertaining to a particular aspect of the firm's work, by increasing the probability that a
situation will arise in which the firm is required to follow through on their promises. This
paper also shows that there may be a trade-off between the informativeness of cheap-talk,
and the costs that firms may have to bear through signaling. Whilst both agents and, in ex-
pectation, firms prefer more information to be conveyed through messages, this will impose
additional signaling costs on the firm and so the net effect on firm profits and total welfare is
ambiguous. I go on to consider whether communication via mission statements may hinder
the firm's ability to adapt to new information, and show that the possibility that adaptation
may be required in the future reduces the informativeness of initial communication. These
56
effects match concerns expressed in the management literature.
For an example of how expressions of firm values may influence worker behaviour, con-
sider the joint venture between Toyota and GM at the NUMMI (New United Motor Man-
ufacturing Co. Inc) plant in California in 1984. The plant had closed two years previously
in circumstances described as "ongoing war" (Brown and Reich, 1989) between the manage-
ment and the United Auto Workers (UAW). However two years after reopening, the plant
had increased its productivity by 50% to a level comparable to Toyota's Japanese plants
and above that of any other GM plant. In contrast, at the Van Nuys plant, which had a his-
tory as troubled as NUMMI's, there was no improvement in productivity amongst ongoing
tension between workers and management.
Whilst some of this success at NUMMI compared to Van Nuys may be attributed to bet-
ter screening and selection of workers, we may also consider the different commitments and
promises made at each plant, and the way in which they influenced the workers' expectations
from the company. For example, NUMMI's agreement with the UAW stated that NUMMI
"has a responsibility ... to provide stable employment," but that layoffs could be compelled
by "severe economic conditions that threaten the long-term financial viability of the Com-
pany", although only if other policies, including reductions to executive pay, had already
been attempted. Whilst the agreements made at the Van Nuys plant used similar language
in general, the term "layoffs" was replaced by "indefinite layoffs" and the list of measures to
be taken before any layoffs did not include reductions to management compensation. These
may seem like small differences, particularly since the language used is sufficiently vague to
avoid legal ramifications, but management at the two plants did in fact respond differently
to the economic downturn in 1987-1988. Whilst the Van Nuys plant placed workers first on
a "mandatory extended holiday" and later on 50% time with rotating shifts, the NUlIMI
plant honoured its commitment to avoid layoffs of any type and instead brought its work-
ers in for further training at full pay. These different responses in turn may have affected
workers' attitudes towards the firm: NUMMI's policies seemed to generate greater loyalty
from the workforce, whilst at Van Nuys there was another period of disagreement between
the management and the union, which felt shut out of decision-making.
In the context of the model presented in this paper, the early promises made by the
management at NUMMI and Van Nuys constitute different cheap talk messages. Whilst
neither company made binding commitments, NUMMI made somewhat stronger statements
regarding potential layoffs than Van Nuys, and when called upon to act on these statements,
followed through. Importantly, however some of the effects on worker behaviour at NUMMI
were seen before any such demonstrable commitment to their workers had been made. In-
terpreted in the light of this model, this fact pattern suggests some separation through the
initial messages.
The paper proceeds as follows. The next section discusses the related literature in
economics, before proceeding to the model in section 3. Section 4 discusses the equilibria
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of this game, and how the separation induced in the cheap-talk game may depend on the
equilibrium specified in the signaling stage of the game. Section 5 presents an example,
and discusses the welfare implications of the trade-off between more costly equilibria in
the signaling stage versus more informative communication in the initial cheap-talk game.
Section 6 extends the model to allow for the possibility of a change in the firm's type and a
consequent need for adaptation, and shows that this reduces the scope for informative cheap
talk. Section 7 concludes.
2.2 Related Literature
In addition to the literature in management discussed above, there is considerable literature
within economics discussing the role of leadership and values in organizations. Various
papers have analysed leadership and firm missions in the context of a signaling game. For
example Hermalin (1998) models leadership by example by allowing managers to send costly
signals or make a sacrifice in order to convey information about the state of the world,
inducing employees to supply more effort in high-productivity states of the world. In the
event it occurs, the signaling game presented in this paper plays a similar role, but this
paper adds an earlier opportunity for communication and shows that these early cheap-talk
promises may convey coarse information about the firm's type, as long as there is positive
probability that "leadership by example" may be called upon in the future.
In a paper that deals more explicitly with firm "missions" Bolton, Brunnermeier and
Veldkamp (2011) present a model in which leaders use the firm mission statement to both
convey information and induce cooperation amongst followers. However managers know
that they will receive more precise information in the future, and so face a trade-off between
inducing coordination through a clearly defined but potentially incorrect mission, and wait-
ing for more information at the risk of miscoordination in the short term. A similar dynamic
is captured in the extension to this paper, in which I consider the possibility that the firm's
type may change. Dewan and Myatt (2008) also view communication from management as
a means of facilitating coordination, and argue that more value should be placed on clarity
than accuracy. In the model presented here both the principal and the agent value more
information, absent the cost of signaling, but I show that increased clarity is associated with
greater expected costs for the firm and the net welfare effect is ambiguous.
We can also relate this paper to the literature on managerial vision, such as Rotemberg
and Saloner (2000) and Van den Steen (2005). In these papers the manager's type represents
a particular vision or bias. In Rotemberg and Saloner hiring a manager with a particular
bias allows the firm to commit to an overarching strategy, knowing that the manager will
act in such a way as to enforce this strategy. This makes it easier to elicit effort from
employees working on certain projects. Van den Steen shows that management vision may
have a sorting effect and attract similar employees, who are more willing to supply effort. In
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contrast to these papers, I focus on a single task and a single employee type, but explicitly
model the extent to which the manager's type may be communicated to employees before
either party takes any costly actions.
This paper is also related to the literature on cheap-talk games that originated with
Crawford and Sobel (1984). The most closely related paper is perhaps Kartik (2009) which
considers a cheap-talk game in which there are costs that arise from fabricating misleading
information, and which increase with the magnitude of the lie. In this paper, these costs
associated with sending misleading information are endogenised via the signaling game, and
can be regarded as the costs of being found out, rather than the costs of lying. As in the
Kartik paper, theses costs increase with the magnitude of the lie, through the difference
between the agent's belief based on the cheap-talk, and her updated belief following the
signal
2.3 Model
A principal of privately known type 0 E [0, 9] seeks to elicit effort from an agent during two
time periods. Payoffs to the principal and the agent depend on the principal's type, and
on the actions taken by the agent in each period. The payoff functions are such that the
agent is willing to supply a higher level of effort to a principal whom he believes is of higher
quality, whereas the principal always prefers the agent to supply more effort. Payoffs are
realized at the end of the game.
There are two potential methods by which the principal can communicate her type to
the agent: at the start of the first period the principal may send a costless message m E .&,
and at the start of the second period, with probability p, the principal may send a costly
signal s c R, which may be thought of as money burning. We will focus on fully-separating
equilibria in the signaling game, meaning that if the firm has an opportunity to signal,
then in doing so it will reveal its type. The equilibrium concept will be Perfect Bayesian
Equilibrium and so at each stage of the game the agent chooses his actions based on the
available information.
The timing of the game is set out more formally below:
First Period:
1. The principal's type 0 ~ U[2, j] is drawn and privately observed by the principal.
2. The principal sends a message m c W to the agent.
3. The agent chooses an action ai C i = R.
Second Period:
4. With probability p, the principal has the opportunity to send a signal s C R, at
a cost c(s) = s. The agent observes whether or not the signal is available and, if
applicable, observes the signal s.
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5. The agent chooses an action a2 E d2 = R.
6. Payoffs H(al, a2,0) - s and U(ai, a2 ,6) are received.
The following assumptions are made regarding the payoff functions. Assume that the
agent's utility function is weakly convex in ai and a2 and that U(ai, a2, 9) satisfies increasing
differences in ai and 9, and in a2 and 0, and therefore the optimal choice of effort in each
period is increasing in the agent's belief about 9. Specifically, U(ai, a2, 0) is such that if
for beliefs f(0) and g(9) over the principal's type g(.) > f(.) in a first-order stochastic
dominance sense, then aj(g(.)) > ay(f(.)) for i = 1, 2. In addition, assume that < 0,&a 1 -a2 -
so the agent's optimal choice of effort in the second period is decreasing in the effort supplied
in the first period.
This assumption that the choice of effort in the second period is decreasing in first-period
effort is crucial for the informativeness of cheap-talk in this setting. If the agent's utility
were additively separable in effort, then effort in the second period would depend only on
the belief induced by the signal, if applicable, and not on whether this belief corresponded
with the message sent at the start of the game. In this case the principal would not be
punished for sending a misleading message, and so would have no incentive not to imitate
the highest type, rendering any messages uninformative. However if the agent's choice of
action after observing the signal also depends on his effort earlier in the game, then inducing
high effort in the first period could be costly for the principal if he is later caught out.
One way of thinking about this inseparability of effort in the agent's payoff function is
to assume that the agent's payoff is some function of profits and the total effort expended.
That is, U(ai, a 2 , 0) = f(H(ai, a 2 , 0)) - c(al + a2), where c(al + a2) is concave. Given
that the cost of second period will depend on first period effort, if the agent supplies high
effort in the first period based on a high belief about the principal's type, but subsequently
learns that he has been misled, then he may greatly reduce effort in the second period.
Alternatively, these payoffs can be thought of from a behavioural point of view: if the agent
feels that he has been deceived by the principal into supplying excessive effort at the start
of the game, then he may resent this and punish the principal by withdrawing effort in the
second period.
I now turn to the employer's profit function I(ai, a2, 9) - s. Assume that profits are
increasing and concave in ai, a2 and 9. Let ai(#) denote the agent's optimal choice of action
in each period, assuming the agent believes with certainty that the principal's type is 5. I
make the following assumptions:
1 dr(ai(6),a2 (ai(O),9),O) > 0 for all 5< 9;dO
2. a "'(a(),a 2 (ai(6),0),0) > 0 for i = 1,2;
3. d2 n(a1(6),a2 (al(§),6),0) < 0.d02
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The first assumption states that for all types of employer 9 the payoffs to imitating a type 0
at the start of the game are strictly increasing for all 9 < 9, even if the agent will learn the
principal's type after the signaling game. This implies that all types can gain by imitating
some better type. This assumption also rules out profit functions that would give the
principal an incentive to destroy her reputation at the start of the game, in the hope of
benefiting from an improvement in the agent's beliefs and an increase in effort following
the signaling game. An alternative way of ensuring this would be to place restrictions on
the relative weights of a1 and a2 in the profit function, and a constraint on the extent to
which the agent's choice of effort a2 would depend on a1 . It follows from assumption 1 that
a weaker type would also have an incentive to imitate a stronger type if their true type
wouldn't be revealed in the signaling game.
The second assumption requires that the principal's profit function satisfy increasing
differences in ai and a2, i.e., that a higher type gains more from higher effort in each period.
Given that both ai and a2 are increasing in the agent's belief about 9, this in turn implies
that the gains to imitating a particular type 9 are increasing in the principal's true type 0.
The third assumption states that the principal's payoffs are concave in 9, and so the returns
to imitating a higher type are diminishing in that type.
2.4 Equilibrium
First, I define the equilibrium concept that will be applied throughout this paper. For the
analysis of the equilibrium, I will begin by considering the agent's actions, given his beliefs
about the firm's type. The paper then turns to the principal's problem, first solving for the
principal's actions should the signaling game occur and then proceeding to analyse the cheap-
talk messages sent in equilibrium. The paper presents conditions under which an informative
cheap-talk equilibrium will exist, and analyses how this varies with the probability of the
signaling game occurring, and the costs of the signals sent in equilibrium. For the first part
of this section I consider the minimally informative cheap-talk equilibrium, that in which
two distinct messages are sent. I subsequently consider equilibria in which more than two
messages may be sent, and relax the assumptions made concerning the equilibrium in the
signaling game.
Throughout this paper I will focus on a pure-strategy Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium of
the game: the receiver (the agent) maximises his expected utility conditional on his belief
after observing the message, and, if applicable, the signal; the agent's beliefs are defined by
Bayes' rule, where possible; and the sender (the principal) maximises expected utility given
her type and the receiver's strategy.
Should the signaling continuation game occur, a pure strategy for the principal is a
function s : 0 x A -+ R, so s(m, 9) is the signal sent by a type 9 that sent an earlier message
m. At the cheap-talk stage of the game, the principal's strategy is a function c : e -*A,
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defining the message #(0) sent by type 6. Turning to the agent, he will maximise his expected
utility given his beliefs. Let f(01m) denote the agent's belief conditional on observing the
message m; f(01m, s) describes the agents belief following the signal, if available. If the
signal does not occur, let the agent's second period beliefs be denoted by f(01m, 0). In the
first period his strategy is a function ai : .W -+ R, a mapping ai (m) from the message to
the agent's actions. In the second period his strategy is a function a2 : R U 0 x .di -+ R, so
that a2(ai, s) is a function of the agent's beliefs and his first period action.
To begin the analysis of the equilibrium, I first consider the agent's problem, and solve
by backward induction. In the second period, the agent will choose his optimal action a2 as
a function of his earlier action and his belief about 6. We can divide this into two cases: the
case in which the principal has had an opportunity to signal her type and thus the agent
knows 0 with certainty, and the case in which no signal is available, and therefore the agent
will not update his beliefs, which will be based solely on the message. Considering the first
case, if a principal of type 9 sends a costly signal then the agent will infer her type and
choose effort accordingly:
a2(a1(m), s) = arg max U(a*(m), a2, 0).a2
If no signal is received, the agent chooses effort to maximise his expected utility. Since the
probability of receiving the signal is independent of the principal's type, the agent cannot
infer anything from the fact that he received no information, and has no reason to update
his beliefs: therefore f(O|m, 0) = f(61m). In this case second-period effort solves
a*(a1(m), m) = arg max U(a*(m), a2 , 0)f (0|m)d6.
a2 J8e
Given these second-period actions, and the fact that the signal will be available with
probability p, the agent's action in the first period is:
a* = maxpf U(ai, a2(ai, 6), 6)f(|m)dO + (1 - p) U(ai,a 2 (ai, m), )f (6|m)d6. (2.1)
ai fe Je
The utility function is such that a* is decreasing in a*. In the absence of a signal if m' >
m <-> E[6|m'] > E[O6m], then both ai and a2 are increasing in m.
Given these actions on the part of the agent, we can turn to the principal's decision
problem. First consider the principal's behaviour if the signaling game should occur. We
will focus on the fully-separating equilibrium in which the principal's choice of signal s
perfectly reveals his type. This requires that the signal s(9, m) is such that:
0 = arg max {H(a*(m),a*(a*(m), s(#)), ) - s(5, m)}.
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Solving for the signal sent by a type 0:
s(, m) = s(6(m)) + J IH(ai(m), a2(ai(m), s($, m)), x) _ dx. (2.2)
9(m) dO i=x
The signal sent by a type 6 therefore depends on the lowest type 0, the minimum of
the support, but not on the distribution over the support. If there exists a non-babbling
cheap-talk equilibrium then the message m sent at the beginning of the game can partition
the type space into intervals. The lowest type 9i(mi) in each interval will determine the
signal sent by the remaining firms in that interval. For now, assume that the least-cost
fully separating equilibrium is played over each interval induced by the cheap-talk game,
i.e., s(mi, Si) = 0. This implies that any type 9 that lies at the cutoff point between two
messages must bear a strictly larger signaling cost from sending the lower message than the
higher message. Later in the paper I will relax this assumption and show that allowing for
more costly signaling equilibria can increase the informativeness of communication, but at
the expense of greater inefficient signaling costs.
I now turn to the cheap-talk game, and look for the minimally informative non-babbling
equilibrium in which messages are sent that partition the type space into two intervals. For
simplicity of notation, let f(m, 9) -= 1(ai(m), a 2 (ai(m), m), 9) denote the profits in the
event that the signaling game does not occur, as a function of the message sent m and
the principal's type 9. Let H(m,sm,9) = U(ai(m),a2(ai(m),s),9) denote the profits as a
function of the signal, should it become available.
Proposition 2. A non-babbling cheap-talk equilibrium that partitions the type-space into
two intervals will exist in this game if there exists a type 9 E [0, 0| that is indifferent between
sending the lower message and being believed to be in the set [0, 9], and sending the higher
message and being believed to be in the set [9, 0]. The type 9 must satisfy:
(1 - p)(mL, b) + p[(mL, s(6), 5) - s(mL, 9)] = (1 - p)(mH, 9) + p[I(MH, s(), b)].(2.3)
To show that this is a sufficient condition for a non-babbling cheap-talk equilibrium of
this form to exist it is necessary to verify that the cutoff 9 defined by equation (2.3) does in
fact partition the type-space into two, and so all types 9 > 9 must prefer to send the message
mH, and all types 0 < 0 the message ML, given the agent's beliefs. In this case, the agent
will respond to these messages by supplying strictly greater effort in the first period after
receiving the higher message. It follows from the fact that the principal's payoff function
satisfies increasing differences between al and 9, that higher types gain more from inducing
a higher belief, and therefore if there is some type 9 that is indifferent between sending the
message mL and the message mH, all higher types must strictly prefer to send the higher
message, all lower types the lower message. The details are in the appendix.
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2.4.1 Increasing the probability that the signaling game is played
In this section I provide further characterisation of the cheap-talk equilibrium. The next
section of the paper states two lemmas. The first shows that for a given cutoff 6, which
will determine the agent's beliefs in the absence of other information, as 0 increases the
difference in payoffs between sending the lower message versus the higher message increases.
A corollary of this result is that if the lowest type _ prefers pooling with the remaining types
to announcing her true type, then an informative equilibrium cannot exist. This provides
a simple necessary condition for the existence of a non-babbling equilibrium. The second
lemma shows that if the type space is partitioned into two intervals [0, 0) and [6, 0] then
0 - 9 > 9 - 0. That is, given that all principals have an incentive to imitate a higher type,
the high message will convey less information than the low message.
Following these results, I can then show that the informativeness of communication is
increasing in p: both in the sense that if a non-babbling equilibrium exists for some p, it
will also exist for all p' > p, and in the sense that the expected variance of 0 conditional on
the message is decreasing in p.
Lemma 1. If
(1-p)H(mL, )+pU(mL ,s (),) - S(mL,9) < (1 -p)fl(mH, 9) + p [II (MH ),)] (2.4)
for some 9, then this is also true for all 0' > 9.
This result states that increasing the cutoff 9 increase the gains for that type of being
believed to be in the higher interval. Note that since we are varying 9, this is an off-
equilibrium result. The proof is in the appendix, but the intuition comes from the fact
that both the agent's utility function and the principal's profit function satisfy increasing
differences between ai and 0. Whilst increasing the cutoff 0 increases the agent's beliefs
conditional on either message, the increase in effort will be greater for the higher message,
and in turn this generates greater profits for a higher type principal. Given this result, we
can now state the following:
Corollary 1. If
(1 - p)H(mL, ) + p [H(mL,(),) - S(mL, )] < (1 - p)(mH, 6) + p [(MH, s(),)] (2.5)
for 5 = 0, then a non-babbling cheap-talk equilibrium of this game does not exist.
This is a direct result of the lemma above. This result means that if the weakest type
preferred not to send a distinct message m(2), even if it were only type to do so, then a
non-babbling cheap-talk equilibrium cannot exist. Therefore a necessary condition for the
existence of a non-babbling equilibrium is:
U(a1(e),a 2(ai,0),6) ;> (1-p)H(a 1 (E[]),a 2(ai,E[]), )+pH(al(E[0]),a2(ai.1,), ). (2.6)
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This expression comes from the fact that the lowest type 0 must be able to reveal her type
at zero cost, should the signaling game occur. It also follows that in looking for the cutoff 0
that makes the principal indifferent between sending the message mL and the message mH,
we must ensure that this cutoff 6 > 0.
Lemma 2. If a non-babbling cheap-talk equilibrium exists in which the type-space is parti-
tioned into two, then it must be the case that the indifferent type 5 < 2
This lemma means that if the type-space is partitioned into two, the upper interval must
exceed the lower interval, and therefore stronger messages convey less precise information.
Intuitively, if we assume some indifferent type $ > 2, then from our assumption of a2'
uniform distribution over [0, $], the difference between the agent's belief and the principal's
true type will be greater if the principal sends the lower message than if he sends the higher
message. Given that the profit function is concave in 6, $ must strictly prefer to induce the
higher belief in this case, even without accounting for the additional cost of signaling that
she would incur if she sent the lower message.
The two lemmas stated here allow us to analyse how the existence of a non-babbling
cheap-talk equilibrium may depend on the probability of the signal becoming available,
and to provide some comparative statics on the amount of information conveyed to the
agent. Intuitively, since only a babbling cheap-talk equilibrium exists in the game without
the signaling opportunity, and it is the constraints on the firm's signal that provide the
traction for informative cheap-talk, we would expect a higher probability of the signal to be
associated with more informative communication since it increases the costs associated with
misrepresenting the firm's type.
Proposition 3. If an informative cheap-talk equilibrium exists for some p, then an in-
formative cheap-talk equilibrium will also exist for all p' > p, with 9' > 9. Moreover the
information conveyed by the message is increasing in p, in the sense that E[Var(|m)] is
decreasing in p.
Proof. As stated above, the existence of an informative equilibrium in this game requires
that there exists 0 such that:
(1 - p)HI(mL, 0) + P[II(mL, s, 0) -s(mL, 9)] = 1-P)Ii(mH, b) + P[HI(mH, s,0)
which implies that:
P[H(mL, s(9), 9) - I(MhH, s(0), 0) - s(mL, 9)1 (1 - P)[ (MH, 9) - ll(nnL, 9)].
Since we are focusing on profit functions for which cheap-talk cannot be informative in the
absence of the signal, we know that the right-hand side of this expression is positive for all
0: firms of all types 0 prefer to send the "better" message if there is no risk of being called
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upon to act on this message. Assume that this expression holds with equality for some p,
9. Now consider increasing p to p'. In this case the left-hand side will exceed the right-hand
side. From Lemma 1 we know that, for 9' > 9
ll(mH, s(O9), 9 ) - H(mH, s(9), 9) > H(mL, s(O'), 9') - ll(mL, s(9), 9)
and therefore ll(mL, s($), 9) - H(mH, s(9), 9) is decreasing in 9. Therefore in order to have
equation (1) hold with equality for p' > p, we must have 9' > 9. Since we must have
9' < -L, it cannot be the case that 9' now exceeds 6, and so the non-babbling equilibrium
will still exist.
Turning to the second part of this proposition, we know from above that 9 < 1/2, and
so increasing p shifts the cutoff towards 1/2, making the two partitions more equal. The
expected variance of the agent's belief, conditional on the message sent, is E[Var (0lm)]
2 + (1 -) , which is decreasing in $ for all 0 E [0,1/2). Whilst the decrease in
uncertainty following the high message is offset by an increase in uncertainty following the
lower message, the fact that the firm's type is more likely to lie in the higher interval ensures
that the net effect is to reduce the agent's uncertainty. 0
This is as one would expect. Given that informative communication is not possible if the
firm is never called upon to follow up on their promises, increasing the chance that the signal
is available and hence that the firm will face a cost of lying makes initial communication
more informative. Moreover increasing the chance that the firm is caught misleading that
agent and is punished by the reduction of effort in the second period reduces the principal's
temptation to imitate a better type, thereby reducing the mass of types that wish to send
a higher message. This reduces the expected variance in the principal's type conditional
on the message sent, thus increasing the informativeness of the equilibrium. However since
signals in this game may be interpreted as money-burning and are thus wasteful, the gains
from improved communication may be offset by the increase in expected cost.
Considering this result in the context of mission statements, this suggests that a mission
statement is more likely to be informative as the probability of having to follow up on the
promises made therein increases. This might explain the somewhat counterintuitive sug-
gestion from the management literature that broader mission statements are more effective
than statements that relate to a particular aspect of the firm's work, such as their technology
or marketing. Whilst statements regarding a specific area of the firm might be expected
to convey more information, if there is little chance that an opportunity will arise for the
firm to demonstrate their commitment within a particular area, workers will be less inclined
to give them much weight. However a mission statement detailing the firm's core values
or their commitments to all employees could have more credibility, by increasing the set of
circumstances in which the firm might have to act on its promises, and thereby increasing
p.
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2.4.2 Equilibria in which more than two messages are sent
Thus far, the paper has focused on the minimally informative non-babbling cheap-talk equi-
librium, that in which the messages sent in equilibrium succeed in credibly dividing the
type-space into two partitions. I now turn to the more general case, and define conditions
under which the type space may be divided into n partitions, and show that the informa-
tiveness of communication is increasing in p, in the sense that if a cheap-talk equilibrium
with n partitions exists for some p, then a cheap-talk equilibrium with n' > n partitions will
also exist for all p' > p.
Assume that there are now n partitions {_, ... , Si, ... , $n-1, #}, where types in the partition
[Oi-1, 62) send a message m E &i, where ldi C W, and &A n A& =0 for all i # j. By
a similar argument to that made above, we can show that the type-space will indeed be
partitioned in this way; that is, if some type 6 sends a message m E &j that induces a belief
f(61m), then any type 6' > 0 will send a message m' that induces a belief f(6|m') > f(6|1m).
This implies that stronger types send weakly better messages, and ensures that we do not
have to consider equilibria in which, for example, the strongest and weakest types send the
same message, but intermediate types another.
Proposition 4. A non-babbling cheap-talk equilibrium in which the type-space is partitioned
into n intervals will exist is there are a series of types {$i} such that:
(1-p)17(m 2 , Si)+p[I7J(mi, s(6i, in), Si) -s(mi, 0)] < (1-p)H(mi, $i)+p[U(mi+1, s(S&, mn), 62)]
(2.7)
for each i 1, ... ,n-1, where
1. message mi induces the belief that 6 - U[$i _1 , Si); and
2. 60 = , $n = 6.
Moreover if an equilibrium with n partitions exists for some p, then for any p' > p, an
equilibrium with n' > n partitions will exist.
This result is analogous to the case in which the type-space is partitioned into two.
Firstly, the messages will partition the type-space in a monotonic way, with a series of inter-
vals in which higher intervals correspond to "higher" messages, i.e., messages that generate
beliefs over a higher range of types, and hence lead to higher first-period actions. From the
fact that the profit function satisfies increasing differences in a1 and 6, if some type 6 derives
greater utility from sending the message mi+1 rather than the message mi, all types 6' > 0
must also prefer this stronger message.
The argument that the maximum number of informative messages that can be sent in
equilibrium is increasing in p also follows from arguments made above. Assume, for example,
that for fixed p there is a non-babbling equilibrium in which the type-space is partitioned
into two. Now consider p' > p. From Proposition 2 above, the informative equilibrium will
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still exist and the cutoff 9 between the two messages will increase. Will it be possible to
generate a more informative equilibrium in this case? From Corollary 1, if a more informative
equilibrium exists, then it must be the case that the lowest type 0 prefers to announce its
true type (and have the agent believe that message and ascribe Pr[6 = 0|m] = 1), to pooling
with the types in [2, 0]. That is,
U(a1(e), a2(6),) > pH(ai(mL), a2(a1(mL), ),) + (1 - p)U(al(mL), a2(al(mL), ML),
The right-hand side of this expression is decreasing in p, since this increases the probability
that the agent learns the firm's true type and reduces second-period effort accordingly.
Therefore for sufficiently large p the weakest type may prefer to send a distinct message,
and the type-space can be partitioned into three. This argument extends to the general case
in which there are n messages, and therefore the number of partitions that can be achieved
in the most informative cheap-talk equilibrium in weakly increasing in p.
Increasing the probability that a firm is called upon to act on their promises not only
weakly increases the number of messages that may be sent in equilibrium, but it also increases
the informativeness of such an equilibrium. This can occur through two routes: firstly, for
a fixed number of intervals, increasing p increases each of the cutoffs, reducing the expected
variance of 6 conditional on m, as above; secondly it may increase the number of messages
sent, and the existence of an additional interval will reduce the size of each partition, and
hence the variance of the principal's type conditional on the message. I address each of these
in turn.
The first effect, that the expected variance falls, is analogous to the result of Proposition
2. Increasing p increases each cutoff $j, which will make the partitions of the type-space
more equal. The expected variance of the message conditional on the signal in this more
general case is E[Var (0)m] = 6 12 where 0o = 0 and 0, = 0. Minimizing this
expression implies that (fi+1 - b)2 = (9i _ -i) 2 for all i, i.e., all intervals should be equal
in size. Whilst this will not be attainable in this game, increasing p will bring this expected
variance closer to the minimum. As in the two message case, for lower messages the variance
of the agent's belief may increase, but the ex ante expectation of this variance will decrease.
The second effect is somewhat stronger: if the number of partitions in a cheap-talk
equilibrium increases from n to n + 1 then the cutoffs between partitions in the new case
will be such that the expected variance conditional on m decreases for every message sent,
by any type ..
We can see this in an example. Consider a cheap-talk equilibrium in which 2 messages
(ML, mH) are sent in equilibrium, as in the previous section, where the indifferent type is 0.
As shown above, if the lowest type 6 strictly prefers to announce her true type to sending
the message ML, then there will exist a cheap-talk equilibrium with 3 intervals. Assume that
p is such that this lowest type is indifferent, and that when the probability of the signaling
game increases from p to p' this type now strictly prefers to send a distinct message. Let
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this lowest type 0 send a "new" message mo; if this type strictly prefers to send this message
then there is some type So > 0 that is now indifferent between sending the message mo and
the message mL (given that the low message now induces different beliefs). We can now
turn to the type b, who was previously indifferent between the messages mL and mH: since
the very lowest types now send the message mo instead of mL, the agent's belief about 0
conditional on observing mL will improve, so the agent will supply more effort after receiving
this message. This implies that the type 0 must now strictly prefer to send the message mL,
and that the indifferent type must be some 9' > 9.
Moreover we will also have '- 0 < o -0. This comes from increasing differences between
ai and 0. We know that in the equilibrium with two messages, 0 was indifferent between
sending the message mo and the message mL, and the type 9 was indifferent between the
messages ML and mH, given al(mL). We also know that if a third message is introduced the
lower bound on the set of types that send the message mL must increase from 0 to 0o, and
so ai (mL) must increase. From the fact that there are increasing differences between ai and
0, this increase in effort generates a greater increase in profits for a better type. This implies
that a smaller increase in 0 is required to restore indifference between the messages mL
and mH, given that this increase in b will also increase al(mH). Therefore the set of types
sending the message mL will decrease in moving from the equilibrium with two messages to
that with three messages.
The increase in the number of messages sent must also increase the amount of information
conveyed by any message. We know that the set of types sending the message mL must
decrease, whilst the increase in the cutoff 9 must also decrease the set of types sending the
message mH. This implies that those types that send the same message in the equilibrium
with three types as in the equilibrium with two types must now lie in a smaller interval,
and so their messages must convey more information. Meanwhile, those types that send a
different message must send a lower message, i.e., a more informative message (from Lemma
2). Thus the variance of the agent's beliefs conditional on the message Var (O|m) cecreases
for all messages. This is stronger than the previous result, that stated that increasing
p without increasing the number of messages sent in equilibrium increases the expected
variance conditional on the message.
2.4.3 Increasing the cost of signaling
So far I have focused on the least-cost fully-separating equilibrium in the signaling contin-
uation game. Whilst this may be justified as the unique equilibrium by applying the D1
refinement (Cho and Sobel 1990), it is worth asking whether allowing other, more costly,
equilibria in the signaling game may affect the informativeness of communication. The least-
cost separating equilibrium may moreover seem counterintuitive, in that the lowest type of
firm in the highest interval reveals its type at zero cost, whereas firms of lower quality, which
did not make such strong promises, still send costly signals. It might be reasonable in such
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a scenario for the employees to conclude that the firm is of the worst possible type, or that
they had misinterpreted the initial message sent by the firm. Imagine for example that a
firm in the lower interval had been misinterpreted by the agent and assumed to belong to
a higher interval. In the equilibrium described above, where firms of very different types,
which sent different messages, may nonetheless end up sending the same signal, the weaker
firm would not be able to distinguish itself later in the game.
In this section of the paper I consider equilibria in which the signal sent by the lowest
type Oi that sends the message mi is strictly positive. Let s($3, mi) denote this signal. In
this setting the agent cannot extort arbitrarily costly signals from the principal, although
the ability to do so would allow the agent to guarantee that the principal always announces
her type truthfully. The cost of the signal is constrained by the fact that the principal
always has the option of refusing to pay, i.e., setting s = 0, and accepting that the agent
will respond to this by assuming that the principal is the worst type. Therefore the largest
signaling cost smax(Oi) that can be imposed on a type 6i satisfies:
H(ai(mi), a2 (ai(mi), i), i) - smax(i, mi) = (al(mi), a2(a1(mi), 6), 6j). (2.8)
The following proposition considers the two-type case and states that increasing the
signaling cost in this way increases the amount of information communicated by the cheap-
talk message. The same result will also apply for the case in which n messages are sent.
Proposition 5. The informativeness of communication is increasing in the cost of signaling,
s(mH, 0): if a non-babbling cheap-talk exists for some s($, mH) C (0, smax(Oi,mi)], it will
also exist for all 9(6', mH) > s(6, mH), where 9' > 6.
This proposition states that increasing the signaling cost for all types in the higher
interval, by increasing the signal sent by the lowest type in that interval, makes cheap-talk
more informative both by increasing the range of values p for which such an equilibrium
exists, and by increasing the cutoff 9 between messages (which as noted above, reduces the
expected variance of the agent's beliefs following the message). The result that this cutoff
cannot exceed 2 still holds (see proof of Lemma 2 in the appendix), and so a non-babbling
equilibrium must still exist.
Proof. Let s denote the signal sent by the indifferent type 0. The indifferent type 0 must
satisfy
p [(ML, s(), 6) - (MH, s(6), 6) - [s(ML,9) - s) = (1 -p){H(mH,9) - (ML,9)]-
Increasing s to s' increases the right-hand side of this expression. As above, increasing
differences in the principal's profit function implies that fI(mH, 9) - II(ML, 9) is increasing
in 9, whereas H(mL, s(0), 9) - H(mH, s(0) is decreasing in 0. Therefore if the cost of signaling
increases to s' > s, the indifferent type must now be some 9' > 6. 0
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Thus an equilibrium in which all firms that send a higher message must pay a more
costly signal can increase the information available to the agent. This may be due to the
fact that by increasing s it is now possible to obtain a non-babbling cheap-talk equilibrium
for payoffs, or a value of p, under which such an equilibrium would not exist for s = 0.
Moreover, extending this argument to allow for a general number of partitions, increasing .
may increase the maximum number of distinct messages that can be sent in equilibrium. In
addition, and analogously to varying p, by shifting the cutoffs between messages, increasing
s can reduce the expected variance of the agent's beliefs conditional on the message.
This increase in the signaling cost effectively increases the punishment imposed on the
principal by lying: if a low type seeks to deviate by sending a higher message, she must
bear a larger cost of maintaining this pretence should the signaling game occur. Whilst this
generates more informative communication, it also increases the expected value of surplus
destroyed through wasteful signaling. This might explain some of the criticisms of mission
statements found in the management literature: for example Edmondson and Cha (2006)
argue that because mission statements are often non-specific and open to interpretation,
workers will tend to expect more than employers intended to convey. If these stronger
expectations take the form of expecting a stronger signal from better firms (coupled with
the threat of believing them to be the worst type should they fail to send such a signal),
then this could in fact increase the amount of information conveyed by mission statements.
This may even be ex ante optimal for the principal, but nonetheless when the signaling
game occurs the principal would always prefer a less costly equilibrium.
2.5 Example
The paper now turns to an example with specific functional forms in order to illustrate the
equilibria in this game, and to consider the welfare implications of achieving more effective
communication at the start of the game, at the potential cost of having to send wasteful
signals at the start of the second period.
Assume that 0 - U[0, 1]. Let the worker have utility function U(ai, a2, 6) = -(al -0)2 -
( 22 -0)2 , and let the principal have the profit function II= -(ai - b- 0)2 - (a2 - b- 9)2.
These payoffs are similar to those in Crawford and Sobel (1984), in that each party wants
the agent's actions to be matched to a function of the principal's type, 9, but a bias b is
introduced that means the principal always prefers higher actions to the agent. These payoffs
are extended to incorporate the agent's actions across both periods: whereas the principal
wants the agent to exert effort 0 + b in both periods, the agent will take into account his
earlier effort ai when choosing second period effort a2.
There are a couple of ways of thinking about these payoffs. For example, a behavioural
argument could be made that the agent feels a sense of obligation to supply effort to the
principal, and the extent of that obligation depends on 9. Moreover if the agent supplied
71
more effort to the principal in the earlier stages of the game, he will feel less of an obligation
in later periods. We could think of the agent maximising a utility function of the form
Ut(ai, ..., at, 9) = -(I a, - 0)2 in each period t = 1, 2 (with no discounting). That is,
the agent wants to ensure in each period that his mean level of effort over the history of
the game matches the obligation he feels to the principal. Alternatively, we could represent
these payoffs in a per-period form Ut(a1,...,at, 9) = 20(i E ta,) - (I Z8 =1 tas))2 - 02
We can think of this per-period payoff function as representing a salary which is a function
of the principal's type and the agent's entire history of effort supplied, minus a cost of
effort. This effort cost c(ai, ..., at) = -(1 E,__ ta,))2 also depends on the history of effort
provided: this dependence could come from the fact that having supplied higher effort in
the past the worker is now less interested in his task, or because the opportunity cost of
work has increased as the worker has spent less time on other activities. In this example
the principal does not share these considerations, and so prefers the agent to supply higher
effort in the second period, regardless of his first period action.
Given these payoffs, the agent would ideally set ai = 9 in the first period. However the
agent is uncertain about 9, and given the principal's bias b we cannot have fully informative
communication in this setting. However there may exist a non-babbling cheap-talk equilib-
rium, in which case the agent's belief about 0 will be informed by m. For this functional
form the agent cares only about the expectation of 9, not the distribution as a whole, and so
a* = E[9|m]. In the second period, the agent wishes to set the mean of his actions equal to
9, and so a* = 2E[I ] -a*, where J indicates the agent's information in the second period.
This information may comprise only the message sent at the start of the game, or it may also
include the signal, if available. If the signal is unavailable, then the agent has no reason to
update his beliefs at the start of the second period, and so E[9|m, 0] = E[9|m] -t a* = a*. If
the signal is sent, then the agent learns 9 with certainty in the fully-separating equilibrium,
and so a* = 29 - E[9|m].
Turning to the principal's problem: if the signal is not sent, then the principal receives
the same payoff in each period. Otherwise, with probability p, the principal must distinguish
her type by sending a costly signal, following which the agent learns her type with certainty.
Therefore the principal's payoff becomes fI(9,m) = -(2 - p)(E[O|m] - b - 9)2 _ p(g
E[9|m] - b)2 - ps(9, m). We will allow for both the least-cost fully separating equilibrium
in the signaling game, and for more costly equilibria in which the indifferent type Oi sends a
signal sj. If the signaling game occurs then the signal sent by a type 0 E [ 9 i1, SC] that sent
a message mi must satisfy:
9 = arg max (25 -a*(mi) -b-6)2-s(5)
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which implies that
Sk + Sk-1 0 -S-
s(6, mi) = 4(0 - $4-1) 2 i+ b - 2
This model nests the Crawford-Sobel payoffs, and so for p = 0 we know that no non-
babbling cheap-talk equilibrium exists for b > 1/4. For non-zero values of p, however, the
fact that the principal may have to follow up on the message with a costly signal, which
will depend on the message sent. Consider the cheap-talk equilibrium with n partitions
{0, (1, ... , 1, ... , _ 1}; we know from Proposition 1 above that the cheap-talk equilibrium
will take this form. Let types in the interval [Oi-1, Oi] send a message mi. Upon observing
this message the agent will take the first-period action a*(mi) = E[Olmi] = 2%+b
Given the cost that a type 0 must bear if the signaling game occurs, we can solve for the
indifferent types {0, 1, I..., Ik, ... , Sn_1, 1}
-( 2 - p) 2 * -Si - b - p Si - -- b]- p[ si + 4($<-1 + Si )(fSi-1 + b)|][2 1L2
= -(2- p) -' $2 -' b] - p SP - 6+ - b] -- p[si+1 ]
for i = 1, ... , n - 1 where Oo = 0 and 6n = 1.
For the simplest non-babbling cheap-talk equilibrium, that with 2 messages, there is an
indifferent type 9 = _ 2(-) . As discussed above, the cost of signaling s is restricted
such that . E [0, 20(1/2 + b)]: the type 0 cannot be induced to send a signal greater than
this, since she always has the option of sending a signal s = 0 and being believed to be
the worst type. To confirm that this indeed constitutes an equilibrium, it must be verified
that E (0, 1), this implies that b < -1 . For p = 0, therefore, an informative cheap-
talk equilibrium exists only if b < 1/4, as in Crawford-Sobel 1994; however for any p > 0,
there exist values of b such that cheap-talk cannot be informative in the game without the
opportunity to signal, but cheap-talk can be informative in the augmented game.
It is also worth noting that the result that 9 < 1/2 holds here, even if we set the maximum
signaling cost smax(6, ML) = 40(1 + 2b). In this case 9 = 1 - 2b(1 - p) < 1 for all p > 0.
Therefore weaker messages convey more information, in the sense that the measure of the
interval [Ai-1, k2] is decreasing in i.
Without stating the exact cutoffs here, for smaller b, larger p, or larger s we may also
have more informative equilibria. Figures (1) and (2) below show the signals sent in such
equilibria, with 2 and 3 messages respectively. The images include both the lowest cost
equilibrium, in which the weakest type in each interval sends a costless signal, and the most
costly equilibrium, in which the lowest type in an interval sends a signal equal to that of
the highest type in the adjacent interval. As discussed in section 4.2, increasing the cost
73
5 A -10
09. -)
of the signal the weakest type in each interval sends makes imitating a higher type less
appealing for weaker firms, shifting the cutoffs upwards and increasing the informativeness
of communication.
'(9. M
Figure 2-1: Signals sent in equilibrium with two messages: Costless (L) and Costly (H)
Figure 2-2: Signals sent in equilibrium with three messages: Costless (L) and Costly (R)
In both the equilibrium with two messages and that with three, increasing the cost
of signals sent by those types in the higher interval increases the informativeness of the
equilibrium, in the sense that the variance of the agent's belief decreases. Whilst this
represents an increase in the agent's welfare, the effect on the principal's total profits, net
of the signal, is ambiguous. The paper turns to the welfare implications in the next section.
2.5.1 Welfare
This section considers the welfare implications of inducing more informative communication.
As discussed, increasing either the probability of having to send a costly signal p or selecting
an equilibrium in which types in higher intervals must send more costly signals, may generate
an equilibrium in which more messages are sent, and thus more information conveyed to the
agent. We can therefore ask whether taking measures to increase these expected signaling
costs can increase total welfare. For example, we may imagine that increasing the scope
of these messages or sending them to a wider audience may increase the probability that a
firm is called upon to act. This accords with the suggestion in the management literature
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that messages that are broader, rather than focused on a particular aspect of the firm such
as sales or technology, are more effective. The cost of this, however, is that since the signal
represents money-burning, it is wasteful in terms of total surplus.
In this section I show that increasing the number of messages sent improves expected
utility for the agent and, discounting the signal, also increases ex ante expected welfare for
the principal. However once the signaling costs are accounted for the total effect on the
principal's welfare, and on total welfare, may be ambiguous. This result is in accordance
with some of the arguments made in the management literature regarding the drawbacks of
mission statements. It is argued that workers may interpret mission statements in a partic-
ular way, and be quick to attribute failures to live up to these interpretations to hypocrisy.
This disappointment in the firm is something we would expect to see in equilibrium: in any
interval there will be types that fall below the mean of those sending a particular message,
and the agent will react to this by reducing the effort sent. Moreover, to the extent that the
agent can influence the signaling equilibrium through his beliefs and induce an equilibrium
which is more informative, but more costly to the principal, it may be beneficial to the agent
to interpret the messages in a way that places more demands on the principal.
Proposition 6. The agent's utility U(m, 9) and the principal's profits U(a1, a2, 9) (non-
inclusive of signaling costs) are increasing in the number of messages sent in equilibrium.
Proof. From Proposition 4 above, we know that increasing the number of messages sent from
n to n' > n means that each type 0 will send a message that reveals the firm to be in an
interval[6 1, ] of smaller measure than the interval [$i-1, 64]. I now show that decreasing
the size of the interval increases the agent's expected utility, conditional on the message
sent.
E[U(ai,a2,)|mi) = -(2 - p) (i12 + 6 ) dO
_ 2(2 - p) 6i + 6i_1 (2.9)
3 2
Since the agent's expected utility increases as the size of each interval decreases, and all
types will send a message corresponding to a smaller set of types, the agents ex ante expected
utility is increasing in n.
Similarly, turning to the principal's profits, non-inclusive of the signaling costs
EH -(2-- p) + O-0±6i 2 2 b)d9
42 2)
- (Oi - $j_1)(($j - i-)2 + 3b 2 ). (2.10)
The principal's profits are therefore also increasing in $i - i_1, and so increasing the number
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of messages sent increases expected profits to the principal.
Therefore the agent is always better off by endeavouring to select a more informative
equilibrium. This result will extend to any risk-averse payoff function. To the extent that
the agent can influence equilibrium selection, for example through the beliefs that they will
ascribe to different signals, the agent thus has an incentive to try and induce the principal
to take more costly actions if the costly signal is available.
As far as increased information is concerned, the principal's and the agent's beliefs are
aligned; if we ignore the signaling costs, then the principal's expected profits ex ante are also
increasing in the number of messages sent. That is, before knowing her type, the principal
would have a preference for revealing as much information as possible through the cheap-talk
messages. However once her type is drawn, the bias b means that the principal always has
a preference to distort communication, limiting the number of messages that may be sent
in equilibrium. Once we account for signaling costs the net effect on both profits and total
surplus is ambiguous. Increasing the number of partitions affects the signaling cost in two
ways. Firstly, there is a direct effect in that it may be necessary to increase s in order to
increase the number of messages sent in equilibrium. Secondly, for fixed p and §, selecting
a more informative equilibrium increases the signaling costs by increasing the marginal cost
of revealing their type to firms in higher intervals.
The figures (3), (4) and (5) show the net profits, expected utility and surplus from
the non-babbling equilibrium, the equilibrium with 2 messages, and the equilibrium with
3 messages. Both the least-cost and most costly equilibria are shown. For the principal,
increasing the number of partitions always increases the utility of the weakest type; this
must be the case, since moving from an equilibrium in which n messages may be sent to one
in which n + 1 messages may be send requires that the weakest type (in this case 0 = 0) is
willing to announce his true type. However in this example the strongest types are made
worse off in more informative equilibria: whilst the increase in information increases their
payoffs from the agent's actions, this comes with the downside of a more costly signal. The
firms who make the strongest commitments through their mission statements induce the
highest expectations in their employees, and are therefore constrained to bear greater costs
to maintain this reputation.
0M.
Figure 2-3: Profits in cheap-talk equilibrium: Costless (L) and Costly (R)
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Although the net effect on the firm is unclear, improved communication will increase the
expected utility of the employee. In particular, for the quadratic loss function in the example
presented here, increasing the number of signals decreases the measure of each partition, and
thus reduces the maximum loss that the agent may sustain. With more accurate information
the agent is both able to set his first-period action closer to the full-information optimum,
and in the event the signal is received, the variance of his second-period action will decrease.
This is utility-improving for any risk-averse agent.
Figure (5) shows that the net effect is nonetheless ambiguous. Whilst moving from
the babbling equilibrium to one in which the type-space is partitioned into two is welfare
improving, refining the partitions decreases total surplus for most types 0. In the case
shown here, moving from two messages sent in equilibrium to three messages generates a
slight increase in total surplus, for both the least costly and most costly equilibria, however
this will not always be the case.
Figure 2-4: Agent's Utility by Firm Type: Costless (L) and Costly (R) Equilibria
Tota Soplus Total Surplus
Figure 2-5: Total Surplus: Costless (L) and Costly (R) Equilibria
2.6 Adaptation
One of the drawbacks of mission statements discussed in the literature concerns problems
of adaptation: circumstances may require a change in firm policy that could be interpreted
as a betrayal of their mission statement. In this case workers may react angrily, even if the
firm has been acting in good faith and did not anticipate a change in direction. If the firm
is aware that they might need to change their policies they will be reluctant to make any
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specific promises in their mission statements and thus we will expect communication to be
more generic and less informative.
This situation will be modeled by assuming that with probability -y the principal's type
changes, and is redrawn independently from U[_, 9]. I will assume that the agent does not
know whether a new draw has taken place. For simplicity of exposition, I will focus on the
specific example from section (5), however these results will hold for the more general case.
In the first period, the agent will choose effort as before and so a*(m) = E[Ojm]. In the
second period, if the signal is sent then the agent learns the principal's type (but not whether
the type has changed) with certainty, and in that case will set a*(m, s) 29 - E[6|m]. If
the signal is not sent, then the agent receives no new information about the principal's type,
but must take into account the possibility that the principal's type has changed and so the
original message is uninformative. Note that if the principal's type changes and the signal
is unavailable there is no scope for further information to be conveyed through cheap-talk
messages: there is no possibility of another signal being required in the future and so there
would only be a babbling equilibrium in this game. Therefore the agent will update his
belief about 9 to E[6m, 0] = -yE[9] + (1 - -y)E[fm], and chooses second-period action
a2(m, 0) = y + (1 - 2y)E[1m].
For the principal, the possibility of a change in type not only changes the value of the
initial message sent, but also affects the signaling costs. This is because, regardless of
the message sent, in the second period the principal must now distinguish herself from all
potential types, not only those who sent messages lying in a particular interval. This means
that the relevant "lowest type" is now 9 = 0 for all messages sent, and therefore the signal
becomes s(9,rm) = 20 (ai + b - 2).
I now consider the cheap-talk game, and the principal's expected payoff from sending a
message mi, given her original type 9. The principal's payoff from the agent's first-period
action will be unchanged. In the second period, if no signal is available the agent will choose
his action based on the message and taking into account the possibility that the principal's
type will change. The principal must also anticipate that with probability -y her type will
change. If the signal is available, the agent will learn the principal's type with certainty,
whether or not it is redrawn but the principal's expected profit and signal must take into
account this possibility. The principal's expected profit is therefore:
lI(6. m) = - (a1(m) - b - 0)2 - (1 - p) [ (a(m, 0) - b - x)2 dx + (1 - ')(aa(m, 0) - b - 6)2
- p j [(x - al(m) - b) 2 - s(x,m)]dx + (1- 'y)[(O - ai(m) - b) 2 - s(0,m)].
0
For a non-babbling cheap-talk equilibrium to exist, there must be at least one type
O c (0, 1) that is indifferent between sending a lower message mL, inducing the belief that
~ U[0, 0), and the higher message, inducing belief 0 ~ U[6, 1]. Solving for the indifferent
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type in this example with two messages, -= 2-y(4pb-l) - y2 2b(-y) . This is decreasing4(l-p)(l-2y2 1--y
in -y, so as the probability that the principal's type changes increases, the informativeness
of communication decreases.
For more general payoff functions, increasing y makes it more tempting for a low type
to attempt to imitate a higher type by sending a higher message: given that there is some
probability that the firm's type will change, and in expectation increase, the firm is less
likely to bear the consequences of imitating a higher type and then revealing themselves to
be of lower quality through the signal. For higher types, given the possibility that their type
will change and they will be unable to live up to promises made in good faith at the start of
the game, the payoffs from attempting to distinguish themselves will decrease. Even if the
signal is not available, the agent will take into account the possibility that the principal's
type has been redrawn and thus, for any message sent at the start of the game, his beliefs will
revert towards the mean in the second period. This also reduces the gains for the principal
of trying to convey information about her type.
2.7 Conclusion
This paper presents a model of cheap-talk in which communication may be informative if
with positive probability the sender has the opportunity to follow through on her promises
through a costly signaling mechanism. I argue that this may be interpreted as a model of
mission statements by firms, whereby non-binding, and seemingly platitudinous, promises
and commitments can carry weight if they constrain the firm's future actions and induce
the firm to make greater sacrifices in order to convince employees of their quality.
I focus on cheap-talk games in which, absent the possibility of sending a costly signal
later in the game, a non-babbling equilibrium would not exist. I show that if the probability
of the firm being able to distinguish its type through a costly signal is sufficiently high, initial
cheap-talk messages may be able to convey some information by partitioning the type-space
into distinct intervals. Moreover, further increases in p will increase the informativeness
of such a cheap-talk equilibrium both by weakly increasing the number of messages that
may be sent in equilibrium, and by reducing the expected variance of the agent's beliefs
conditional on these messages.
Although increasing the probability that the firm has an opportunity to signal will in-
crease the amount of information conveyed to the agent, this paper shows that the overall
welfare effect may be ambiguous. Since the signal may be interpreted as money burning, it
is wasteful from a social point of view, and these losses may offset the increase in expected
utility and profits due to better information. There are further costs associated with these
cheap-talk messages if the possibility that the firm's type or mission will change in response
to changing circumstances: not only does this reduce the information conveyed by messages
at the start of the game, but it increases the costs that the firm must bear to reveal their
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type should the signal become available, and may increase the "punishment" on the firm for
a perceived betrayal.
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2.8 Appendix
2.8.1 Proof of Proposition 1
Proposition: A non-babbling cheap-talk equilibrium that partitions the type-space into two
intervals will exist in this game if there exists a type 9 that is indifferent between sending
the lower message and being believed to be in the set [6, 9], and sending the higher mes-
sage and being believed to be in the set [0,0]. The type 0 must satisfy: (1 - p)U(mL, 0) +
p[1(mL , s (0), 6) - s(mL, 6)] = (1 - p)1(mH, 9) + p [H(MH, s(9), 6)].
Proof. For now, consider the limited message space W = {mL, mH}. If pure-strategy cheap-
talk is informative, then it will separate the type-space into two subsets eL and OH, where
OL U (H - and EL n EH = 0. In equilibrium, messsages are sent according to a function
0 : E .4/, such that types 6 E 19 send messages mi. That is, types in the disjoint sets 0 L
and OH send distinct messages. Let f(O|mi) be the agent's belief on observing a message
in mi.
I now show that the partition will be into two intervals [2, 0) and [0, 0]. Assume that
f(6|mi), for i = L, H, is such that a*(mH) > a*(mL)- Consider some 6 such that
(1 -p)H(ai(mH),a2(ai(mH),mH),O) +p[HI(al(MH),a2(a(MH),sH()),O) - s(MH,O)] >
(1 - p)U(ai(mL), a2(al(mL), ML), 6) + p[H(al(mL), a2(a1(mL), sL(G)), 6) - s(ML , 6),
then for any 6' > 6, this expression also holds. Taking the first part of each expression, since
the profit function satisfies increasing differences in al and 6, H(al(mH), a2(a1(MH), mH), 6')-
11(ai(mH), a2(a1(mH), mH), 0) > H(al(mL), a 2 (al (mL), mL), 6') H(a(mLL), a2(a (mL), ML), )
For the remainder of the expression, we require
U(a1(mH), a2(ai(mH), s (0)), 6) - s(MH, 6) - (I(al (mL), a2(al(mL), s(6)), 6) - s (ML, 6))
to be increasing in 6. That is, should the signaling game occur, the gain from having sent
the higher message is increasing in 6, where
d 0H 9a2 H ds(m, 6) _BOH
d[U(aI (m), a 2 (aI(m), s(0)), 6) - s(m,6)) = 8-2 8 + - d l
We know that > 0, and so the gains from having sent a higher message and induced
a higher action ai are increasing in 6, as desired.
The converse is also true: that if some type 6 prefers to send the lower message, then
any type 6' < 6 will also prefer to send the lower message. Thus we know that if there
exists some 6 for which this expression holds with equality, i.e., that is indifferent between
sending the lower message mL and the higher message mH, then all types 6 > 9 will strictly
prefer to send the higher message, and all types 6 < 6 will strictly prefer to send the lower
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message.
Therefore messages will partition the type space into two subsets [0, 0], [0, 0]. Moreover,
since the messages will partition E into two disjoint intervals we know that these messages
and the concomitant beliefs will in fact induce effort a* (mi) > a* (M2 ).
We can extend this proof to allow for a more general message space, W, by assuming.
that types in the sets E1 and 0 2 send messages drawn from the appropriate subset 4i c A,
where i n 2 = 0. El
2.8.2 Proof of Lemma 1
Lemma: If (1-p)U(mL, 5)+p[U(mL, s(A), )-s(mL, 9)] < (1-p)H(mH, )±p[F(mH, s(), 9)]
for some 9, then this is also true for all 9' > 9.
Proof. The statement is equivalent to
p[H(mL, s(),) - H(mH, 8(),)) - ps(mL, ) < (1 - p)[I(mH,) - H(mL,9)
for some 0. Consider some 9' > 9. Increasing the cutoff point between the two messages
increases the agent's expectation of 9, conditional on either message. Moreover, we must
have a*(mH,0') - a*(mL,9 0) > a*(mH, ') - a*(ML, '). This comes from the fact that
there are increasing differences in ai and 9 in the agent's payoff function. This is turn
implies that H(mH, ') - H(mL, 9') > ll(mH, 9') -- (mL, 9'). Therefore the right-hand
side of the expression above must be increasing in 9. Turning to the left-hand side of the
expression, we know that s(mL, 9) must be increasing in 9'. This comes not only from
the fact that the higher type 9' must pay more to distinguish itself from the type 0, but
moreover from the fact that increasing 9 also increases a*(mL). This effectively increases
the stakes for the principal, and raises the marginal cost of signaling. Moreover we must
have U(mL, s(6), 9) - ll(mH, s(6), 9) decreasing in 9, since increasing differences between
ai and 0 implies that H(mH, s($'), 9') - H(mH, s(6), 9) > ll(mL, s(9'), 9') - H(mL, s(6), 6).
Therefore equation 2 will still hold if the cutoff is increased from 9 to 9'. E
2.8.3 Proof of Lemma 2
Lemma: If a non-babbling cheap-talk equilibrium exists in which the type-space is partitioned
0+6into two, then it must be the case that the indifferent type 9 <
Proof. For the indifferent type 9 it must be the case that
(1 - p)H(mL, 0) + p[H(mL, s(), 0) - s(mL, )] = (1 - p)H(mH, 0) + p[H(mH , s(), 9)]
which implies that
p[U(mL, s(9), 9) - Hl(mH, s(9), 9) - ps(ML, 0) = (1 - p) [fl(mH, 9) - H(mL, 9) (2.11)
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We know that if the signaling game does not occur then the principal cannot be punished
for sending a misleading message, and so the right-hand side of this expression is strictly
positive for any p > 0. We want to show that if 9 > + then
p[H(mL, s(9),9) - rI(mH, s(),) -ps(mL, b) < (1 -p)[l(MH,O) - fl(mL,9)
for any p. To consider the most extreme case, consider p = 1: if this expression is satisfied
for p = 1, it must hold for all p. In particular, we want to show that
MMSO) )- (H SO,0)<0if b >0+ (2.12)
From Assumption 1, we have
d17(ai(0), a2(a1(0), 9), 9) > 0
dO
for all 6 < 0. It follows that
](al(mL), a2(al(mL),),) < (al (6), a 2 (al(),9,)
since mL must induce a belief lower than the principal's true type 9. We want to compare
this loss in surplus from imitating a lower type to the change in surplus from imitating a
higher type (given that the payoffs from imitating a type $ are still increasing at 5 = 9).
Even if the principal is made worse off by sending the higher message, if 9 - 9 > 0 - 9 then
9 - E[0fmL] > E[GImH] - 9 and from the concavity of the principal's profit function in 0
(assumption 3) it must be the case that:
1(ai(mL), a2(al (ML),),) -H(al1(6), a2(a1(),) >
U(ai(mH), a2(al(mH),),9) -- U(al(9), a2(al($),9)
given the beliefs induced. Therefore even if the principal's payoffs after the signaling game
from sending the higher message are less than those from announcing her true type (given
that the agent punishes the deception by withdrawing effort), she must still be better off
than if she imitates the low type. This will be true for any 9 > 2. So expression (2.12)
must hold, and therefore equation (2.11) cannot be satisfied for any 9 > 2,even for p = 1
and ignoring the additional costs of signaling from sending a lower message. For 9 < 0+
the true type will be closer to the agent's expectation conditional on the message mL, and
so this argument from concavity will no longer hold.
This result will still hold for higher signaling costs
If we consider the equilibrium in which the weaker type in the higher interval must send
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a costly signal, it will still be the case the that indifferent type O(s) < 2-. In order for this
to be the case, we require:
p[H(mLs(0),0) - s(mL, ) - (H(mH, s($),) - s(mH,5))] (1 - p)[H(mH,0) - H(mL,5).
(2.13)
As above, consider p = 1, the case in which the signaling game occurs with certainty. In
this case the signal s(mH, 0) is defined as
5 d~
s($, mH) = s() + j --=(aj(mH), a2(al(MH), s(9, mH)), X) dx > Smax(,'fm1H)-
10 d6 =X
We want to show that the left-hand side of expression (2.13) must be negative for 6> 2+.
We know that
d2d 'FOU a 2 OU ds(m,0)1 dO8Ud2 U[(ai(m), a 2 (ai(m), s(0)), 0) - s(m,0)] = d6 _914a2 + - d ) d a < 0
and so the expected payoffs after the signaling game, inclusive of signaling costs, are concave
in 0. We also know from assumption 1 that the payoffs to imitating a type 0 are increasing
in j for all j < 0, and so a principal of type 0 must strictly prefer to reveal his true type
than imitate a weaker type. From the concavity of his payoffs in 0, it therefore follows that
if 0 - E[OImL] > E[0ImH] - 0 he must be strictly worse off sending the lower message than
the higher message, even if the signaling game occurs with certainty. Therefore we must
have 0 < -+.
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Chapter 3
Matching the Market: Relational
Contracts and the Dynamics of Bonus
Payments
3.1 Introduction
The payment of large bonuses, especially in the finance industry, has been a subject that
has attracted debate and opprobrium over recent years. Whilst most would acknowledge
the value of making these payments as a way of rewarding performance, they are often seen
as being disproportionately generous. These criticisms have become more salient as bonus
payments have rapidly rebounded following a period of economic turmoil, especially since
many industries remain fragile. However bonus payments are not only a means of providing
incentives, they may also serve to convince workers of the quality of their employer, and will
be subject to competitive and market pressures.
This paper presents a model in which bonus payments not only provide incentives for
effort but may also reveal information about the principal's type. I will assume that a
principal of privately known type seeks to elicit effort from an agent in an infinitely repeated
game. Both the principal and the agent will be risk-neutral and will share a common discount
factor. However the principal may be one of two types, where her type determines the
probability that high output is produced, conditional on the agent supplying effort. I will
assume that output is non-contractible but is observed by both parties and so high effort can
be supported by a relational contract in which a bonus is paid following high output. In this
setting the agent will update his beliefs about the principal's type based on his observations
of output and on the bonus received.
This paper shows that since the agent must update his beliefs about the principal's
type based on his observations of output the two types cannot pool indefinitely. I focus
on the case in which the low type is unable to obtain effort from the agent when her type
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is known, and show that in this case the two types cannot separate through the contract
offered, but that the high type may be able to separate by paying a larger bonus following
the first instance of high output. Alternatively, the two types may initially pool and both
pay the same bonus, waiting for the agent to update his beliefs over time. In both cases the
necessary bonus payment will evolve with the agent's belief, and there is positive probability
that following a run of low output the agent's belief may fall to a level at which he is no
longer willing to supply effort. This implies that even a high-type principal may find herself
trapped in an inefficient equilibrium. The desire to avoid this outcome may lead the principal
to pay bonuses greater than those required to elicit effort in order to induce separation at
the earliest opportunity, especially after a run of low output.
One way of thinking about this setting is as a model of firm resilience. We can imagine
that the output of the firm depends on the agent's effort, some external shock, and the ability
of the firm to resist or adapt to this shock. A better firm is therefore able to withstand a
greater proportion of shocks, and will therefore generate high output more frequently, despite
external events. Firms will try to signal their type through their ability to pay larger bonus
payments. In particular we will expect to see higher bonus payments after a run of bad
output as the firm must restore the agent's belief in its quality. A run of low output will
also increase the pressure on good firms to reveal their type, since their relationship with
the agent will become more fragile as his beliefs deteriorate. This model therefore predicts
that bonuses may dramatically increase at the earliest opportunity following a run of poor
performance.
The paper goes on to more explicitly model how the dynamics of bonus payments may
be affected by the agent's perceptions of markets conditions. I augment the model to include
a signal, observed by both parties, that indicates whether a high type principal would be
expected to produce high output in a particular period. This signal may be interpreted
as an indicator of market conditions, or the performance of potential competitors. The
agent's beliefs about the principal's type will therefore also depend on the signal received.
In particular, if the signal suggests that other firms are struggling then the agent will be
more lenient in his interpretation of low output, whereas if others appear to be performing
well the agent will interpret low output more harshly and may either cease to supply effort
or demand much larger bonus payments in the future to restore his confidence. In addition
to affecting the agent's beliefs and hence the bonus that must be promised in future periods,
the signal may also influence the principal's decision to pay a bonus in the current period.
We will expect to see scenarios in which the principal pays the bonus following a positive
signal in an attempt to match the market and keep up with her competitors, whereas she
may have reneged had the signal been unfavourable.
As a possible example of some of these dynamics, we may consider the case of Credit
Suisse First Boston, reported in the New Yorker (Stewart, 1993). Widely regarded as a
leading investment bank, First Boston were taken private by Credit Suisse in 1987, causing
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some concern over whether performance and compensation would continue to match the
levels of other Wall Street banks. Although performance was poor in the late 1980s, this
initially was not an issue: other firms were also struggling and so employees were prepared to
accept lower levels of bonuses. However when bonus payments failed to match those of their
perceived competitors as the economy recovered this occasioned widespread resentment as
workers felt that they had been misled by the firm. These circumstances can be considered
in the light of the model presented in this paper: during a run of poor performance, when the
leading firms were also seen to be struggling, the firm faced little pressure to pay larger bonus
payments, and workers were prepared to wait before evaluating the company. However once
other firms were seen to be faring better Credit Suisse faced more pressure to come up with
the generous bonus payments that would convince the workers to trust their quality. Within
this setting, there are two ways of interpreting the firm's behaviour: it could be argued that
Credit Suisse was in fact unable to match the levels of performance of their competitors,
and so was unwilling to pay the larger bonuses which would allow them to continue to pool
with these types. Alternatively, it may be that Credit Suisse acted in good faith: in this
interpretation they would in fact be a high type, but the signals received by the workers
from the market suggested that in this case they should have performed better. Therefore
the failure to match their competitors in performance of bonus payment diminished the
worker's trust in the firm to the point that they were no longer willing to supply effort.
This paper builds on the literature on relational contracts, such as Levin (2003); it also
follows Halac (2011), in considering the extent to which a principal of privately known type
is able to reveal her type through a relational contract. In that paper it is the principal's
outside option that is unknown, whilst a pooling equilibrium will exist, the high type can
also induce separation through paying a larger bonus. In this paper it is the probability that
high effort generates high output that is privately known, and this implies that there must
be some updating of the principal's beliefs even if the principal does not attempt to induce
separation through a larger bonus. This in turn implies that no pooling equilibrium will
exist in the long-run, and moreover that the types may fail to separate. The dynamics of
the expected bonus payment seen in this paper can also be compared to those predicted in
Li and Matouschek (2013). In both cases we would expect to see bonus payments increase
following a run of poor output. However in their paper this is driven by temporary shocks
to the principal's ability to pay, and the need to ensure that the principal reports truthfully.
In this paper the principal's type is persistent, and affects her incentives, rather than her
ability, to pay.
This paper also relates to the literature on relationship building. The results presented
here suggest that high-type firms can convey their type to the worker, and hence gain the
worker's trust, either through a run of success and gradual updating of the agent's beliefs,
or failing that, by paying a much larger bonus. There is a substantial literature in which
it is the agent's type that is unknown to the principal, and this will drive the dynamics of
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the relationship. For example Fong and Li (2010) consider a case in which a worker may
go through an initial probationary period before the relationship is either terminated, or
the worker is tenured. Watson (1999, 2002) considers the case in which the stakes in the
relationship may gradually increase over time as more information is revealed.
The paper will proceed as follows. In the next section I outline the model. In Section
3 I analyse the possible equilibria in the baseline model, without signals, and consider the
dynamics of the bonus payments made in equilibrium. In Section 4 I consider an augmented
model in which the agent receives some signal of whether a high-type principal should be
able to generate high output in a particular period, and I discuss how this changes the
principal's incentives to pay the bonus. Section 5 concludes.
3.2 Model
A principal (she) and an agent (he), both of whom are risk neutral and who share a common
discount factor J, interact in an infinitely repeated game. In each period, the agent chooses a
level of effort e E {0, 1}, where the cost of effort c(e) = ce. Output yt C {YL, YH} is a function
of the agent's choice of effort, the state of the world, and the principal's type 0. Assume
that the principal may be either a high or low type 0 c {6L, 6H}, where Pr[O = OH = P.
The principal's type will determine the probability that high output is generated, given the
agent's choice of effort. Specifically, assume that Pr[y = YHIe = 0, 0] = 0 for all 0, and
Pr[y = YHe = 1, 6] = 7ri, i = L, H. Let rH > 7rL.
Thus if the agent supplies no effort, there is zero probability of high output being pro-
duced. If the agent supplies effort 1, at a cost c, then there is a positive probability of high
output. This probability is greater for the high type of principal, and so the expected value
of effort is higher. I will assume that -TL(YH - YL) > c, and so the expected value of output
is such that it is worth supplying costly effort, regardless of the principal's type.
Assume that the principal cannot observe the level of effort supplied by the agent, but
that both parties can observe output. However output will not be formally contractible.
Effort in this game can therefore only be sustained by a relational contract and the promise
of a bonus payment conditional on output. The compensation offered to the worker will
take the form wt = st + bt(yt), where st is a fixed salary, and bt a non-contractible bonus
that may be contingent on output.
In each period, the timing of the game is as follows:
1. The principal offers the agent a contract specifying a salary st and a bonus b., to be
paid following high output. The agent accepts or rejects this offer. If the agent accepts
then the salary st is paid.
2. The agent chooses effort et C {0, 1}, which is unobserved by the principal.
3. Output yt E {YH, YL} is realised, and observed by both parties
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4. The principal chooses whether or not to pay the bonus bt.
5. Payoffs are received: U = st - cet + btfBonus paid, " = yt - st - byRBonus paid-
I will assume that the agent's outside option is Uo < YL, and that the agent is drawn
from an infinite set of identical workers, all of whom can observe the full history of out-
put generated and transfers received. This assumption implies that the principal has the
bargaining power in the relationship, and can hire a new agent should the relationship ter-
minate. The principal's outside option is therefore bounded below by YL in every period,
the payoff she can obtain by hiring a new agent who supplies zero effort. I will assume that
the agent has limited liability and therefore that any bonus payments must be non-negative.
3.3 Equilibrium
In this section I analyse the potential equilibria of the game, and whether, and how, the
principal's type may be revealed. I show that in the long-run there cannot be a fully pooling
equilibrium in which the agent supplies effort; this is because the agent must update his
beliefs about the principal's type based on his observation of output. I then focus on the
case in which, were the principal's type known, the low type would be unable to elicit effort
from the agent. I show that in this case there cannot be a separating equilibrium which
induces separation at the very beginning of the game, through the contract offered, but that
there is an equilibrium in which the types separate after the first success. In the short-run,
there may also exist a pooling equilibrium in which both types always propose the same
bonus, but separation may occur over time through the evolution of the agent's beliefs.
However in neither of these cases can the high type guarantee separation: there is always
positive probability that the agent's belief deteriorates to the point that he ceases to supply
effort before the high type principal has an opportunity to prove her type.
I will consider the Perfect Bayesian Equilibria of this game. In each period the agent
chooses effort to maximise his expected utility given his belief about the principal's type pt
and the promised bonus bt. The agent's strategy will be a function e : [0, 1] x R-+ {0, 1},
that maps from the agent's belief and the promised bonus to his binary choice of effort. In
each period t the agent's beliefs will be determined by Bayes' rule as a function of his prior
belief pt-1, and his knowledge of output, effort and the bonus in the previous period. At
the start of each period the principal offers a non-negative bonus bt E Rt, where bt(ht, Oi)
may depend on the entire history of the game, and the principal's type. The principal's
strategy will also specify the bonus to be paid, + : x {0, 1} x {OL, 6 H} -+ R, where
the principal's choice of payment will depend upon the bonus promised, the level of output
realised and her type.
I will also place the following restriction on the agent's beliefs:
Assumption 1. The agent's beliefs about the principal's type are independent of the fixed
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salary s.
This assumption rules out equilibria in which the agent updates his beliefs about the
principal's type on the basis of the salary offered. For example, this would preclude an
equilibrium in which the high type sought to separate by offering a contract with a large
fixed component at the start of the game, or by offering efficiency wages. This implies
that any separation of the two types will come through the bonus payments promised, and
whether or not the bonuses are paid. This assumption also ensures that the principal does
in fact have the bargaining power: I rule out situations in which the agent can obtain all
the surplus from the relationship by threatening to assume that the principal is a low type
if she pays any other salary but that demanded by the agent.
Equilibrium when the principal's type is common knowledge
Before turning to the case in which the principal's type is private information, we can
find the optimal relational contract in the game in which the probability 7r of high effort
generating high output is common knowledge. Following Levin (2003), any payoffs that can
be obtained through a relational contract in this setting can achieved by using a stationary
contract. The contract will take the form of a base salary s, and a non-contractible bonus
b to be paid if output is high: w = s + bIl{y = YH}. I will look for an equilibrium in which
the agent supplies effort in the first period, and then in any time period t, if for all s < t if
y, = YL then b, = b, et = 1. Otherwise, if the principal has ever reneged on the bonus then
the agent will supply zero effort in all future periods. The bonus and salary must be such
that: (1) the agent is willing to participate, (2) the agent will supply costly effort, (3) the
principal will pay the promised bonus when yt = YH.
In this case, these conditions become:
1. -- [s + 7rb - c) > U
2. s+7rb-c+ -- [s+7rb -c] >s + s
3. - b+ - -[7r (YH - b) + (1 - 7r) YL - s] ;> -L(YL - s)
The two incentive constraints can be satisfied whenever there exists 6 such that
c 67r(YH - YL)
- < b* (7r) < (3.1)
r - 1- 6+67r
and then the salary can be set to ensure participation: s = Uo. Note that the bonus paid is
decreasing in 7r, but the principal's willingness to pay is increasing in 7r. Therefore a better
type can ensure cooperation for a larger range of discount factors, and moreover can do so by
promising a smaller bonus. For the majority of this paper I will focus on parameter values
for which equation (3.1) can be satisfied for 7r = 7rH, but not for 7r = 7rL. That is, I will
assume that were her type known, a high-type principal could obtain effort from the agent
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through offering a relational contract that promises a bonus bH = 1n(YL) following high
output, but a low-type principal would be unable to obtain any effort from the agent, since
she would be unable to credibly offer the necessary bonus payment.
3.3.1 Equilibrium when the principal's type is private information
In this section I consider the full model in which the principal's type is private information.
As noted above, the lower type has two possible motivations for imitating the higher type:
firstly, for certain values of the discount factor only the high type will be able to obtain
high effort from the agent; moreover even if the low type can obtain effort, the high type is
able to do so through a lower bonus payment. Given that the agent can observe output and
must thereby update his beliefs about the principal's type, there cannot be a fully-pooling
equilibrium in the long-run. However rather than waiting for the agent to update his beliefs,
the principal may prefer to signal her type in order to induce separation. I focus on the case
in which only the high type of principal is able to elicit effort in a separating equilibrium,
and show that the high type cannot separate from the low type through the contract offered,
but can do so by paying a larger bonus after the first success. However if the agent's early
attempts are unsuccessful then the agent will update his belief about the principal's type,
and may cease to supply any effort, meaning that the types can never separate.
Evolution of the agent's beliefs
Before turning to the details of the equilibria, it will be useful to specify how the agent's
beliefs will evolve over time based on his observation of output. Let pt denote the probability
that the agent attaches to the principal being a high type in period t, where pi = p. Given
that the principal's type determines the probability that high effort generates high output,
the agent will update his belief based on output in each period. His beliefs will evolve in
the following manner: if the agent supplied high effort and high output was realised, then
Pt±1 (et = IYt = YL) = Pt~rH
PtWrH ± (-pt)rrL'
whereas if output is low
Pt1 - AH
pt+i(et = 1, Yt = YL) = Pt(l 
- r+pt) 
- L
Otherwise, if the agent does not supply effort then output cannot be high for either type,
and so the agent will not update his beliefs: pt+1(e = 0) = Pt.
Assume that at the start of period t + 1, the agent has supplied high effort in all prior
periods, and that high output has been generated n times. The agent's belief Pt+1 is:
p~rH(1 - 7rH)t-n
Pt+n = pr(1 - r H)tn + (1 - p)ir(l - L n
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We can also consider the expected value of this belief, conditional on the principal being a
high or low type:
tprr (1 7rH )t"E[pt+1|7r = i] = 7r(!(1 - 7ri)t[-"
n py -') H rH)tn + (1 - p)7tn(1 - 7 L
where i = L, H. It follows that if the agent supplies effort in every period, then t -+ 00,
E[pt+17riHI] -+ 1, whereas E[pt+1|7rL] -4 0.
Proposition 2. There is no long-run pooling equilibrium in this game in which positive
effort is supplied.
This result states that as the agent acquires more information, he must be able to
distinguish the two types. That is, if et = 1 for all t, then as t -a 00, Pr[pt > 1 - E|0 =
OH] -+ 1 and Pr[pt < g|6 = OLI - 1 for all E, q > 0. This is an immediate consequence
of the agent's updating of his beliefs. We know that, if the agent were to supply effort to
both types in every period t, then as t -+ oo then pt -+ 1 if 0 = OH. In order for the two
types to pool in the long run, it must be the case that the agent's expected beliefs about
the principal's type are the same for both the high and low types. However given that the
high type will have a higher rate of success conditional on the agent supplying high effort,
and since the agent can observe output, the agent must update his beliefs.
Whilst there can never be a long-run pooling equilibrium in which positive effort is
supplied, if the agent ceases to supply effort then he will cease to update his beliefs. In this
case we could see an equilibrium in which both types promise the same bonus, but since
effort is never supplied there is no chance of output being high, and therefore no chance of
the bonus being paid. Moreover if the low type is unable to obtain effort when her type is
known, then there must be some critical value P such that if his belief drops below this level
then the agent will cease to supply effort, and therefore will no longer update his beliefs.
3.3.2 Separating equilibrium in the game with private information
Whilst there cannot be a fully pooling equilibrium with positive effort in the long-run, since
the agent must update his beliefs, I now consider whether the high type can improve on this
outcome by offering a contract or making a bonus payment that induces separation earlier
in the game. I will focus on the case in which the low type is unable to elicit effort when
her type is known, but the high type can, and show that in this case there is no equilibrium
that induces separation at the very beginning of the game. I then show that by paying a
larger bonus the high type can induce separation after high output is realised for the first
time. However, there will be a positive probability that the agent's belief deteriorates to a
point at which he is no longer willing to supply effort before the high type has a chance to
prove her type in this way. In this case there will be no further opportunity for separation,
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and so even a high-type principal may find herself trapped in an equilibrium in which she
cannot obtain any effort from the agent.
Assume that 6 is such that equation (3.1) cannot be satisfied for 7r = 7rL, but is satisfied
for 7r =grH. That is, in a separating equilibrium the low-type principal would be unable to
obtain any effort from the agent. Therefore the low type will always have an incentive to
imitate the high type at the start of the game: even if the high type is able to separate by
paying a larger bonus following the first success, achieving high output once before reverting
to the zero-effort equilibrium is strictly better than receiving zero effort throughout.
Proposition 3. If 7rL is such that the low type cannot obtain effort when her type is known,
then an equilibrium in which the two types separate through the contract offered and the high
type obtains high effort with positive probability cannot exist.
Proof. Assume that such an equilibrium did exist. That is, the high type can offer some
contract (bt, st) that generates belief Pr[0 = OHI{st, bt}] = 1, and which induces the agent to
supply effort with positive probability. We know that the low type cannot elicit effort from
the worker in this case, and so her payoff in a separating equilibrium will be YL - Uo in every
period. Now consider the deviation in which the low type offers the same bonus payment
as the high type. Given assumption 1, the agent's belief will not be influenced by the fixed
salary offered and so the low type does not need to match the high type's fixed salary st;
this also implies that the high type has no reason to offer a salary greater than that needed
to ensure the agent participates. By offering this bonus, the low type can induce the agent
to supply effort. If output is low, then no bonus payment is required, and so the agent will
not update his beliefs if it is not paid. Otherwise, if output is high, the low type can renege
on the bonus. If she does so, the agent will cease to supply effort, leaving the low type with
the same payoff as she would have obtained by offering the low-type contract at the start of
the game. Therefore the low-type must be made better off by deviating and imitating the
high type in order to achieve high output once, without making any bonus payments. L
Although the types cannot separate through the contract offered, given that the low type
can never be made worse off than she will be through separating at the beginning of the game
and never obtaining any effort, the types may be able to separate on the equilibrium path if
the high type can pay a bonus on which the low type would always prefer to renege. We can
therefore consider an equilibrium of the following form: at the start of each period the high
type of principal will offer a bonus b(pt) conditional on success. This bonus will be sufficiently
large that the low type will never pay it, but the high type will. Therefore, following output
yt = YH, the high type will pay the bonus and the low type renege, leading the agent to
assign Pr[O = OH y = YH,bt = b(pt)] = 1, and Pr[9 = OH y = YH,bt # b(Pt)] = 0.
The following conditions are necessary for the bonus payment b(pt) to support separation
at the end of period t. Firstly, it must be such that the low type prefers to renege on the
bonus and take her outside option of zero effort in all future periods. That is, even if after
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paying the bonus the agent will attach probability 1 to the principal being the high type,
the low type must still prefer to renege:
-b+ [IrL(YH - bH) + (1 - irL) YL - S] < (YL - S) (3.2)
1-3 1-5
where bH is the bonus that will induce the agent to supply high effort when pt = 1, i.e.,
bH = $.
Secondly, the bonus must be incentive compatible for the high type, given that paying
it will ensure that the agent believes that the principal is the high type with probability 1:
-b+ [7rH(YH - bH) + (1 - lrH)YL - s]> (YL - S) (3-3)1-6 1-3
Thirdly, the agent must be willing to supply high effort, given the promised bonus and
her belief about the probability that it will be paid. In each period t, the agent will attach
probability pt to the principal being a high type, and the probability of success conditional
on the principal being this type is 7rH. The agent's expected payoff in this case is:
U(pt,b) = s - c + pt rH[b + SU(pt+1 = 1)] + (1 - pt)7rL6U(pt+1 = 0)
+[pt(1 - WH) + (1 - pt)(1 - 1L)]U(pt+1(Yt = YL)) (3.4)
where U(pt+1 = 1) = iUo is the agent's continuation value if he is paid the bonus and
so attaches probability 1 to the principal being the high type; U(pt+1 = 0) = 1Uo is the
continuation value when he is convinced the principal is the low type;1 and U(pt+1(yt = YL))
is the agent's continuation value if output is low. In this last case, since output is low, neither
type will pay the bonus and so the agent cannot be certain about the principal's type, but
nonetheless he will update his beliefs as shown above.
The agent will be willing to supply effort if
1
U(pt, b) ;> Uo (3.5)
In order to pin down the agent's continuation value, we must consider two cases. Since
the principal has the bargaining power, she will set the minimum bonus necessary given
that this bonus must both induce separation and be sufficiently large to motivate the agent.
For the latter, the size of the bonus will therefore depend on the agent's belief about the
likelihood that the bonus will be paid: Pr[bt = b] = P.lH-2 Therefore the required bonus b
will depend on which of these constraints binds.
First consider the case in which the agent's incentive constraint binds in period t, given
'Since the principal has the bargaining power, the agent can be held to his outside option in either case
2 Note that in this equilibrium neither type will ever pay a smaller bonus: on observing a smaller bonus
the agent will update her beliefs to p(bt # b) = 0, and will therefore provide no effort in the future. Therefore
if the principal is to renege on the bonus it is optimal to do so by setting bt = 0.
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some bonus b(pt). Assume that the agent provided high effort, but output was low. In the
subsequent period the principal must promise a higher bonus to induce the agent to supply
effort, in which case the incentive constraint will once again hold with equality, and so
U(pt+1(yt = YL)) = 1 Uo.
However as pt decreases, the bonus required to induce the agent to supply effort increases.
This bonus may eventually reach a level at which it is no longer incentive compatible for the
high type. In this case the agent will cease to provide any effort, and will therefore never
expect to receive a bonus payment, and so
1
U(pt+1(yt - YL)) = Uo.
This expression for the agent's continuation value relies on the fact that the principal can
hold the agent to his outside option in every period. This assumption can be justified from
the fact that the principal has the option of hiring another agent in the future, who will have
observed the history of output and the transfers paid. This implies that once the principal
has succeeded in conveying her type, it will also be known to all other potential agents. She
would therefore have the option of offering a different agent the minimum bonus bH = c/7rH
required to induce the agent to supply effort. This restriction rules out an equilibrium in
which the principal obtains effort from the agent by not only promising a higher bonus
after the first success, but by also promising higher bonuses in the future, i.e. by promising
to transfer surplus to the worker. If the principal can obtain effort from a different agent
through a contract that allocates all surplus to the principal then any promises to pay a
larger bonus in the future, after the types have separated, will not be credible.
This implies that in the case in which the agent's effort constraint binds, equation (3.4)
reduces to
-c + ptrHb+ 1 Uo _> Uo
1U -> 1 -- o
which implies that b > c . Otherwise, it will be the low type's reneging constraint that
binds, and so the high type can induce separation by paying the minimum bonus such that
the low type will prefer to renege.
Proposition 4. There exists an equilibrium in which in every period t if
c(1 - 6)pt ;> p = - ~ )(3.6)
7rH6(rH(YH - YL) - c(
then the agent supplies effort et = 1 and the two types separate if high output is produced.
This result follows immediately from the preceding analysis. The principal can induce
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separation following high output in period t by promising a bonus
b(pt) = max [7rL (YH - YL) - C--- , (3.7)
We only need to verify that the high type's promise to pay the bonus b is credible. We know
that if
b(pt)= 1 rL(YH - YL) -C---
then the high type must be willing to pay the bonus; in this case the low type is indifferent,
but the continuation value for the high type is strictly greater than for the low type. Other-
wise, if the agent's incentive constraint binds, then the bonus required to obtain effort must
be credible for the high type, which requires that:
c 6
b(pt) < - < [7rH(YH - YL) - C], (3.8)
pt7rH 1 -6
which is equivalent to the expression above.
I now turn to the dynamics of this equilibrium. Since the bonus payment necessary to
induce separation may depend on the agent's belief, if the high type is unsuccessful at the
beginning of the game then the amount she will need to pay the agent following the first
success may increase. Figure (1) gives an example of how the promised bonus may vary over
time. At the start of the game, the binding constraint on the bonus is that the low type
will not imitate the high type. In this case the required bonus does not depend on pt, but
must exceed the low type's expected gain from paying the bonus and successfully imitating
the high type. For pt sufficiently high, the agent will attach a high enough probability ptlrH
to receiving the bonus that he will be willing to supply effort. However following a run
of low output the agent's belief will deteriorate. Eventually the agent's effort constraint
will bind, and so the principal will need to increase the promised bonus payment in order
to ensure that the agent still supplies effort. Since the necessary bonus payment is now
decreasing in pt, with every successive failure the promised bonus must increase further.
If the required bonus payment reaches a point at which it is no longer credible, given the
principal's continuation value, then the agent will cease to supply effort. This will occur
when pt < p, i.e. when the agent's belief falls below the threshold defined in equation (3.6).
At this point the agent will no longer supply effort, and so the promised bonus is irrelevant.
Figure (1) shows the point at which this may occur, assuming a history in which yt = YL for
all t. If, at any time t output had been high, the high type would have paid the promised
bonus while the low type would renege. This would be sufficient to separate the two types,
after which the high-type principal could revert to paying the optimal bonus bH, indicated
by crosses in the figure.
We can see from this analysis that not only is the high-type principal unable to separate
through the contract offered at the start of the game, but that she may not be able to
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Figure 3-1: Evolution of the bonus payment and the agent's beliefs after successive failures
separate at all if there is a run of low output at the start of the game. This example also
suggests that firms that have recently suffered a run of poor results may need to do a lot
to restore worker confidence, and in particular will be prepared to pay a much larger bonus
after a period of low output than after a period of greater success, even though we may
imagine that the firm's balance sheet is healthier in the latter case.
3.3.3 Equilibrium in which both types pool in the short-run
I now consider whether the high type will want to offer the bonus that induces separation,
given that she may be able to do better by initially pooling with the low type, optimistic
that eventually the agent's beliefs will update, allowing her to pay a bonus approximately
equal to that which she would pay in the game with full information. In this section I show
that whilst a long-run pooling equilibrium is not possible, at the start of the game both
types may be willing to promise, and pay, the same bonus. In this case the necessary bonus
will depend on the agent's beliefs, which in turn depend on the history of output. I show
that if the principal is in fact a high type then in general the long-run bonus that she will
pay will approach the same level as in the separating equilibrium; however there is a risk
that if output is low for successive periods at the start of the game then the agent will cease
to supply effort, and therefore no longer update his beliefs. In contrast, if the principal is a
low type then the agent's belief will eventually decrease to a point at which the necessary
bonus is only credible for the high-type, and in this case separation must occur following
high output.
We know that the optimal bonus defined in equation (3.7) will induce separation after
high output is produced, provided that pt is such that the agent is willing to supply high
effort. However we could also consider an equilibrium in which the following bonus is offered
in period t:
[7=c (3.9)
PtAH - (1 ~ Pt)>'L
This bonus will be sufficient to induce effort from the agent if he believes that both types
of principal will pay the bonus, given their expected future surplus. I now find conditions
97
11
under which such an equilibrium will exist at the start of the game, and consider when the
high-type will prefer to initially pool with the low type rather than attempting to induce
separation. Since the low-type of principal cannot obtain effort in a separating equilibrium,
we know that the bonus required to obtain effort from the agent bL > C/7rL cannot be
credibly promised by the low type, and so
c 07r(YH YL)
7rL 1 - 6  06L
Given that 7rH > 7rL, for any pt > 0, b < bL. Therefore it may be the case that the low
type can commit to this bonus, given his continuation value. I will consider three cases: (i)
the case in which the low-type can never credibly promise this bonus, whatever the agent's
belief after the bonus is paid; (ii) that in which the low type may be willing to pay the
bonus, if the agent's belief after receiving the bonus is sufficiently high; and (iii) that in
which the low type strictly prefers to pay this bonus than to renege. In the first case,
the equilibrium defined above, which induces separation after the first success, will be the
unique equilibrium in which positive effort is supplied. In the second case, we will have a
semi-separating equilibrium in which the low-type pays the bonus with some probability;
this probability will be defined so as to set the agent's belief following payment, and hence
the bonus in subsequent periods, such that the expected continuation surplus for the low
type makes her indifferent. In the third case we will see pooling at the start of the game, but
as pt decreases the game will move to either the semi-separating or fully separating phase.
I will consider each of these possibilities in turn.
In the first case, the low type is unwilling to pay the bonus bt = regar--PssPt7rH+(1- pt)TL rgrls
of the agent's belief after receiving the payment. In particular, this implies that the low
type would renege on the bonus even if paying it induced the agent to believe that Pt+1(Yt =
YH, bt = bt) = 1, i.e., that the principal must be the high type. This implies that
b t = c 0 'rL(CH - L ) -C
Pt rH + (1 - Pt)lrL 1 - 0 . iHrL
and so the pooling bonus is greater than the bonus required to induce separation. Therefore
the only bonus that can induce the agent to supply effort is one that only the high-type
would pay. As long as the high type is in fact willing to pay this bonus b = c/ptrH (since
the agent knows the low type will not pay, regardless of output), this will be the unique
equilibrium of the game.
Proposition 5. If
c 0c> 6-[7r(YH 
- YL - C|
PrH + (1 - p)rL 16 (
then the equilibrium that induces separation after high output is first realised is the unique
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equilibrium for which el > 0.
I now consider the second case, in which there may be a semi-separating equilibrium in
which the low type pays the promised bonus with probability #. This will occur if
6
-bt + E [U(OL,Pt+1(Yt = YL,bt =bt))I < j (YL - Uo)
for Pt+1 - ptrH - but
c 6
- + 6E[UF(8L, tp+1 = 1)] > (YL - Uo).
Pt7rH -
This means that the bonus payment is such that if both types pay, then the low type's
expected continuation surplus, given the way in which she expects the agent's beliefs to
evolve, is insufficient to induce the low type to pay the bonus. If this were the case, then
following receipt of the bonus the agent should attach probability 1 to the principal being
the high type, and accept a smaller bonus c/rH in the future. However the low-type would
then be willing to pay the bonus, given the future surplus she could obtain by successfully
imitating the high type. This implies that there will exist a semi-separating equilibrium in
each period in which the low-type reneges on the bonus with probability #, where:
6
-bt (pt, 4) + 6E[U(OL, Pt+1(yt YH, bt = bt(Pt, 4), )] = _ (YL - Uo)
Pt+i(Yt = YH, bt = t(pt,q),q) = Pt
1 H
Pt~rH + (1 - Pt)0rL
bt (pt, #) =
PtAH +(1 - Pt)#7L
The first of these conditions ensures that the low type is indifferent between paying the bonus
and reneging, given her continuation value E[U7(OL,Pt+1(Yt = YH, bt = bt(pt), d)] which is
a function of her type and the agent's updated belief. The second expression defines this
updated belief as a function of 4. The third expression ensures that the promised bonus
bt(pt, 4) is sufficient to induce the agent to supply effort, given that he knows there is a
positive probability that the principal may be a low type and renege.
The third case is that in which the low-type strictly prefers to pay the minimum bonus
b required to obtain effort from the agent to reneging and obtaining zero effort for the rest
of the game. This requires that
6
-bt± + E[(OL, P+1(yt =Y L, bt = 6t))I ;> (YL - Uo),
meaning that this equilibrium can only exist for strictly greater values of pt than the semi-
separating or separating equilibria.
We can now consider how the low-type's continuation surplus will evolve, and how that
will determine which of these three outcomes may occur in any period. In the first case the
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agent knows that the low type will never pay the bonus c/ptlrH, and so this is the same as
in the equilibrium in which separation is induced after the first success. Following a success
therefore, if the bonus is paid then the agent will attach probability 1 to the principal being
a high type; this type can subsequently pay the bonus bH, and receive effort et = 1 in every
period. Following a failure, pt will deteriorate, implying that the bonus must increase in
subsequent periods in order to persuade the agent to supply effort. Eventually we will reach
a point at which pt < 5, and so the bonus necessary for the agent to supply effort is such
that even the high type would prefer to renege; anticipating this, the agent will cease to
supply any effort.
This equilibrium in which separation is induced after the first success is absorbing, in
the sense that once pt is such that this is the unique outcome in period t, the game will
never revert to one of the other equilibria in which the low type pays the bonus with positive
probability. This is because if output is high full separation will occur, but if output is low
the agent's beliefs can only decrease further, implying that the bonus will increase and so
will still not be credible for the low type.
In contrast, if pt is such that either the semi-separating or pooling outcome is possible
in period t, then we may see the parties move between these phases. For example if pt
is high, and therefore b smaller, the bonus may be credible for both types. Following a
success, therefore, both types will pay the bonus and so pt+1 > pt, reducing the requisite
bonus further, increasing the continuation value for the low type, and ensuring that this
pooling outcome will exist in the following period. On the other hand, if output is low then
pt+1 < pt: in this case we may move from the phase in which the low type always pays the
bonus to that in which she randomises, or to the separating phase in which the low type
will never pay the bonus. Moreover, we know from Lemma 1 that as t -+ oo, if the principal
is in fact a low type, then the agent's belief must tend towards zero, implying that it must
eventually fall below p, and so in the long-run the low-type will be unable to obtain any
effort from the agent.
Figures (2) and (3) show two possible histories, in which the principal is a high type
and a low type respectively. In the first figure, we can see the evolution of the bonus
payment required to elicit costly effort from the agent as his beliefs evolve. Over time, the
agent's belief that the principal is a high type approaches 1, and so the high-type principal
can obtain effort by promising approximately the same bonus as she would in a separating
equilibrium. Moreover, by this point low output in a particular period has little effect on the
agent's beliefs, and so the bonus will remain fairly constant. We can contrast this outcome
when the principal is a high type with that in which the principal is a low type. In this
example, the low type is able to obtain effort from the agent at the start of the game. That
is, early successes mean that the agent's belief about the principal's type is quite high, and
so the low type can obtain effort by promising a smaller bonus, one which she is willing to
pay. However following a run of low output the agent's belief deteriorates, and so in order
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Figure 3-2: Example: equilibrium with initial pooling when the principal is a high type
to obtain high effort the bonus must increase. In particular, the bonus will increase rapidly
once it has reached a level at which the low type will renege. In this case if high output is
achieved the two types will separate: the low type will renege and so the agent will update
his belief to pt(yt YH, bt s0) i 0.
We can also see from this example that a low type is more likely to completely separate
than a high type. In this case full separation will only occur if in some period t the bonus
payment required to induce effort is such that the high type will pay the bonus following
high output, but the low type will renege. However the bonus payment will only reach this
level when pt is small, that is, if output has frequently been low. Given the differences
in success probabilities 7rH and 7rs, such a history is more likely if the agent is in fact a
low type. In contrast, if the principal is a high type then we will expect to see more early
successes, which will increase the agent's belief pt, reducing the necessary bonus and making
full separation (i.e., the agent assigning belief pt = 1 to the principal being a high type)
less likely. In this case early successes, rewarded with more moderate bonus payments, are
sufficient to build tha agent's confidence in the principal's type, and so she will not need to
make stronger promises the agent in order to obtain this trust and secure the future of the
relationship.
3.3.4 Optimal equilibrium for the high-type
Having considered the two possible equilibria in which the agent supplies effort at the start
of the game, I now turn to the question of which is optimal. The high type faces a trade-off
here: if she initially pools with the low type then in expectation the agent will update his
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Figure 3-3: Example: equilibrium with initial pooling when the principal is a low type
beliefs in such a way that the long-run equilibrium will be the same as following separation.
However this learning may take a long time. In contrast, if she promises a larger bonus
following the first success then the high type will expect separation to occur more quickly,
but she must incur this greater cost. In either case there is a risk that the agent's belief
may deteriorate to a level at which he no longer supplies effort; this is a greater risk in
the pooling equilibrium, since in the separating equilibrium only one success is required to
ensure this outcome will not occur.
In this section I show that the high type will prefer to offer a larger bonus after the first
success in order to distinguish herself if learning is otherwise likely to be slow, or if the bonus
payments at the start of the game in the pooling equilibrium will be large. This implies that
the separating equilibrium is preferred if p is small, or if the difference between 7rH and 7rL is
small. We can see these results by comparing the expected surplus to a high type principal
from the pooling equilibrium and the separating equilibrium. This expected surplus must
be computed numerically, and figure (4) shows how it varies with p, the probability that the
principal is in fact the high type, and lrH - 7rL, the difference in success rates.
As noted in Lemma (2), there are parameter values for which the separating equilibrium
is the unique equilibrium in which effort is supplied, since the bonus required to elicit effort
from the agent is such that the low type will always renege. We also saw above that even
if the relationship begins in a pooling equilibrium in which both types pay the promised
bonus, after certain histories the relationship may move into this separating phase, even
if the principal is in fact a high type. Moreover, the principal herself may wish to switch
initially attempting to pool with the low type, to promising a larger bonus payment that
would induce separation following the next instance of high output. We can see this by
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Figure 3-4: Comparing the expected payoffs from pooling vs. inducing separation
comparing the expected payoffs from the two equilibria as a function of p. If output is low
at the start of the game then the agent's belief deteriorates: this both increases the bonus
that must be paid, and increases the risk of the agent withdrawing effort altogether. The
high type might therefore want to increase the promised bonus beyond that required to
obtain effort from the agent: for p small, the increase in the bonus paid following the first
success will be small, and a single realisation of high output is sufficient to ensure that the
high type receives high effort for the remainder of the game.
In contrast, the principal will never abandon a strategy of attempting to separate in
favour of pooling with the lower type: pooling will only be preferred if pt has increased
compared to pi = p. However this can only occur following a success, in which case the high
type will have already succeeded in fully separating by paying the larger bonus.
These results suggest that if the agent's belief p at the start of the game is high then we
would expect to see both types promising and paying the same bonus payments. During a
run of high performance, the agent's trust in the firm will increase and there will be no need
for bonus payments to increase. However, following a run of poor performance the agent's
beliefs will decrease. Even if the types continue to pool, we would therefore expect to see
higher bonuses being paid as the firm starts to recover and output increases. This effect will
be amplified if pt has dropped to the level at which the high type now prefers to separate
at the earliest opportunity, rather than risk being trapped in the long-run equilibrium in
which no effort is supplied. In this case some firms may pay much larger bonuses after a
period of poor performance, whilst others will renege and accept that the agent will punish
this by ceasing to supply effort. This result suggests that we may see greater heterogeneity
in bonus payments, and more breakdowns in firm-employee relationships as companies start
to recover from a period of economic turmoil.
3.4 Matching the Market
In this section I extend the model to allow for the possibility that the agent may receive a
signal of the output of a high-type principal. That is, the agent learns the probability that
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his effort would have generated high output, were the principal in fact a high type. The agent
will take this information into account when updating his beliefs: in particular, were output
low following a favourable signal the agent will attach less weight to the principal being a
high type than were the signal unfavourable. I show that this will affect the equilibrium in
two ways. Firstly, by influencing the agent's beliefs the signal will affect the dynamics of the
bonus payment. In particular, if a run of low output is accompanied by signals suggesting
that the high type is unlikely to produce high output then there is less need for the bonus
payment to increase. However if the agent receives an indication that the high type should
have produced high output then this will put more pressure on the bonus. Secondly, the
signal may determine whether or not the principal wishes to pay a promised bonus payment,
given that it will influence the continuation value.
We can think of this signal as an indication of market conditions, or the performance of
similar firms. In this case the agent will compare the performance of the principal against
the performance of those he regards as her competitors. If similar firms appear to be doing
badly, that it, if the signal is bad, then the agent is less inclined to consider the principal
to be a bad type when output is low. However if the signal is high, and so other firms
appear to be doing well, then the agent will be quicker to update his beliefs and potentially
to withdraw effort altogether. This indicator of market performance also affects the firm's
incentive to pay a bonus: if competitors appear to be doing well then there is greater value
in "matching the market" and paying the bonus; if not, then the firm has a greater incentive
to renege.
Let the signal received by the agent at E {0, 1} indicates whether or not the high-type
will generate output yt = YH, conditional on et = 1. Assume that the signal is correct with
probability q > 1/2. That is, Pr[yt = YHIO = OH, at = 1] = Pr[yt = YL|0 = OH, -t = 0) = q.
I will assume that the likelihood of high output being generated is independent across types,
and therefore that the signal tells the agent nothing about the probability of the low-type
generating high output in any period. I will assume that this signal is observed by both the
principal and the agent at the same time as output is observed. Therefore the realisation
of this signal will not affect the principal's choice of bonus offered, or the agent's choice of
effort, but it may determine whether or not the bonus is paid, and the agent's inference
about the principal's type.
The agent will now condition his beliefs both on his observation of output and on the
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signal received. Specifically, the agent's beliefs will now take the following form:
pt+1(YH, O- = 1) = qptlrH
qPt~rH + 0.5(1 - pt)7rL
pt+1(YH, J = 0) = (1 - q)PtlrH(1 - q)pt-rH + 0.5(1 - pt)1rL
pt (YLa= 1) = (1 - q)pt(1 - 1rH)(1 - q)pt(1 - 7rH) + 0.5(1 - pt)(1 - 7L)
pt+1(YL, O- = 0) =qpt(1 - rH)
qpt(1 - 7rH) + 0.5(1 - pt)(1 - 7rL)
3.4.1 Inducing separation through payment of the bonus.
I first illustrate how the introduction of this signal will affect the bonus payment that must
be promised in the equilibrium in which the high type endeavours to induce separation at
the earliest opportunity. In this case we will see less upward pressure on the bonus payment
during a run of low output if the signal is low, that is, if the agent believes that all firms
are performing poorly. However the bonus will increase more rapidly, and the relationship
will be more likely to break down as the agent ceases to supply effort, if the signal suggests
that market conditions are good.
As in the baseline model, if the low type is unable to obtain effort when the agent knows
her type, then it will not be possible for the two types to separate through the contract
offered; the low type will always have an incentive to imitate the high type in order to try
and obtain high output once, and then reneging on the bonus. However the high type may
be able to induce output following the first success by promising a bonus payment on which
the low type would always prefer to renege. As discussed above, the bonus necessary to
induce separation in this case must be sufficient to induce effort from the agent, and to
ensure that the low type doesn't wish to imitate. The bonus will be the minimum value
of b that satisfies these constraints, subject to being credible for the high type. After a
run of successive failures the agent's belief will deteriorate, increasing the necessary bonus
payment. However the agent's belief will now depend not only on output and his prior, but
also on the signal. In particular, if the agent's signal suggests that output should be high,
were the principal a high type, then low output will lead to a greater decrease in this beliefs.
We can see this in figure (5) below, which shows the evolution of the agent's beliefs and the
bonus promised, given the signal, if output is low in every period
Figure (5) shows how the bonus payment required to induce separation will vary with
the agent's belief, which in turn depends on the signal received. The right-hand figure shows
these signals: in periods in which the signal is zero, and so the agent does not expect the
high type to generate high output, we see only a small decrease in the agent's beliefs, despite
successive failures. When the signal is one, and so the agent expects the high type to have
produced high output in that period, the belief decreases more sharply; once the agent's
incentive constraint has started to bind this in turn drives up the promised bonus payment.
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Figure 3-5: Dynamics of the bonus payment with the signal
Eventually the magnitude of the bonus, combined with the signal U17 = 1 means that the
agent's belief deteriorates to the point at which the bonus payment necessary to induce
effort is not credible for either type.
In this case the signal only affects whether or not the bonus is paid insofar as it determines
the agent's beliefs and hence the magnitude of the bonus; it does not affect the continuation
value. This is because whenever this bonus is paid it must be case that the two types
separate. Since output is observed, failure to pay the bonus leads to the agent ceasing to
supply effort in all subsequent periods. Alternatively, if the bonus is paid then the agent
attaches probability 1 to the principal being the high type and so the signal cannot affect
his beliefs in the future.
We can see from the above figure that as in the baseline case there may be histories in
which the high type is unable to separate and so remains trapped in an equilibrium in which
the agent supplies no effort. The effects of a more informative signal are ambiguous. We
know that one success is sufficient to separate the types (and thereafter the signal becomes
irrelevant), so consider the case in which the principal is a high type, but suffers successive
failures. If the signal is more accurate, then it is likely that the agent will receive a signal
that the high type is unable to supply effort: in this case his beliefs will not deteriorate
following observations of low output. This gives the principal more time to obtain the single
success which can ensure the survival of the relationship. However for q sufficiently large
one incorrect signal suggesting that the high type should have achieved high output may be
enough to lower the agent's beliefs to a point at which he ceases to supply effort altogether.
3.4.2 Equilibrium in which types pool in the short run
I now consider the equilibrium in which the types may pool in the short run, and so both
types may promise, and pay, the same bonus in early time periods. In this case the principal's
decision regarding whether or not to pay the bonus in a particular time period may depend on
the signal at observed during that period, not only on how prior signals {;}4 have affected
the bonus payment that must be promised in period t. This is because the signal in period t
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will determine the agent's beliefs in the future, and hence the principal's continuation value.
The continuation value will be higher if the signal is one than if the signal is zero, and this
difference may convince the low-type principal to pay a bonus when otherwise she would
have reneged. In this case the pressure to "match the market", i.e., to behave as if a high
type, may convince the principal to pay the bonus; conversely, if output is low in this case
then this will lead to a greater decrease in the agent's belief, and he may cease to supply
effort.
Assume that at the start of period t both types promise a bonus payment b conditional
on high output. As in the baseline game, there are three potential outcomes in each period:
that in which both types pay, and so continue to pool; a semi-separating case in which
the low type pays the bonus with some probability, where that probability will determine
the agent's beliefs and hence the continuation value; and the case in which only the high
type will pay, and so any success must induce separation. From above, we know that the
conditions for an equilibrium in each period are:
bt (pt, 4) + (YL - Uo) = 6E[1I(OL, pt+1(YH, bt = bt (pt,), ,ot),
pt± 1 (YH, bt bt(pt,4 ort) = (o-tq + (1 - -t)(1 - q))PtlrH(atq + (1 - ot)(1 - q))PtlrH + 0.5(1 - Pt)#7rL
bt (pt, 4) =
PtIrH + (1 - Pt)#lrL
where #~is the probability that the low type pays the bonus: if # = 0 we have complete
separation following a success, if 4 = 1 the types continue to pool, and for 4 E (0, 1) there
will be partial separation. In this case the expected continuation value for the principal will
also depend on or, since this will influence the agent's future beliefs, and thus the bonuses
that must be promised in subsequent periods. By influencing the continuation surplus, the
signal will therefore also influence the principal's incentive to pay the bonus.
Proposition 6. There exist bonus payments bt(pt) on which the principal will renege with
positive probability if at = 0, but will pay with certainty if ot = 1
Proof. We can compare the expected continuation surplus E[II(OL,Pt+1(YH, bt = bt(pt, ), , ot)]
for at = 1 and ot = 0; since q > 1/2, we must have
qPt7rH (1 - q)Pt7rH
qpt 7H + 0.5(1 - Pt)lrL (1 - q)ptlrH + 0.5(1 - pt)lrL
and so probability that the agent attaches to the principal being a high type will be greater
if o- = 1 than if a = 0. This implies that the bonus payment the agent must be promised in
the following period is lower, since there is a higher probability of payment. Moreover, con-
ditional on output and the signal, beliefs in all subsequent periods will be higher. Therefore
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the expected continuation value following a positive signal is higher:
E[HJ(OL,pt+1(YH,bt = b,4, at = 1)] > E[fl(OL,Pt+1(YH,bt = b0,$,at = 0)].
This in turn increases the bonus payment that the low type is willing to pay. In particular,
for certain b we can have:
6E[H(OL, pt+1 (YH, bt = b, 0, t = 0)] < b+ J(M - UO)< 6E[H(OL, pt+1(YH, bt = b,#,at = 1)].1 - 6
In this case the low-type would prefer to renege on the bonus payment were the signal
low, but pay if the signal suggests that the high-type would be able to do so. Whilst this
outcome will not occur in equilibrium (since this would imply that Pt+1 (YH, at = 0, b) =
1 > Pt+1(YH, ut = 1, b) if the low type reneges with certainty), the low type will renege
with positive probability following a low signal, but always pays the bonus following a high
signal. This payment probability 4 will be determined so as to ensure that the low type is
indifferent between paying and reneging, given the continuation value. E
We can compare this outcome to that in the baseline equilibrium, or equivalently, to
that when the signal conveys no information: q = 1/2. Assume that in this case pt and
the bonus bt(pt) are such that the low type will pay the bonus some probability, given the
concomitant continuation value. If q increases, then paying the bonus following a positive
signal generates a higher continuation value and so must be preferred; if the signal is low
then the continuation surplus decreases, and the agent will mix and pay the bonus with some
probability. The more accurate the signal, the more value there is to a low-type principal in
paying the the bonus and attempting to match the performance of fier perceived competitors
following a positive signal. On the other hand, if the signal suggests that high types are
unlikely to have received high output (- = 0), then high output may convey a negative
impression to the agent. 3 In this case the principal prefers to renege on the bonus, since the
agent would infer her type and cease to supply effort anyway.
In addition to affecting the principal's incentives to pay the bonus in period t, the signal
at also influences the bonus payments that will be promised in the future, similarly to in
the separating equilibrium described above. Again, this implies that even if output is low
for successive periods, if the signal suggests that other firms are likely to performing badly,
the agent will not punish poor performance by expecting much larger bonus payments in
the future, or by ceasing to supply effort. The greatest pressure on bonus payments, and
3 In this case, where output is independent across types the signal conveys no information about the
expected output of a low type. This implies that if at = 0 but yt = YH the weight the agent attaches to
the principal being a high type decreases: that is, the positive signal from high output is outweighed by the
negative signal. We could imagine this happening if unexpected success whilst other firms are performing
badly is regarded as suspicious or indicative of fraudulent activities. An alternative structure could have
output not be independent across types: for example we could imagine that a low type would achieve success
only if a high type also would. In this case high output would reveal that a signal at = 0 must be incorrect.
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the greatest risk of the agent's belief deteriorating to a level at which he is no longer willing
to supply effort therefore comes when the signal is positive, but output low. Therefore we
would expect to see bonuses increase rapidly after a downturn as firms face greater pressure
to prove their quality during the recovery. This will be accompanied by greater heterogeneity
in firm performance both because those who fail to achieve high output are more likely to
see the agent withdraw effort altogether, and because the higher bonus payments are more
likely to induce separation as the low types renege.
3.5 Conclusion
This paper considered a model of relational contracting in which the principal's type de-
termines the probability of high effort generating high output, where this type is privately
known to the principal. In this setting the bonus payment required to elicit effort from the
principal will be driven by the agent's beliefs, which depend on his observations of output.
In particular, the promised bonus payment must increase following a run of poor perfor-
mance; this is necessary to maintain the agent's confidence in the firm and ensure that he
continues to supply effort. We can distinguish between the equilibrium in which the high
type tries to induce separation by paying a larger bonus following the first success, and
that in which both types promise, and pay, the same bonus initially until the agent's beliefs
gradually update. The separating equilibrium is likely to be preferred by the high type when
the belief the agent attaches to this type is lower. This implies that following a period of
poor performance during which the agent's belief has declined the principal may be more
inclined to try and induce separation at the earliest opportunity, even though this requires
a larger bonus. Therefore we may expect to see firms paying larger bonuses after a run of
poor performance, or as they emerge from a downturn, even though we would imagine that
they may have less resources to do so.
The paper then considers this need to match the expectations of the agent more explicitly
by augmenting the model to include a signal than may be interpreted as an indicator of
market conditions or the performance of potential competitors. In this case we will see
less pressure on the firm to prove its type, and hence less pressure on the bonus payments,
if the signal suggests that high-type firms are unlikely to be performing well. However if
the agent receives information that suggests that a high-type principal should be producing
high output then he will judge underperformance more harshly, and this will exacerbate the
pressure on the principal to prove her quality. The signal will affect not only the bonus
that must be promised to the agent in order to maintain his confidence, but may also affect
the principal's decision of whether or not to pay. In particular, the principal's continuation
value from paying a bonus is greater following a positive signal, that is, when the agent
expects a high type to produce high output. In this case we may see firms paying a bonus
in order to match the market and keep up with those perceived as leading firms.
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